Bryan Ford: > Travis Biehn wrote: >> It was surprising (to me) that Chaum should be the one to produce the first >> of the modern 'solving the key escrow problem' algorithms. Academia has >> been ignoring this particular problem for quite a while - I expect that >> more proposed solutions will follow, solutions that will be more difficult >> to prove insecure… > > Not quite true. Although it’s not a “hot topic” in academia, we and a few > others have written a few papers exploring privacy-preserving approaches to > controlled, limited data collection for law enforcement. For example: > > - “Restructuring the NSA metadata program”: > http://outsourcedbits.org/2014/03/10/restructuring-the-nsa-metadata-program/ > - “Secure protocols for accountable warrant execution”: > https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/secure-protocols-for-accountable-warrant-execution/ > - “Catching Bandits and Only Bandits: Privacy-Preserving Intersection > Warrants for Lawful Surveillance”: > http://dedis.cs.yale.edu/dissent/papers/bandits-abs > > None of these papers really suggest or call for “key escrow” or “backdoors”, > especially not against general-purpose end-to-end encryption or mobile > devices. But even so, this line of research understandably tends not to get > much love either from many die-hard privacy purists. :)
https://anon.inf.tu-dresden.de/publications/KWF2006ETRICSRevocableAnonymity.pdf is probably one, in the context of the AN.ON/JonDonym system. See as well: http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/sassaman-pet2008.pdf Georg
signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
-- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
