Hi Dana,
One thing I don't see mentioned here is certificate transparency, which, while
not a 1:1 replacement, nevertheless strongly contributes to the same goal of
control over issuance.
Is there a plan to implement SCT verification in Firefox, similar to what
Chrome and Apple have shipped? I
On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 3:46 PM J.C. Jones wrote:
> (Sorry for the delay in replying, had a long-weekend of PTO there)
>
> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 7:08 AM Henri Sivonen
> wrote:
>
> > On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 8:12 PM J.C. Jones wrote:
> > > It appears that if we want full security key support fo
There are a lot of good reasons to oppose this:
- This is a very frustrating _expansion_ of non-standard APIs, more than a
year after we shipped the W3C standard API
- It'll put pressure on other browsers, which were only implementing
webauthn, to also support u2f.js
- It'll prolong the period of
Hi dev.platform!
I wanted to let everyone know about some changes to how C++ IPDL actors are
implemented that are currently in the process of being landed (I expect to
land them to autoland tomorrow morning). This message will summarize these
changes, for complete details see
https://bugzilla.mozi
Hi Soren,
I'm not sure if this is the "correct" way to use phabricator, but it is the
way I use it successfully :-)
I follow basically your steps, except I use them in tandem with the firefox
tree hg extension, and hg bookmarks. So my workflow looks like:
$ # create a new bookmark to work on
$ h
I'm very excited about this -- in my experience very few developers know
about the dangers of target=_blank.
Do we have any sense of how large the breakage will be, and do we have any
docs for developers who are impacted? (I assume rel=opener is the fix?)
Yay!
Alex
On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 3:29
Would it make sense to consider giving nsTHashtable and PLDHashTable
different names? Right now the names suggest that we have 3 general purpose
hash tables, but it might be easier if the names better suggested their
purpose, e.g. PLDHashTable -> MinimalCodeSizeHashTable (I'm sure we can do
better
Hey Christian,
This is great! I'm super excited.
ASAN helps in another way, besides just giving us much better UAF
diagnostics: it catches issues besides crashes! It's very common for small
buffer overflows to not corrupt things quite enough to crash.
Two small questions:
1) Is there a metabug
Can you describe in a bit more detail what you're trying to accomplish?
As a general rule, the design of the sandbox is that the content process
shouldn't/can't access any system resources, and any resource you need
should be provided via IPC to the parent process.
alex
On Thu, Jul 5, 2018 at 11
Outstanding! I love a good IPC attack surface reduction!
Alex
On Wed, Jun 27, 2018 at 6:54 PM Tom Schuster wrote:
> Since landing bug 1465911 [1], CPOWs [2] are only functional on our testing
> infrastructure. In normal builds that we ship to users CPOWs can be
> created, but no operations like
Do you have a sense of how this is going to be implemented? Is there going
to be specialized code for this, or is it going to be handled by all the
general navigation changes for process-switching when you change sites?
Alex
On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 5:02 PM Mike Conley wrote:
> >
> > I am not su
I don't have an opinion on the style change itself, but I'm a very strong
+1 on just picking one and making sure clang-format enforces it.
Alex
On Fri, Apr 13, 2018 at 9:37 AM, Emilio Cobos Álvarez
wrote:
> Sorry, I know, coding style thread... But it's Friday and this is somewhat
> related to
What was the original intended use case for remote XUL, powerful origins
controlled by Mozilla, or enabling developers to build their own powerful
origins?
Alex
On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 11:36 AM, Boris Zbarsky wrote:
> Background: We currently have various provisions for "remote XUL", wherein
>
For macOS users this will hopefully be available from brew shortly:
https://github.com/Homebrew/homebrew-core/pull/25164
Alex
On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 9:21 AM, Ted Mielczarek wrote:
> Hello,
>
> Yesterday I tagged and released sccache 0.2.6:
> https://github.com/mozilla/sccache/releases/tag/0.2.
Hi all,
Small FYI: With bug 1405088 which landed yesterday, the macOS content
process sandbox no longer allows writing to files _anywhere_ on disk. Huge
thanks to the folks who helped out with landing the blockers!
