On 2012-04-19 16:41, helpcrypto helpcrypto wrote:
>> My "solution" to this is to treat all PKI-using applications as complete
>> applications running in trusted code.  W3C tries to do something different,
>> we'll see how that pans out...
> 
> Ok Anders, but you are -again- talking much about your protocol, 

Dear HelpCrypto, I'm not pushing my protocol.  I just don't think
that web-pages should be able to directly address *any* device
but the screen.  If you take PKCS #11 it has a lot of methods and
I haven't a clue how to warn/alert the user when a method is called
in a way that makes sense.

Since you typically need a bunch of calls in order to do something
"pkcs11-ish" you would annoy the user with tons of warning dialogs.

If Mozilla thinks this is viable solution I think it is (about) time to speak 
up!

BTW, I don't think your English is that bad :-)  I'm no pro either :-)

Anders

not
> answering my question (or at least, i didnt get it as clear as water).
> I think, this must be a communication problem between my spanish and
> yours swedish (?). I really sorry for that.
> 
> Im talking about something much more simpler: "Detect a card insertion
> and be sure the card is doing the operation i requested".
> 
> For example:
> Within a browser, i click on "dear card, please, RSA sign this data" button.
> 
> IIUC, you say "that should not be done" or "that is not good for ~ reasons".
> And that is want to know.
> 
> Why, if i request a certificate using a webpage (=generate keypair), i
> cant control if the operation is performed within the card (not in
> softokn)?
> (Using latest build, i can do that operation, but i cant control where
> is done...)
> 
> Actually, if i access an untrusted SSL site, i see a warning "you are
> about to enter on an untrested site..."
> Why i could not see "this page wants to use the smartcard..." warning?
> 
> Maybe, this discussion should be on private to avoid spamming
> dev-tech-crypto list...?
> 

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