Patches 1-3 fix actual or latent bugs causing uninitialised stack to leak into the trace buffers. Xentrace is a developer/debugging activity restricted to fully privileged entities, so the leaking of uninitialised stack contents is not a security concern here.
Patches 4-6 are various pieces of cleanup. This entire subsystem is a mess, but the practical gains in patch 4 speak for themselves. Andrew Cooper (6): xen/trace: Don't over-read trace objects xen/memory: Remove tail padding from TRC_MEM_* records xen/credit2: Remove tail padding from TRC_CSCHED2_* records x86/trace: Reduce stack usage from HVMTRACE_ND() xen/credit2: Clean up trace handling xen/trace: Minor code cleanup tools/xentrace/formats | 4 + tools/xentrace/xenalyze.c | 12 +- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 8 +- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 9 +- xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c | 17 +- xen/common/memory.c | 4 +- xen/common/sched/credit2.c | 343 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- xen/common/trace.c | 58 +++---- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/trace.h | 30 ++-- 9 files changed, 235 insertions(+), 250 deletions(-) -- 2.11.0
