Just thought.. strange.. Aymeric never bails out of a discussion, and guess what, I overlooked his reply! Here we go.
On Mon, Jun 27, 2016 at 01:00:14PM +0200, Aymeric Vitte wrote: > > Do you know of any other technology that does so with comparable dedication? > > Is the spy detection for bittorrent that you implemented (and mention > > further below) similar to this? > > Probably it is, but as stated I did not understand very well the > presentation, is there some paper or more detailed document about it? https://gnunet.org/cadet > > Hm, I have a feeling you are describing how gnunet works. Nodes that see > > each other keep on communicating to each other also after a restart, but > > whenever a new route needs to be discovered, it's time to use the DHT > > with the hardened CADET technique. This way it can cross network boundaries, > > reach into censorship-friendly countries, operate over mesh networks. That > > extra post-broken-Internet capability does not make gnunet less efficient > > over the broken Internet. > > It's similar indeed, I believe each system designed for > privacy/anonymity have similarities, maybe something different with > Convergence/Peersm is that no direct routes are established toward the > peers and data are relayed by rdv points to which the peers are > connected via two Tor hops, but one might finally consider that the > routes through the rdv points are direct ones, another difference is > that peers do not advertise themselves in the DHT, others are doing it > for them, one idea behind this (other than countering sybil attacks) is > to make sure that the peers cannot freeride Interesting, I think gnunet does it differently.. there's some game theory in there. But that's outside my competence scope. > >>> Also why do people even > >>> think of using an insecure file sharing tool (Bittorrent) over an > >>> anonymizing network that isn't designed for it if they can use a > >>> file sharing system that is designed to be anonymous? gnunet-fs works > >>> great from what I've seen... > >> gnunet-fs has probably not 200 M peers and associated content, probably > > Tor also doesn't have 200 M bittorrent peers. If those peers are all > > outside of Tor, then what's the point? Is anonymity only for a few? > > I did not get this, what do you mean? What peers outside of what Tor? You are alluding to bittorrent's 200 M peers, right? Well, those are on clearnet, correct? We can expect that Tor would not be able to scale to handle them all, it can only help some freeloaders cover their identity. gnunet-fs has not seen much popularity but it has been tested in simulations on university supercomputers with some million virtual users. > > Yes. At first it may make sense to play lego and put two things > > together, one for the file sharing and the other for anonymity. > > But it doesn't scale up. > > Neither works and/or achieves its goal, perfect example is > https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live#deanonymizing-the-vpn-peers You are announcing a bigger scandal than the unwillingness of WebRTC developers to close their deanonymization loophole? Well, let me know when "More to come" is replaced. > > Or maybe it is just a question of patience > > at the expenses of Tor's relay donors. > > Maybe if one day we can add Tor nodes apart from the centralization > system (like inside browsers as Convergence is proposing), if not it has > to be separated But then you are not using potential synergy of multicast and onion routing. If thousands of people are participating in a distribution tree, is it really necessary to have full-fledged OR between each distribution point? I think the anonymous multicast papers have figured out more efficient ways. -- E-mail is public! Talk to me in private using encryption: http://loupsycedyglgamf.onion/LynX/ irc://loupsycedyglgamf.onion:67/lynX https://psyced.org:34443/LynX/ -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
