> All of these ideas about removing allegedly âinsecureâ or > âvulnerableâ > relays from the network ignore the fact that someone who wants to > compromise Tor relays and use them to attack Tor users will just make > the relays appear to not be vulnerable, so that they can stay in the > network. I'm amazed at how many people want us to remove relays which > have definitely not been compromised from the Tor network.
To be clear I didn't suggest this. It doesn't sound like a bad idea although the question is what good if any would it do? Having some compromised nodes is already assumed. I think the concern is that if a significant number of relays can be easily compromised then there is a reason to do this. It would be 'hardening' the network. It doesn't matter if some relays are taken over and appear to be not-vulnerable. The fewer that can be taken over reduces the risk of encountering multiple compromised nodes in any given path. There are other ways to achieve this. Setting up many many nodes for instance. _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
