The world of waking is in many respects similar to that of dream.
The objects of waking are perceived as the dream-objects are; and they are
evanescent as well, like the contents of dream. What is non-existent in the
beginning and at the end, is so even in the present. That is real which is
not conditioned by time. Per contra that which is conditioned by time
cannot be real. Just as the dream-objects are experienced in dream alone
neither before nor after, even so the objects of waking are experienced in
the state of waking alone. A difference between the two states cannot be
made out on the ground that, while the objects experienced in waking are
practically efficient, those seen in dream are not; for even the objects of
waking experience are fruitful in practice only in that state and not in
dream; and the dream-objects are useful in their own way in the state of
dream. It is true that the dream-water cannot quench actual thirst. But it
is equally true that the so-called actual water cannot quench the
dream-thirst either. It may be argued that the contents of a dream are
unreal because, unlike the objects of waking, they are strange and
abnormal. But when and to whom do they appear abnormal? To him who has
returned to waking after a dream. In the dream state itself the contents
are not realised to be strange. With perfect equanimity the dreamer may
watch even the dismemberment of his own head. We are told that the denizens
of heaven have their own peculiarities which to us are all abnormal.
Similarly, from the side of waking the dream-contents may seem abnormal;
but in themselves they are quite normal. That there is an essential
similarity between the contents of dream and the objects of waking may be
shown by a closer scrutiny of the two states. In the state of dream, the
dreamer imagines certain ideas within himself and sees certain things
outside; and he believes that, while the former are unreal, the latter are
real. But as soon as he wakes from the dream, he realises the unreality of
even the things which he saw in dream as if outside. Similarly in waking,
we have our fantasies which we know to be unreal, and we experience facts
which we take to be real. But when the delusion of duality is dispelled,
the so-called facts of the external world will turn out to be an illusory
appearance. Therefore it is that the wise characterise waking as a dream]
Just as the dream-soul arises and perishes, the souls of waking come into
being and pass away.[ It is the self that posits the dream-contents as well
as the external world. The things created in the mind within and those
posited in the world without—both these are the illusory imaginations of
the Ātman. The difference between the two sets of things is that while the
dream-contents last only till the mind of the dreamer imagines them
(cittakālāḥ) and are peculiar thereto, the objects of the external world
are perceived by other subjects as well (dvayakālāḥ), and are cognised
through the sense-organs. Illusoriness (vaitathya), however, is common to
both. In dream as well as in waking it is the mind that moves impelled by
Māyā, and creates the appearance of plurality. As identical with the self
the mind is non-dual; but owing to nescience duality is figured and there
is the consequent saṃsāra.
Illustrations for illusoriness are to be found even in the state of waking.
Just as in the dark a rope which is not determinately known is imagined to
be a snake or a streak of water, the self is imagined to be the world
through nescience. And as when the rope is known as rope the posited snake,
etc., vanish, so also when the self is known as non-dual, that pluralistic
world disappears. Like the Palace city of Fairy Morgana (gandharva-nagara),
the universe is seen but is not real The things of the world are believed
to exist because they are perceived (upalaṃbhāt) and because they answer to
certain practical needs (samāchārāt) . But these two reasons cannot make
them real; for even the objects like the elephant conjured up by the
necromancer are observed and are practically efficient but are not real.
One more illustration Gauḍapāda gives in the fourth chapter, viz. the alāta
or fire-brand. When a fire-brand is moved, it appears to be straight, or
crooked, and so on; and when the movement stops, the appearance vanishes.
They do not really come from the fire-brand in motion, nor do they enter
into it when it comes to rest. The patterns of fire that appear with the
movement of the fire-brand are illusory; they have no substance whatsoever.
Similarly, consciousness appears in manifold forms due to Māyā. These do
not come out of it, in reality, nor do they return to it; for they are
naught. There is no dissolution, no origination; no one in bondage, no one
who desires release, no one who is released—this is the supreme truth.
