PRECEPTORS OF ADVAITHAM KANCHI MUTT KR IRS 23924 CONTD
VIMUKTATMAN by P. K. SundaramM.A., Ph.D.
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, at the end of his great classic Advaita-siddhi,
refers to three Siddhi works, viz.
1. Iṣṭa-siddhi,
2. Naiṣkarmya-siddhi,
3. and Brahma-siddhi.
The Brahma-siddhi of Maṇḍana may be said to devote itself to the definition
(lakṣaṇa) and testimony (pramāṇa) of Brahman indicated in the expression,
Brahmajijñāsā, the that of the desire to know. The Naiṣkarmya-siddhi of
Sureśvara is interested in showing the how of Brahman-knowledge, i.e.,
whether it is by knowledge alone or by action that release is secured. The
Iṣṭa-siddhi of Vimuktātman engages itself rather in the question of the why
of Brahman-knowledge, enquiring into the nature and cause of error, that
is, the world. In short, ontology, ethology and epistemology may be said to
be the respective contents of these three Siddhis.
Summary of the chief points discussed in the Iṣṭar-siddhi
The various theories of error are enumerated by Indian philosophers as
follows:
ātma-khyātir-asat-khyātir akhyātiḥ khyātiranyathā
tathā-anirvachana-khyātir-ity-etat-khyāti-pañchakam(?)
These five can be classified into two broad categories, viz., sat-khyāti
and asat-khyāti. Ātma-khyāti of the Yogāchāra Buddhists, akhyāti of the
Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas and anyathā-khyāti of the Bhāṭṭas and Naiyāyikas fall
under the first category, and the asat-khyāti of the' Mādhyamika Buddhists
falls into the opposite camp. The doctrine of anirvachanīya-khyātī adopted
by the Advaitins tries to show that the object of illusion is neither real
nor unreal but indeterminable.
Akhyāti
Akhyāti or non-discrimination is the explanation that the Prābhakara offers
to the problem of illusion where there are two knowledges, each of which
taken in isolation is not false (p. 42). The failure to discriminate that
there are really two jñānas leads to error. In other words, bheda-agraha or
asaṃsargāgraha is the cause of error. This position of the Mīmāṃsakas is
the result of their realism. Knowledge is self-valid and what it shows up
is valid and true. If error arises, it is a subjective short-coming.
Knowledge itself can never be doubted (p. 41). There is no question of the
defective senses presenting positive illusion (p. 42).
Vimuktātman argues that the theory of the self-evidencing character of
knowledge adopted by the Prābhākara rebels against his theory of error.
For, if he is consistent he will see that the two separate knowledges (of
the shell and silver in the illusion where the shell appears as silver, for
example) must present themselves as separate in which case there is no
question of their not being discriminated (p. 43).
If truth, as the Prābhākaras hold, is that which succeeds in yielding the
expected results, Vimuktātman points out that there are instances where
knowledge issues in no practical activity at all (pp. 45-46). To be sure,
knowledge does lead to activity, but this is only incidental.
Again, non-discrimination is said to be the cause of error, but Prābhākaras
at least cannot hold this. doctrine for they do not accept negation as a
category at all. For them there could be no absence of knowledge as in
non-discrimination (p. 116).
Anyathākhyāti
The Bhāṭṭas hold that in error the object appears otherwise than what it
is. But it remains to be asked, whether the object in error becomes other
than what it is, or the knowledge becomes other than what it is, or the
knowledge shows the object as other than what it is. The first two
alternatives are rejected on the grounds that the object cannot become
something else if it has a nature of its own, and that knowledge cannot
suffer a change without reference to the object, for knowledge is
object-dependent.
Thus it is the third alternative that is discussed elaborately by
Vimuktātman. To the Bhāṭṭas, what appears in illusion is not unreal. But
what is unreal is the saṃsarga or identity of the appearance with its
basis. Defects in the sense-organs contribute positively to the production
of error (p. 45). While to the Prābhākaras, error is bheda-agraha, to the
Bhāṭṭas it is abheda-graha.
All the time, the Bhāṭṭas protest that they are realists. In that event, it
is not obvious how they can bear the introduction in error of a subjective
element which brings about the mistaken identity between two real objects.
