To add to what Roger said, "Roger Dingledine" wrote: > But even full scale padding, ignoring the practical side > of how to get a Tor network that can afford to waste so > much bandwidth, doesn't provide protection in the face of > active attacks where you induce a gap on one side and > then observe the gap on the other side. And it might even > be the case that these gaps happen naturally by > themselves, due to network congestion and so on, so > maybe passive observers will be winners even against > a design that does full padding.
All that padding means nothing if an adversary can introduce latency or gaps *at arbitrary* locations in a path. An adversary that can see your guard, and who can also see the guards traffic can introduce the gaps/latency in traffic at any point in your path. You may not even see the attack without being able to visualize end-to-end bandwidth statistics. It might be due to a routing problem at a particular node in the path. Solving this adversary isn't easy because they can hide behind the design of the internet. There isn't a single anonymity network that is immune. --leeroy -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