Going forward if you need the content process to write something to disk,
the appr
Is it practical to be data driven about this? Either by telemetry on how
frequently this is used in Firefox, or by Google giving us data on how much
of their userbase is migrated? This has the benefit of either a) letting us
remove code sooner, or b) ensuring we're aware that we'd be breaking the
e
On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 4:43 AM, Mark Banner wrote:
> On 24/12/2017 19:41, Ben Kelly wrote:
>
>> But I also see rules about cosmetic things like what kind of quotes must
>> be
>> used for strings.
>> AFAICT this kind of rule does not have any tangible safety benefit. Its
>> purely a cosmetic styl
How does this behavior compare with other browsers?
Alex
On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 7:47 AM, Jonathan Kingston wrote:
> Currently our mixed content blocker implementation treats object
> subrequests as mixed passive content. As part of our plan to deprecate
> insecure connections we are going to b
I don't know about C++14 specifically, but a good example is C++17's
std::string_view, which allows an implicit cast from std::string&& and can
very easily lead to UAF:
https://github.com/isocpp/CppCoreGuidelines/issues/1038
Alex
On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 10:52 AM, Simon Sapin wrote:
> On 30/10/1
You read my mind -- thanks!
Alex
On Fri, Sep 15, 2017 at 1:16 PM, Christoph Kerschbaumer
wrote:
>
> On Sep 15, 2017, at 7:14 PM, Alex Gaynor wrote:
>
> Hi Christoph,
>
> Great stuff!
>
> Are external applications able to trigger loads of data:, e.g. a desktop
> m
Hi Christoph,
Great stuff!
Are external applications able to trigger loads of data:, e.g. a desktop
mail application, via the OS protocol handler facilities?
Alex
On Fri, Sep 15, 2017 at 1:08 PM, Christoph Kerschbaumer
wrote:
> Hey Everyone,
>
> we plan to prevent web pages from navigating th
If you're on macOS, you can also get sccache with `brew install sccache`.
Alex
On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 9:05 AM, Ted Mielczarek wrote:
> Yesterday I published sccache 0.2 to crates.io, so you can now `cargo
> install sccache` and get the latest version (it'll install to
> ~/.cargo/bin). If you b
Hi dev-platform,
On behalf of the Runtime Content Isolation (aka sandboxing) team, I'm
delighted
to announce that starting later this week, our macOS and Windows nightly
builds
will prohibit read access to most of the filesystem in the content process!
What does this mean for you? First and forem
s still an option
> on the table if a dedicated build and the associated costs is justified.
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>- Kearwood “Kip” Gilbert
>
>
>
> *From: *Alex Gaynor
> *Sent: *May 9, 2017 7:58 AM
> *To: *Kearwood Kip Gilbert
> *Cc: *dev-platform@lists.mozilla.org
&
l
still be considered :-)
Cheers,
Alex
On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 2:25 PM, Gian-Carlo Pascutto wrote:
> On 08-05-17 19:26, Alex Gaynor wrote:
> > Hi dev-platform,
> >
> > Top-line question: Do you rely on being able to run mochitests from a
> > packaged build (`--appname`)?
>
failures with sandboxed content processes. :-)
>
> Thanks,
>
> Ehsan
>
>
>
> On 05/08/2017 01:26 PM, Alex Gaynor wrote:
>
>> Hi dev-platform,
>>
>> Top-line question: Do you rely on being able to run mochitests from a
>> packaged build (`--appname`)?
>&
l also need slightly expanded access to
> resources such as files, registry, and pipes required for communication
> with Steam.
>
>
>
> Are there any plans to make the sandboxing rules configurable at runtime?
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>- Kearwood “Kip” Gilbert
>
Hi dev-platform,
Top-line question: Do you rely on being able to run mochitests from a
packaged build (`--appname`)?
Context:
The sandboxing team has been hard at work making the content process
sandbox as restrictive as possible. Our latest focus is removing file read
permissions from content
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