This subjective dement does not have any corresponding reality (p. 105).
Again, how can the silver, in the silver-illusion that is presented in
immediate perception, be denied particularly when the Bhāṭṭas hold it to be
real? If silver is denied, then illusion will have to be accepted and
realism must be given up. If silver is not denied, there will be no
question of illusion at all (pp. 94-96). Either that, the silver is
remembered or that it is presented here and now. But what is denied in the
judgment ‘nedam rajatam’ is the silver presented actually and not the
remembered one If was already stated that the presented object cannot be
the content of negation without damage to the professed realism of the
Bhāṭṭas. Nor can the remembered one be the object, for the negation of the
remembered silver cannot affect the presented one and thus illusion would
never have been negated. Hence, we cannot have both the remembered and the
presented as factors in illusion.
If it is said that what is denied here and now of the shell, viz.,
silverness, characterizes really another object existing elsewhere and that
this is the intention of the negative judgment, in that case, it is the
silverness that will be denied and not silver (I, 19). But in illusion we
are concerned with the particular silver, and not with a universal..
Again, the negating judgment, nedam rajatam, is supposed to make only the
predicate false, but not the this, or the relation ‘is’. Why should one
alone of the three factors in “this is silver” be false? (III, 15).
Moreover, the fact that while the ‘this’ element is reaffirmed by the
negating judgment “This is not silver”, the silver-element is denied
clearly demonstrates that of the two elements, ‘this’ and ‘silver’, silver
is less real than the ‘this’, which, in the example, is the shell, or at
any rale, not real in the same sense. But this conclusion will militate
against the pluralistic realism of the Bhāṭṭas.
Ātma-khyāti
The Yogāchāra Buddhists hold that there are no external objects at all.
What exist are only the cognitions. One proof for this is the togetherness
of object and thought, sahopalaṃbhani - yama. Even in an illusion, what we
see as silver outside is only our own cognition. It is the mind that splits
itself up as subject and object, as in dreams. To these Buddhists, silver
is real only as a mode of cognition. What the negative judgment “This is
not silver” does is to negate, not the supposedly external silver (there is
no such thing) but the appearance of its externality (p. 40).
Vimuktātman thinks it is useless to reduce the object lo a mode of thought.
While thought or knowledge is constant, objects are specific and shifting.
The constancy of thought cannot be explained if it takes shape into
objects. And there can be thought without objects (p. 14).
What is said to be sahopalaṃbhay-niyama by the Buddhists is really
sahopalabhyatva-niyama and there can be no such niyama between the dṛk and
the dṛśya, for the dṛk is not seen. Nor is it sahopalabhitvam for the
object is not and cannot be the seer. Moreover, the very notion of
externality will be impossible to explain when there is no external object
at all. bāhyatvasya asataḥ khyāti-prasaṅgāccha.
Again, how can one cognition which is momentary according to the
Vijñāna-vādin be the cognizer of another cognition? Both of them cannot
co-exist, asatvāt, kṣaṇikatvāccha (p. 113). Lastly, one cognition cannot
reveal itself and at the same time be revealed by another, and to the
Vijñānavādin, cognition is self-luminous. The silver being a mode of
cognition must be at once apparent, in which case there is no occasion for
error at all.
Asat-khyāti
In error, the asat-khyāti-vādin argues that that which is non-extent
appears as existent The negating judgment “This is not silver”, establishes
the non-existence of the perceived silver in the silver-illusion (p. 155)
If, either in the error or by its cancellation, the existent were known it
will be tantamount to admitting that there is no illusion at all since
there is no possibility of error or its cancellation when the content is
the existent sat That which is existent can be cancelled neither by the
knowledge of the existent, nor of the non-existent. Nor does the knowledge
of the existent cancel the knowledge of the existent or that of the
non-existent As then, the relation of the sublating and the sublated cannot
subsist between two cognitions of the existent, and as a sublation is
actually perceived, it is fair to conclude that it is the non-existent that
appears as the existent in error.
