Not a specialist with gnunet (how does peers discovery works with gnunet?) but one question can be: if you are using onion routing then why are you using gnunet?
I would put a bemol on the (generally widely propagated) statement that a DHT is necessarily insecure and not resistant to sybil attacks, in the Peersm case the nodeIDs are temporary and related to the onion keys of the peers (so sybils can not position themselves where they like in the DHT, which from some research is maybe not enough but makes sybils' work difficult for sure), they expire after each session, the DHT does not contain direct information about the peers but what the peers know about others (ie what the rdv points know about how to reach others), in addition the peers are informing themselves directly about what they know (the rdv point to reach this peerID and/or the introduction point to establish WebRTC connections between two peers), the DHT is used only if nothing is known about a peer, so sybils should invade both layers which seems quite unlikely. As a corollary your section "Onion routing the secushare way" is similar to Peersm, as well as the concepts that 3 hops are not required (2 for Peersm), indeed a peer can't know its position in the path, in addition for Peersm the peers are acting as rdv points AND peers, and circuits can "extend" from a rdv point to others (A wants to reach D, B knows from C that C knows how to reach D, the path goes through two rdv points B and C, each point being connected via two hops), so they can't even know if they are serving the data as the first rdv point acting as a peer, relaying it as the first rdv point, or relaying it as the nth rdv point, or serving it through n rdv points Tor in his current form will never allow to do p2p, as commented here again: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2016-June/041529.html, the only fact that nodes will not extend to nodes that are not registered in the directories just makes this impossible, but as your onion routing solution or mine show we don't need it. Le 21/06/2016 à 19:39, carlo von lynX a écrit : > On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 12:48:38PM -0400, Paul Syverson wrote: >> Well there's things like alpha-mixing (better tau-mixing) as that > Yes, alpha-mixing would be a great step forward I guess. > Would you say the things I wrote on http://secushare.org/anonymity > regarding not building future work on Tor are accurate? > I wouldn't like to be stating anything stupid in there. > -- Get the torrent dynamic blocklist: http://peersm.com/getblocklist Check the 10 M passwords list: http://peersm.com/findmyass Anti-spies and private torrents, dynamic blocklist: http://torrent-live.org Peersm : http://www.peersm.com torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
