His project was started in july of 2006, which he seems to have been spearheading in a family business, to supply dark net services to christian fundamentalists.
http://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-names-port-numbers.xhtml?search=4105#ShofarNexus The guy ran for congress back before the turn of the millennium, so I dont know if he is brilliant and misunderstood, or if he is a con artist playing a part. On Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 10:59 PM, benjamin barber <barb...@barberb.com> wrote: > http://shofarnexus.com/Download > > On Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 10:43 PM, benjamin barber <barb...@barberb.com> > wrote: > >> I didn't have a problem finding Matryoshka networks but not software >> called "Matryoshka", just as were not using running "onion software", >> some different software use the Matryoshka network method to communicate. >> >> >> On Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 9:51 PM, Roger Dingledine <a...@mit.edu> wrote: >> >>> On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 12:02:45AM -0400, grarpamp wrote: >>> > We also need to take a serious look at TOR, and >>> > without emotional bias, consider if a serious flaw was designed in. >>> >>> "Traffic analysis is the first hole plugged by Matryoshka, but ignored >>> by TOR." >>> >>> I couldn't figure out how to actually fetch this "Matryoshka" software, >>> but it sure looks like another case of somebody not understanding the >>> research field, and thinking that solving the traffic confirmation >>> attack is easy, without actually thinking through the engineering side, >>> the scaling side, or the statistics side. >>> >>> For background see e.g. >>> http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004 >>> >>> It makes sense that if you think solving the problem is easy, you >>> wonder why Tor hasn't solved it. >>> >>> But even full scale padding, ignoring the practical side of how to get a >>> Tor network that can afford to waste so much bandwidth, doesn't provide >>> protection in the face of active attacks where you induce a gap on one >>> side and then observe the gap on the other side. And it might even be >>> the case that these gaps happen naturally by themselves, due to network >>> congestion and so on, so maybe passive observers will be winners even >>> against a design that does full padding. >>> >>> Also, to make it really work in practice, all users are going to need >>> to pad not just while fetching their web page or iso or whatever, but >>> sufficiently before and after that too, else an attacker can match up >>> start times and end times: >>> http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#murdoch-pet2007 >>> >>> This is a great area for further research: >>> http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#ShWa-Timing06 >>> http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#active-pet2010 >>> >>> tl;dr the whole premise of this person's blog post is flawed, since >>> their design likely does not work as they think it does. >>> >>> --Roger >>> >>> -- >>> tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org >>> To unsubscribe or change other settings go to >>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk >>> >> >> > -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