To the argument that the merely non-existent cannot be perceived, the
asadvādin replies that the negative judgment points to the fact that the
non-existent can be experienced (p. 156). Even when one urges the
perception of non-existent tuchchha as error, one accepts it as presented
in error (p. 157). Even Advaitins must accept the perception of tuchchha,
because in māyā, which is of the nature of inexplicability, silverness and
reality are perceived in error. Both of them are thus tuchchha and
perceived.
Now, against this theory, Vimuktātman asos: How can the non-existent appear
as existent, when it cannot even appear as non-existent? Again, since there
are no possible distinctions of time in the śūnya, the earlier appearance
and the later sublation have no meaning and consequently both the error and
its cancellation will be there always; and if this is not desired, never at
all, because of distinction lessness itself. Since there is not
restrictions of space in śūnya either, it is not possible to suggest that
silver that exists elsewhere appears in the shell. Moreover, the usage in
illusion is: “This is silver” and not “negation is silver”. Even the “This”
does not appear in the form of negation. There is no such apprehension of
“This” as “ this is not ” .
Anirvachanīya-khyāti
When the theories of the sat and the asat as presented in error cancel out
each other, what we are left with is the fact that the object in error is
characterisable neither as real nor as unreal nor as both.
khyateḥ nasat, badhat na sat iti anyonyapakṣam nirākurvadbhiḥ vādibhireva
rupyasya anirvachanīvatvam(?) sthāpitam.
There can be no knowledge without an object. In error, then, we seem to
have an object which belongs to an order of reality different from the
normal, (p. 120). Silver, the product of nescience, like nescience itself
cannot be an object of any valid means of knowledge. Likewise, its
negation, too, is not open for knowledge by means either positive or
negative. Does the effect of nescience exist and come into being or is it
non-existent? Does nescience also existing in the same form become
otherwise, or does it change and become otherwise? Does it, existing,
perish or being non-existent perish? Is this destruction a negation or a
positive entity? Questions like these are relevant only with reference to
either positive or negative entities, and not to the inexplicable illusion.
That the inexplicable should appear as existent is precisely the illusion.
And it is not asat-khyāti because there is no evidence for the unreality of
that inexplicable form. As is silver, so is everything in this world.
Nescience (aviveka)
Ajnana or nescience is the material cause of all illusion. Just as a single
principle continues to manifest itself both in the seed and the sprout, the
earth and the pot, one beginningless persistent cause produces all the
empirical existence. There is no necessity that when the cause is present,
the effect is necessarily present. Otherwise, since ajñāna is always
present, the illusion will constantly be present.
This ajnana is beginningless. Though the shell in illusion has a beginning,
its ignorance is beginningless. This is because this ignorance is not
located in the shell but in the Intelligence-Self, even as the knowledge of
the shell is. Nescience is established only by Self-Intelligence, and not
by pramaṇas (p. 60-61).
The non-apprehensibility by pramaṇas is, however, not the reason why
nescience is indeterminable, but its destructibility by knowledge,
(jnana-mātra-apanodyatvāt) (p. 63). For, non reprehensibility is found even
in determinable categories like knowledge, pleasure, etc. (p. 63).
Nescience of specific objects are many, though the mūla-ajñāna or
primordial nescience is one. In fact, there are as many nesciences of, say,
a shell as there are shell-cognitions (p. 63). All cognitions, in other
words, have the hitherto unknown for their content. Every Time an object is
cognized, the nescience concealing that object is removed.
Nescience is not just absence of knowledge. If it were, it will be known by
a negative means, abhāva-pramāṇa; one reason for this is that it is located
in the Self. Ajñāna cannot be of the nature of mutual negation, because
mutual negation has for its substrate the object, while for nescience it is
the Self. Nor is it posterior non-existence for which beginning is accepted
and nescience is beginningless. Again, while nescience is removable,
pradhvaṃsa is not.
Ajñāna is like darkness which is not mere antecedent nonexistence of light.
It is positive. Otherwise, it will be difficult to explain how a lamp taken
from one place to another dispels darkness there. Ajñāna is called so
either because of its conflict with knowledge or because of its being other
than knowledge.
