Travis Biehn wrote: > It was surprising (to me) that Chaum should be the one to produce the first > of the modern 'solving the key escrow problem' algorithms. Academia has > been ignoring this particular problem for quite a while - I expect that > more proposed solutions will follow, solutions that will be more difficult > to prove insecure…
Not quite true. Although it’s not a “hot topic” in academia, we and a few others have written a few papers exploring privacy-preserving approaches to controlled, limited data collection for law enforcement. For example: - “Restructuring the NSA metadata program”: http://outsourcedbits.org/2014/03/10/restructuring-the-nsa-metadata-program/ - “Secure protocols for accountable warrant execution”: https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/secure-protocols-for-accountable-warrant-execution/ - “Catching Bandits and Only Bandits: Privacy-Preserving Intersection Warrants for Lawful Surveillance”: http://dedis.cs.yale.edu/dissent/papers/bandits-abs None of these papers really suggest or call for “key escrow” or “backdoors”, especially not against general-purpose end-to-end encryption or mobile devices. But even so, this line of research understandably tends not to get much love either from many die-hard privacy purists. :) Cheers Bryan -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
