On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 at 23:04, Paul Syverson <syver...@itd.nrl.navy.mil> wrote: > The suggestion was that people _stop_ working on > defeating the GPA, which is unrealistic as both too strong (global) > and too weak (passive).
While this may be true in the theoretical sense, it doesn't mean that one can't make correlation attacks less practical. I find it hard to believe that right now NSA, for instance, has Tor traffic analysis tightly integrated into its worldwide communications sniffing framework, simply because it's too much of a logistic problem, and anonymous networks are unlikely to be sufficiently high-profile targets so as to warrant expending the resources to deal with the logistics (yet). But I think that it is entirely believable that NSA has a dedicated project (even if only for research purposes) where the traffic from all known relays (a relatively stable pool of ~3000 nodes?) is sniffed and analyzed — that would be relatively simple to setup and maintain, given the unlimited interception capabilities. And you can combat the latter — by extending and popularizing the entry bridges concept, implementing exit bridges, making all clients relays by default (even if that won't contribute significant bandwidth), etc. -- Maxim Kammerer Liberté Linux (discussion / support: http://dee.su/liberte-contribute) _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