Removal of Nescience
Destruction of nescience does not conform to any of the known categories,
existent, non-existent, both, and indefinable, but belongs to the fifth
alternative: pañchamaprakāra. One has, as Prof. Hiṛyanna suggests, to speak
of it thus by the fact of the actual removal of nescience which is
indefinable. But in the last chapter of the Iṣṭa-siddhi, Vimuktātman seems
to take the view that the destruction of nescience is indefinable with this
difference that while ajñāna is removable by knowledge, ajñāna-rtivritti is
not (VIII, 2). He also says that Ātman alone is ajñāna-nivrittL Jñānottama
writes that Vimuktātman agrees to the suggestion of some among the
Advaitins that Ātman alone is the removal of ajñāna in so far as it does
not conflict with non-dualism (p. 620),
But the difficulty that if Ātman is the remover of ajñāna how there was any
bondage at all is felt by Vimuktātman. He suggests the alternative view
that avidyānivritti is the absence of any other than Ātman. And Advaita is
not opposed to the nonexistence of anything other than Ātman. Moreover, if
Ātman were not opposed even to the presence of nescience, how can it be
opposed to its absence? Here the abhāva is only the removal.
Jīvan-mukti
Vimuktātman does not accept the theory that the continuance of the body
after realization in the case of a jīvan-mukta is due, not to ajñāna
itself, but to its latent, impressions, (saṃskāras). Latent impressions are
nothing apart from nescience. In the case of the rope-snake illusion, it is
suggested that fear, trepidation, etc., are present even when one knows
that there is only t he rope and not the snake, and that, similarly, the
sarhskāras alone are responsible for the continuance and maintenance of the
body of a jīvan-mukta. But this is a mistaken view. Fear, trepidation,
etc., do not constitute the body of nescience. Only the snake-illusion
does. And when that is over, nescience at that place is removed. If the
saṃskāras themselves causing fear, trepidation, etc., were part of the
śukti-ajñāna , they will be enough to produce the sarpa-bhrānti at any
time. But that is not found to happen.
It is, then, reasonable to suppose that in the jīvan-mukta there is a
residuum of ajñāna in the form of the prārabdha-karmas which is responsible
for the continuance of the body. There is no conflict between prārabdha and
the origination of redeeming knowledge. In principle, actions bestow their
fruits only without conflict with the results of other actions that have
commenced yielding their consequences. Actions of great merit like the
Horse-sacrifice wait for their operation for the exhaustion of the
prārabdha—karmas. Similarly, actions which pave the way for the rise of
true knowledge will yield their results only in the body which is the locus
of experiences brought about by other activities, without conflict (P- 75).
Knowledge then does not militate against experience and vice versa. This
shows that though inhabiting a body, a mukta is not a baddha. The body
should be there for the released soul so that he can transmit the knowledge
to others. If wisdom and death were simultaneous, there will be no one to
pass the wisdom on to others and with the first wise man, his wisdom would
be buried. The actions which lead to knowledge, says Vimuktātman, preserve
the body for some time for this purpose.
vidyachcharīram paripālayantyeva vidyārthānyapi karmāṇi
kiṃchit kālam yāvatā vidyā-saṃtatyucchhedo na bhavet.
Indeed, without the teacher and his instruction, mere activities, however
correct according to scriptures, will never lead to permanent good.
Means to Release
The intuition into the oneness of Reality alone can remove avidyā
completely. For this intuition, śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana are the
means. Calmness and equanimity are prescribed till renunciation of all
actions takes place. Even sacrifices indirectly help this process by
creating purity of mind. The asaṃbhāvam (the notion of improbability) and
viparīta-bhāvanā (the notion of contrariety) with regard to the real nature
of Brahman are removed by the scripture by means of explaining the nature
of Ātman beginning with astitva and ending with freedom from hunger and
thirst. (See Chhāndogya Upaniṣad). The Upaniṣad repeats nine times the
declaration: tat-tvam asi, dispelling every time an illusion about Reality.
