Re https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=419030
I appreciate that you have tried... but I must also appreciate that you have failed. I have a major concern, and I think that if you verified this with the CSRC or your FIPS validation lab, they would second it. The FIPS validation is not applied to the source code, but rather to the binary produced from the source code which is submitted. If you recompile the code, the version that you get from the code is not validated -- only the actual binary PKCS#11 module which was submitted to the validated laboratory is validated. If you expect that CVS saves you from that, I must point out that it is entirely possible for a CVS repository to be edited by hand without being detectable by the command-line tool. OpenSSL has the only FIPS-validated source-procurable implementation in existence. The amount of work that went into it is amazing, and it is only made possible by having a verifiably trusted path from an SHA-1 hashed tarball that contains source files and a file which contains keyed HMACs of all of the source files which are verified by the make process, then HMACs of all of the generated object files are generated and put into a single .o file, which is then HMAC-signed overall. On module load and the call to FIPS_mode_set(1), the entirety of the chained-validated binary code in the process space is key-HMACed, and the HMAC compared with what's stored in the module itself. If it fails, it detects that it is not validated, and goes into the error-detected state, which prevents any cryptographic operation from occurring with it. I don't see anything -- anywhere -- suggesting that Mozilla's FIPS validation effort for its PKCS#11 module has had anything near this level of trust-chain validation associated with it. Thus, if you're recompiling from source, no matter what you may think the result isn't validated. (Since PKCS#11 is supposed to be a standard, providing validated binaries in the CVS tree for checkout shouldn't preclude any updates to the remainder of NSS -- and, as a matter of fact, should actually help the process of including an updated NSS into Firefox.) I need not tell you just how grave this matter is for anyone who relies on Firefox 2.x being FIPS-validated. It could quite easily prevent people who interact with US Federal processing systems being prevented from using Firefox ever again -- due to Firefox fraudulently claiming FIPS validation. Please fix this. Dig out a copy of the binary module(s) which was actually validated, and link it verbatim (import it into CVS in binary mode) into the next version of Firefox. Among other things, this would prevent you from having to jump through all the hoops listed in #419030 to work around the problem. (This also means that only those platforms that you submitted binaries for can be FIPS 140-2 validated, and all the rest are not.) -Kyle H On Sat, Aug 23, 2008 at 10:26 PM, Wan-Teh Chang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Firefox 2.0.0.x, x >=1, use the FIPS validated NSS > software cryptographic module. > > We really went out of our way to keep Firefox 2.0.0.x > using a FIPS-valided NSS software cryptographic > module. See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=419030 > I hope someone appreciates that. > > Wan-Teh > _______________________________________________ > dev-tech-crypto mailing list > dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto > _______________________________________________ dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
