l MAC all encrypted messages and reject
decryption with invalid MACs.
On Sat, Apr 21, 2012 at 11:19 AM, David Dahl wrote:
> - Original Message -
>> From: "Justin Lebar"
>> To: "David Dahl"
>> Cc: dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
>> Sent: Fri
ebAPI, however, for this internal API, I think we
> should specify it.
Do you mean s/this/the? If so, I totally agree. If not, I'm
confused, because I thought I was looking at the web api. :)
Thanks, David!
-Justin
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rithm, but otoh it's also nice to be able to say "hash this for
me" without worrying about which algorithm(s) the browser supports.
-Justin
On Fri, Apr 20, 2012 at 6:10 AM, David Dahl wrote:
> [Forgot to reply all]
>
> - Forwarded Message -
> From: "David Dah
is
unlikely anyone read this page" message that Firefox prints just after
giving the content encryption strength.
Justin
On Aug 20, 6:02 am, Ian G wrote:
> On 19/08/2009 20:30, Justin wells wrote:
>
> > Plainly the concern is that 256 bit AES does you no good if they AES
> >
on when I click "more information"
and look under "technical information" but I do not see anywhere
details of the key negotiation that was performed at the TLS level.
Justin
On Aug 19, 6:38 pm, Nelson B Bolyard wrote:
> On 2009-08-19 11:30 PDT, Justin wells wrote:
>
>
gs (which I'd
like to remain secret for a few more years) how do I check how secure
the connection is?
Thanks much for your kind replies!
Justin
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. But I'm now
lost and can't find how the Master PWD is used to encrypt.
See:
http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/manager/ssl/src/nsSDR.cpp
and
http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11sdr.c
Justin
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licy.crypto (or mozilla.policy.trustanchors),
instead of in the .dev hierarchy.
Justin
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On 1/1/09 6:44 PM, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
If he's a security and user interface expert, why is the security UI
so appallingly *bad*?
*plonk*
Justin
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On 12/23/08 12:20 PM, Justin Dolske wrote:
That said, the Comodo/Certstar is hugely sucky and I would hope there's
something we can do about it that helps users.
I am just full of fail today: "... the Comodo/Comstar *incident* is
hugely sucky ...
On 12/23/08 12:12 PM, Justin Dolske wrote:
On 12/23/08 11:27 AM, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
I'd rather deal with disruption caused thereby (and, yes, the user
complaints generated thereby -- at least then the end-user would KNOW
that there's a problem that's being dealt with rathe
On 12/23/08 11:27 AM, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
I'd rather deal with disruption caused thereby (and, yes, the user
complaints generated thereby -- at least then the end-user would KNOW
that there's a problem that's being dealt with rather than having a
FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY)
Hmm, would they?
_
or these 3rd
party CAs to become operational in Mozilla products without going
through the Mozilla approval process. It seems like a different degree
or trust.
Justin
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Graham Leggett wrote:
> ...
Quick note: you might look at some of the Weave code, which is using PKCS#5.
http://hg.mozilla.org/labs/weave/file/53e25c0c7e2e/src/WeaveCrypto.cpp#l462
Justin
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not a general-purpose crypto API, as it's tailored for Weave's usecase.
Justin
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/trust of 180+ million Firefox users is the important issue.
It's unfortunate that it can take so long to process new requests, but
neither should we hastily rush to rubberstamp anyone who knocks on the door.
Justin
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Kai Engert wrote:
> Ubuntu has apparently chosen to use non-standard library names,
> therefore you can't use your binary produced on Ubuntu on a system that
> uses standard library names.
Similar problems have bitten Labs' Weave extension. See bugs 442679,
4427
s mitigate the impact of #3 on end-users, lest something force
the issue sooner than desired.
Justin
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.
So? While it might not improve security *immediately*, I don't see why a
gradual transition to stricter requirements is a problem. Are you
suggesting we're stuck with small keys forever, or that all CAs must
switch simultaneously?
Justin
__
> /bin/sh: ../../../../dist/SunOS5.9_DBG.OBJ: cannot create
permissions problem?
Go into that directory and try to touch SunOS5.9_DBG.OBJ
"Wan-Teh Chang" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> On Thu, Feb 21, 2008 at 4:42 PM, Gatfield, Geoffrey
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote
t for high value long-lived keys, we recommend getting more entropy.
Perhaps the entropy gathering in NSS could be simplified now, since
modern Unix (and Windows, I assume) platforms include this as part of
the OS...
Justin
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d delete the old one, or various other ways of
shooting yourself in the foot.
> I much more favor providing both the target file and a separate file
> containing the hash, as is done on the Mozilla FTP site.
And how do you verify the contents of the hash file? Another hash file? :)
Justi
er Password
is something the user really ought to do themselves.
Justin
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ld presume that adding it natively to Mozilla would thus
be a lot of work.
Justin
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the www- bonsai for
changes, and be sure that any changes which should continue to stay be
updated into the Wiki's version of that page.
~Justin Wood (Callek)
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() ? how ?
Should I have to temporarly stop Mozilla to automatically open a session
on inserted token ? how ?
Or maybe I'm just going the wrong way :)
Thanks in advance.
--
Nicolas JUSTIN
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