If śravaṇa or hearing once only without these aforesaid means could bring
about intuition, they would be futile. When the mind is sufficiently pure
to receive the final illumination mellowed by these disciplines, then
śravaṇa of the Vedānta texts results in the intuition, removing the
specific illusion every time it is repeated. Here too, Vimuktātman does not
see eye to eye with the school of Maṇḍana which holds that mediate
knowledge arising from śravaṇa needs to be transformed into immediacy by
repeated meditation. He, on the contrary, suggests that from śravaṇa
itself, intuition takes place, provided it comes at the top of all
spiritual equipment
na cha parokṣam vastu parokṣa-jṅānaireva abhyasyamanaiḥ aparokṣībhavet. . .
. . . tasmāt śravaṇādīni abhyasyamānāni aparokṣa eva ātmani anekaprakārān
bhramān nivartayati-santi sākṣāt darśanārthāni bhavanti (p. 64)
* The numbers within brackets refer to the page number or the Adhyāya
number in Iṣṭa-siddhi edited by Prof. Hiriyanna in Gaekwad Oriental Series,
Baroda.
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SARVAJNATMANby N. VeezhinathanM.A., PH.D.
In order to keep alive, the Advaitic tradition lor the benefit of
posterity, Śrī Śaṅkara established Maṭhas or centres of religious learning
and practices in various parts of India. Badari, Dvāraka, Puri, Śrīngeri,
and Kāñchī were his farflung spiritual capitals. Of these, the Maṭha at
Kāñchī is the foremost and is termed the Kāmakoṭi-pīṭha. And, Śrī Śaṅkara
himself assumed the headship of this pīṭha. Ordained as Sannyāsin by Śrī
Śaṅkara himself, Sarvajñātman was nominated successor to the Kāmakoṭi-pīṭha
with Sureśvara—his preceptor, as his protector.
In the history of-the Kāmakoṭi-pīṭha and in the Advaita
literature, Sarvajñātman
stands out as a prominent figure. He is well known to be the author of the
work Saṃkṣepaśārīraka which is a succinct exposition in verses of the views
of Śrī Śaṅkara as stated in his bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtra. He also wrote
another work on Advaita entitled Pañchaprakṛyā. which is divided into five
sections. The first of them deals with the different kinds of meanings
which a word may have. The next three sections treat of what are described
as the ‘great-sayings’ of which ‘tat tvam asi’ is a familiar example and
point out how they should be interpreted. The last section is devoted to
the elucidation of the nature of bondage and release. This work summarizes
the teachings of the Saṃkṣepaśāriraka.
Apart from his works on Advaita, he wrote a short treatise—
Pramāṇalakṣaṇa on the Mīmāṃsā system. This work deals with the various
pramāṇas of the Mīmāṃsakas and doses with an estimate of their
epistemological doctrines and it is available in manuscript in the Madras
Government Oriental Manuscripts library.
The Saṃkṣepaśārīraka has one thousand two hundred and forty stanzas in
various metres and consists of four chapters.
1) The first comprises five hundred and sixty-three verses and corresponds
to the first adhyāya of the Brahmasūtra termed ‘samanvayādhyāya’, and as
such it is the most important adhyāya. It is devoted to the correct
interpretation of the different texts of the Upaniṣads pointing to the
attributeless Brahman.
2) The second comprises two hundred and forty eight verses and it
corresponds to the second adhyāya of the Brahmasūtra termed
‘avirodhādhyāya’. It shows that the Upaniṣadic teaching is not stultified
by other proofs like perception, etc., or by the views of other
philosophical systems.
3) The third contains three hundred and sixty six verses and it corresponds
to the third adhyāya of the Brahmasūtra termed ‘sādhanādhyāya’ and it is
devoted to an exposition of the means to the realization of Brahman.
4) The fourth contains sixty three verses and it corresponds to the fourth
chapter of the Brahmasūtra termed ‘phalādhyāyā’ and it deals with the
nature of liberation.
Though the titles of the four adhyāyas of this work correspond to those
of the Brahmasūtra, and the subject-matter treated of in each is the same
as in the bhāṣya of Śrī Śaṅkara on the corresponding chapters of the
Brahmasūtra, all reference to the nature of the qualified Brahman, the
methods of meditative worship thereof and the result arising therefrom, is
avoided. On this ground, the title Saṃkṣepaśārīraka (the gist of the
Śārīrakabhāṣya of Śrī Śaṅkara) is significant.