6 The establishment of the non-reality of the world by Gauḍapāda does not
mean that the great teacher subscribes to the view of ontological unreality
(śūnyavāda). We have already seen how in the Āgama-prakaraṇa he expounds
the meaning of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and shows through an inquiry into the
nature of the three avasthās that the Self (t urīya) is the sole reality.
That this is so Gauḍapāda argues through reasoning in the
Advaita-prakaraṇa, and cities in support the evidence of passages from
other scriptural texts as well.
The self is unlimited like ether, undivided and the same throughout. The
jīvas asre apparent distinctions therein, as pots, etc., produce in ether
divisions as it were. We speak of a plurality of souls and a multiplicity
of material objects, even as we speak of pot-ether, pitcher-ether, and so
on. The one Ātman appears as the many jīvas, as the same ether seems
divided, enclosed in the different things. When the things are destroyed,
the distinctions in ether too vanish; so also when the jīvas are realised
to be manifestations due to Māyā, the self alone remains. There is no
contingence of the defects of one jīva being occasioned in the other jīvas
or the defects of the jīvas defiling the purity of the self. It must be
noted that Gauḍapāda’s theory is not eka-jīva-vāda but ekā-’tma-vāda. Since
the empirical plurality of jīvas is recognised, there is not the
contingence of the defects of one jīva being occasioned in the others or
the experiences of one being confused with those of the rest. And by the
defilments of the jīvas the self is not affected, as dust, smoke, etc.,
present in the pots or pitchers do not make either foul. Forms, functions,
and names differ from object to object; but there is no difference in
ether. Similarly, the jīvas vary in their physical make-up, mental and
moral endowment, in station and status; but the self is unvarying,
formless, functionless, and nameless. Just as children wrongly attribute
dirt, etc., to the sky, the ignorant superpose on the unsullied self
defects like birth and death, pleasure and pain. But these are changes that
are not real and do not touch the self. The birth of the jīvas and their
death, their coming and going, do not alter the Ātman. They are not
products of the self, nor are they parts thereof. The non-dual reality is
partless; it neither causes anything, nor is caused by anything.
Scripture in many places proclaims the non-duality of the self and
deprecates the delusion of duality. Through an inquiry into the five
sheaths (kośas) that cover the soul, the Taittirīya Upaniṣad exhibits the
self as the non-dual bliss, not to be confused with the mutable coverings.
In the ‘Honey section’ of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka the principle behind the cosmic
elements is identified with the self which is the substrate of the body and
its functions. What is without is within as well. The same ‘honey’ pervades
all beings. It is immortal, the self, Brahman, the all. As the spokes are
fixed in the nave of a wheel, so are all beings centred in the self. Thus
scripture declares the non-difference of the jīva from the self and
denounces plurality. Difference is illusory; the one appears as many
through Māyā.
“There is no plurality here.”
“Indra through māyās assumes diverse forms.”
“Though unborn he appears variously born.”
The Īśāvāsya denies birth of the self, and the Bṛhadārmyaka asks, “Who
indeed could produce him?” What is real birth is incomprehensible; and what
is unreal cannot even be born.
It is true that in some contexts scripture speaks of creation. Through the
illustrations of clay, metal, sparks, etc., creation of the many from the
one is described. But this is only to enable those who are dull-witted and
middlings to understand the fundamental unity of reality. Śruti declares
creation in some places, and non-creation in others. The two sets of
passages cannot have equal validity. That teaching should be taken as the
purport of scripture which is ascertained through inquiry (niśchitam) and
is reasonable (yukti-yuktam) . If birth is predicated on the real, it must
be in the sense of an illusion, and not in the primary sense. The self is
unborn, sleepless and dreamless, nameless and formless, self-luminous and
all-knowing.
