________________________________ From: Mark Nottingham <[email protected]>
> First, two things that I don't _think_ are being disputed: > 1. Surfacing censorship events to end users is desirable, because it a) > avoids user confusion / misattribution of the problem, and b) allows end > users to be more fully informed. This is becoming a more urgent problem, > thanks to current events. I don't necessarily view this as desirable. Specifically, I see an important distinction between informing the user and informing the user agent. I feel that informing the user agent is potentially desirable. It can react in various useful ways: * Interpreting the censorship as damage and routing around it. * Collecting anonymized telemetry on censorship events to produce a public report. * Potentially notifying the user at an appropriate level of detail. Surfacing censorship events to the user is often difficult, inappropriate, or counterproductive, depending on factors such as the user's technical skill and the applicable legal frameworks. I am reminded of a string of incidents in Kazakhstan [1], which were successfully resolved without any specific user messaging in client software. Attempting to explain the precise situation to those users might have increased the risk of panic and confusion. --Ben [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazakhstan_man-in-the-middle_attack
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