This work Samkṣepaśārīraka has eight commentaries. The earliest of
them seems to be the Siddhānta-dīpa by Viśvaveda and it is available in
manuscript [R. 1558 (b) ] in the Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts
Library. Another commentary called Sambandhokti is by Vedānanda and it is
also available in manuscript (R. 2919) in the Government Oriental
Manuscripts Library, Madras. Rāmatīrtha, the disciple of Kṛṣṇatīrtha, wrote
a commentary known as Anvayārthaprakāśikā published in the Anandāśrama
Sanskrit series, Poona. He has based his commentary on the commentary
Siddhāntadīpa already referred to. His disciple Puruṣottama wrote a
Commentary called Subodhinī.
This also has been published in Ānandāśrana Sanskrit series, Poona.
Nṛsiṃhāśrama, the disciple of Jagannāthāśrama who was a contemporary, of
Kṛṣṇatirtha, the preceptor of Rāmatīrtha referred to above, wrote a
commentary called Tattvabodhinī published in the Princess of Wales
Sarasvatībhavana texts series. Madhusūdanasarasvati wrote an authoritative
commentary Sārasaṅgraha, and it is published in the Kāśī Sanskrit series.
This commentary is based on the one by Viśvaveda referred to above. Apart
from these commentaries, Aufrecht mentions one more commentary known as
Vidyāmṛtavarṣiṇi. Another commentary by one Pratyagviṣṇu is referred to by
Madhusūdanasarasvati in his Sārasaṅgraha.
Sarvajñātman has distinct views on the important Advaitic concepts,
and they have considerable importance in the historical development of
Advaita. His merits appear most clearly when he is contrasted with other
Advaitic writers like Padmapāda, Sureśvara and Vācaspatimiśra.
Sarvajñātman’s most important contribution is his view regarding the
locus and content of avidyā. He holds that the pure consciousness is the
locus and content of avidyā as against Vācaspati who maintains that the
individual soul is the locus of avidyā, while Brahman is its content The
latter view is refuted by Sarvajñātman on the ground that the notion of
individual soul derives its existence from avidyā and as such it is
posterior to avidyā. The latter cannot abide in a substratum which is
decidedly subsequent to it. Sarvajñātman further contends that the pure
consciousness is the locus and content of avidy ā neither in its absolute
form, nor in its blissful form, but in the form of inner self
(pratyakchaitanya). This he proves on the basis of the experience ‘I do not
know myself’. It is Sarvajñātman who explains the apparently contradictory
statements of Śrī Śaṅkara regarding the presence of avidyā in Brahman in
deep sleep. To any serious student of Advaita, the contradiction in the
statements of Śrī Śaṅkara, viz., avidyā does not exist in the state of deep
sleep and avidyā exists in Brahman in that state remained unsolved. And,
Sarvajñātman explains this view of Śrī Śaṅkara by stating that avidyā is
not determinated perceived in the form of ‘I do not know myself’ in the
state of deep sleep and it is with this view that Śrī Śaṅkara has said that
avidyā does not exist in that state. Really it exists in that state in
Brahman, as it is evident from the reminiscent experience in the form ‘I
did not know anything when I was asleep’. Similarly Sarvajñātman explains
Śrī Śaṅkara’s statement that the individual soul is the locus of avidyā, by
contending that avidyā though present only in the pure consciousness is
revealed in the form ‘I am ignorant’ by the intellect which is the limiting
adjunct of the individual soul. It is well-known that the nature of a
revealing medium is such that what is revealed through it appears as though
present in the medium itself. The mirror which reflects the face appears to
contain the face. In the same way, the intellect which is the revealing
medium of avidyā reveals it as present in itself and consequently in the
consciousness delimited by it, that is, the individual soul. Avidyā,
however, is present in the pure consciousness.
Sarvajñātman’s contribution to the theory of the nature of Brahman also is
noteworthy. Relying on the method of gathering the unrepeated words found
in the affirmative Upaniṣadic texts to arrive at the exact nature of
Brahman—the method prescribed by the author of the sūtras in the aphorism
‘ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya’ (III, iii, 11), Sarvajñātman affirms that, on the
whole only ten words convey the essential nature of Brahman in an
affirmative manner. And those words are: nitya, śuddha, buddha, mukta,
satya, sūkṣma, sat, vibhu, advitīya and ānanda.
