On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 11:45:54PM +0000, Robert Ransom wrote: > On 2011-12-21, Chris <tmail...@errtech.com> wrote: > >>> So please, don't bother with that justification, a scan like that would > >>> probably just be one scan of 10000 you receive every week. > >> > >> The scan which happened yesterday was enough to get the attention of both > >> the > >> university network security team, and the sys-admins of the department > >> which > >> hosts my Tor server. The last time this happened was 2009. > >> > >> It's already difficult enough to host a Tor server, but triggering > >> institutional > >> IDS is only going to make justifying the benefit of running a node harder. > >> > > > > This is a dumb policy although that being said if this is going to have a > > significant negative impact on the Tor network from a bandwidth or > > security (loss of nodes could impact security too) then what about having > > the Tor software do a check on the system? This would bypass the network > > and avoid intrusion detection systems in place on the network. I imagine > > anyway. > > All of these ideas about removing allegedly ???insecure??? or ???vulnerable??? > relays from the network ignore the fact that someone who wants to > compromise Tor relays and use them to attack Tor users will just make > the relays appear to not be vulnerable, so that they can stay in the > network. I'm amazed at how many people want us to remove relays which > have definitely not been compromised from the Tor network. >
Ah, perhaps they have read [1] and are trying to roll out such an attack below the radar. Who _do_ they work for? ;>) On a less facetious note, people might want to look at our trust work as a more constructive response to the diversity of geolocations, jurisdictions, OSes, operators, Tor versions, hardware etc. [2], although it is still research and I do not pretend to have all the pieces to make this fully practical without several more years of work. [1] freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ccs07-doa.pdf [2] www.ohmygodel.com/publications/ortrust-ccs11.pdf aloha, Paul _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
