I should have said of the pitch kind or roll kind of torque. Reports seemed to say it nosedived, so sounds like the pitch kind. And if there was a little bit of both, that is an even more complex aerodynamic stability issue.
On Sat, Jul 6, 2019, 8:45 AM Venkatesh Vadde <[email protected]> wrote: > Wow, Beiber. This is as close a dissection of the MAX-737 issue as I have > read or heard anywhere. Sounds criminal to have not used redundancy in the > sensors, especially in civil aviation with so many lives at stake on a > trip. Human complacency takes over, I guess, when something works so well > for so long. The lifting torque you mention was of the yaw kind or roll > kind? > > On Sat, Jul 6, 2019, 12:28 AM Dennis Lee Bieber <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On Fri, 5 Jul 2019 16:41:40 +0000 (UTC), "'Mark Lazarewicz' via >> BeagleBoard" <[email protected]> >> declaimed the following: >> >> >It's shoddy psuedo engineer's like that the caused people to be Killed >> on Boeing 737 max software outsourced to sub standard engineeers I know I >> worked with them lots of nodding and smiling no substance. >> >> From what I've read, some test bed software, and maybe some >> display >> software was outsourced. NOT the flight management software -- which has >> been produced by GE Aviation (formerly Smiths Aerospace, nee Lear-Siegler) >> for quite some time on the 737. {I supported the "BootROM" of the 737 >> flight computers for four years -- BootROM runs the memory/processor >> self-checks, and determines which application (dataloader, flight >> management, etc.) is to be started based upon external sensors (no >> dataloader if the wheels are not on ground <G>). The flight software for >> the boxes was produced in the cubicle farm on the other side of the >> building from mine.} >> >> The gist I have for this fiasco is that shoddy requirements were >> in >> play -- defining the MCAS system to be a "transparent" addition to the >> software (one description I've read describes MCAS as being meant to >> compensate for the different lift characteristics of the MAX when angle of >> attack varies. The MAX engines are so large that they are mounted much >> more >> forward from the wing, and higher -- as a result, when not directly aimed >> into the air flow (as in climbs), the engine nacelle created a lifting >> torque in front of the wing. MCAS was supposed to counter that torque so >> pilots "feet" the plane behaving the same as non-MAX 737 models. However, >> MCAS relied upon single sensor (and apparently did not have left/right >> redundancy) -- the multi-sensor configuration was "optional" on the order >> form. >> >> Because MCAS was supposed to be "transparent", pilots were not >> supposed >> to need updated training. It was also added to the flight software in a >> way >> to minimize how much of the flight software (most of which has been flying >> for decades on 737 models) had to be re-certified... >> >> >> -- >> Wulfraed Dennis Lee Bieber AF6VN >> [email protected] >> http://wlfraed.microdiversity.freeddns.org/ >> >> -- >> For more options, visit http://beagleboard.org/discuss >> --- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "BeagleBoard" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/beagleboard/he6vhe9g1pd04iq16e8fcodrgdv9fnnpa3%404ax.com >> . >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > -- For more options, visit http://beagleboard.org/discuss --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "BeagleBoard" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/beagleboard/CAHW0bcyTDD5NECBpkVSGTGbfH8nSpSaJGDxmXL17fYprQJ1wOw%40mail.gmail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