This same method is adopted in the case of the negative texts also. But,
Sarvajñātman suggests that as the elements that are to be negated in
Brahman are numerous, the words found even in all the negative Upaniṣadic
passages are not exhaustive and hence many words should be gathered. Herein
arises the question of relation between the affirmative and negative
Upaniṣadic passages. Sarvajñātman says that the negative Upaniṣadic texts,
by denying all duality, confirm the knowledge of the absolute nature of
Brahman arisen from the affirmative Upaniṣadic passages.
The question whether lordship is natural to Brahman or not is answered in
the negative by Sarvajñātman, on the ground that lordship involves a
reference to the controlled beings; and whichever is dependent on something
else is illusory, and hence lordship, being illusory, cannot be natural to
Brahman. This conclusion seems contrary to the view of the author of the
sūtras, who in the aphorism ‘parābhidhyānāttu tirohitam tato hyasya
bandhaviparyayau’ (III, ii, 5) holds that lordship is natural to Brahman.
Sarvajñātman, with a refreshing independence of judgment, points out that
the author of the Sūtras has said so from the opponent’s stand-point and it
is not his final view. And to substantiate this point, he refers to the
other aphorism ‘kāmādītaratra tatra cāyatanādibhyaḥ’ (III, iii, 39) which
treats lordship on a par with attributes like possession of desire, etc.,
which cannot be said to be natural to the attributeless Brahman. Hence,
Sarvajñātman holds that Brahman is eternal, pure, consciousness,
ever-released, truth, subtle, existent, all-pervasive, absolute, and bliss.
And herein lies Sarvajñātman’s contribution to the theory of the nature of
Brahman.
As regards the elucidation of the nature of the supreme lord and the
individual soul, Sarvajñātman adopts the well-known theory, the
pratibiṃba-vāda, and in this he seems to have been influenced by the views
of Padmapāda.
Coming to the practical side of Advaita, Sarvajñātman speaks of asceticism
as a necessary condition for attaining the knowledge of Brahman. He holds
that the remote means such as the performance of rituals including the
optional ones (kāmya-karma) lead to the desire to know Brahman; and after
this result is achieved the remote means should not be pursued. Again,
Sarvajñātman holds that the Upaniṣadic texts alone give rise to the
intuitive knowledge of Brahman; and śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana
remove the impediments which are present in the intellect of the aspirant
who has such a knowledge and which hinder the knowledge from becoming
effective in dispelling avidyā.
Summing up, Sarvajñātman as a philosopher has a considerable historical
importance. His main contribution to Advaita rests in his clear exposition,
in verses, of Śrī Śaṅkara’s views as stated in his bhāṣya on the
Brahmasūtra. His work is entitled Saṃkṣepaśārīraka; and the title is very
significant, as throughout the work, Śrī Śaṅkara’s phrases and arguments
recur. He is most concerned with finding a way of reconciling the apparent
contrary statements of Śrī Śaṅkara. His treatise is systematic, critical,
and without any trace of dogmatic assertion. He does accept the foundations
laid by his predecessors, yet he makes improvements on them. He is best in
detail and in criticism. His style is easy and un-pedantic. He has an
admirable literary sense, and, in fact, only several centuries after
Sarvajñātman the world could produce Vidyāraṇya, who like Sarvajñātman,
wrote in verses on the Advaitic concepts in an admirable way. Sarvajñātman
is a great philosopher who has profoundly influenced Advaita-thought in the
subsequent ages. As Madhusūdanasarasvati characterizes him, he knows the
traditional interpretation of the Advaita Vedānta. His views are very
respectfully cited by Appayya Dīkṣita, Madhusūdanasarasvati and
Brahmānandasarasvati.
śrīkānchīkāmakoṭyākhya-pīṭhādhiṣṭhitam adbhutam,
bhāvaye ’ham mahā-moha-dhvāntasaṅghātaham mahaḥ.
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K RAJARAM IRS PART 8 23924
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