After reading your three mails, i have only one thing to say: Clear as water.
Thank a lot for your patience and effort on explaining this for
short-minded like me.
Thanks a lot, REALLY, for your long, detailed and clear answer.
Of course, thanks a lot to Anders (which also suffered me) and others,
for the patience you are showing.
Now, a few comments to some of yours and some questions at the end.
> Here, you mean the keygen operation? I think it has to be the Software
> Security Device. aka, the soft-token ?
When an smartcard is present, and a request to generate a keypair is
made, Mozilla shows a dialog to select the cryptographic device where
the keys are going to be. If im developing a page to "request a
certificate" on the smartcard, i (as a developer) CANT control if the
user selects the card or softokn.
So, if the user doesnt read the BIG warning that i show ("you must
select the CARD!!!"), and never does, the keys are generated on
softokn and that ends in many problems. Starting with the user
thinking the cert is on the smartcard, where is not. Our users know
what "the card" is.
> Some UI tests have shown 99% of those warnings to be ignored. Some
> optimistic tests have shown only 60% are ignored... Some active teaching
> experiences have shown they can get it down to 30% with training, but the
> test repeated after 3 months shows return to bad habits :)
dont tell me.
-------------------->you must select the CARD!!!
> Is your application so valueless that you can cope with that? When using
> smart card systems, you'll notice there are no warnings... because the smart
> card designers at least know that if they rely on warnings, it's game-over.
This proves you havent used spanish DNIe.
Designers decide that, as a warning can be ignored, make sure user
dont ignore the warnings.
So DNIe show 2384729847239874923794 warnings, and i ignore them all.
> Mind you, we don't know how valuable or valueless your application is.
> Perhaps you could tell us what the key pair or signature is used for?
company users need to sign documents (xml/pdf...) or mail
we use FNMT (some guy could be killed for that) certs
we have an smartcard where we put the cert in.
we want users to be able to sign data (webforms or documents) using
web [Actually using Java]
we want users to be able to request certs 'directly' on smartcard
(from a website)
Do you need more details?
I understand "this is a trusted site" is FAR AWAY from "this is a
trusted site that can read my hard drive/execute commands".
Signed applets, at the other hand, have full access, and can access to
the smartcard.
If there are no better options at the moment, shouldnt we
(mozilla/firefox) suport them properly?
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