7 That the self is unborn and that nothing else there is which is born,
Gauḍapāda seeks to demonstrate through a dialectical criticism of the
causal category in the fourth chapter. Causation, like all other relations,
falls within the realm of nescience, because on analysis it turns out to be
unintelligible. There are two rival views on causation which are totally
opposed to each other. The Sāṅkhya theory is that the effect is
pre-existent in the cause and is not produced de novo. The Nyāya-Vaiśeśhika
view is that the effect is non-existent prior to its production. On either
of these hypotheses there will not result in causation. If the effect is
already existent, there is no need for any causal operation; it is
meaningless to say that what is existent is bora. If the effect is
non-existent, it can never be produced; what is non-existent like the
barren woman’s son is not at any time seen to take birth.[43] Even without
their knowing the two rival schools, satkārya-vāda and asatkārya-vāda, are
thus seen to support the view of noncreation or non-origination.
Of what is really unborn the disputants predicate birth. But this is a
flagrant violation of the law of contradiction. How can that which is
unborn and therefore immortal become mortal? The immortal cannot become
mortal, nor the mortal immortal; for it is impossible for a thing to change
its nature. If what is by nature immortal were to become mortal, then it
would cease to be changeless, and attain artificiality, illusoriness. But
this is impossible for what is immortal by nature. The Sāṅkhya thinks that
the unborn and beginningless Prakṛti evolves itself into the manifold
evolutes that constitute the universe. But this view cannot be justified by
any canon of logic. If Prakṛti becomes the world, it cannot be unborn (aja)
and eternal (nitya). Even to admit that there is a first cause is to
confess the failure of causation as a principle of explanation. To add to
the confusion the Sāṅkhya says that the effect is non-different from the
cause. Now, is the effect born or unborn? If it is born, it cannot be
non-different from the cause which is unborn. If it is unborn, then it
cannot be called ‘effect’, as the effect is that which is produced. And if
the effect is produced and is non-different from the cause, the cause
cannot be permanent or unchanging. There is no illustration that could be
instanced to prove the production of the effect from the unborn cause. If
to avoid this difficulty it be said that the cause too is born, then there
should be a cause for that cause, a still further cause for that other
cause, and so on ad infinitum.
The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that the cause and the effect are reciprocally
dependent. Merit and demerit are responsible for producing the body; and
the body occasions merit and demerit. The chain of causes and effects is
without beginning, each alternating with the other, like the seed and the
sprout. Here again we meet with insuperable difficulties. If the antecedent
of a cause is its effect and the antecedent of an effect is its cause, then
both cause and effect are begun. How can they be beginningless? Moreover,
there is a paradox in the very thesis that is proposed. To say that the
antecedent of the cause is its effect is like saying that the son begets
his father. There must be some definite sequence recognised as between
cause and effect. It is no use believing that the two are reciprocally
dependent. If the cause and the effect can be indifferently antecedent or
consequent, there would be no distinction whatsoever between them, and to
call one a cause and the other an effect would be entirely arbitrary and
void of meaning. Now, there are three possible ways of stating the
sequence. It may be said that first there is the cause and subsequently the
effect takes place (pūrva-krama); or it may be held that the effect is
followed by the cause (apara-krama); or it may be thought that the cause
and the effect are simultaneous (saha-krama) . None of these alternatives
is intelligible. That the cause cannot produce the effect we have shown
already. If the cause is unborn, it cannot change and therefore cannot
produce; if it is born there is infinite regress. The reverse order too is
impossible; for, as we said, it is just like making the son antecedent to
the father. The effect by definition is that which is produced by the
cause; and if the cause is not there before the effect, how can the effect
be produced? And from the unproduced effect how can the cause come into
being? The third alternative also is untenable. If what are simultaneous be
causally related, there must be such a relation between the two horns of an
animal. But as a matter of experience it is well known that the two horns
are not so related. This, then, is the crux of the problem. Without
settling the sequence, the distinction of cause and effect would be
unintelligible. And it is impossible to settle the sequence. In despair,
appeal might be made to the illustration of seed and sprout. But a little
thought would reveal that these—seed and sprout—cannot serve as
illustration. It is only when the causal sequence has been settled that the
relation between seed and sprout would become intelligible. Since the
latter is a particular falling under the wider relation of cause and
effect, it cannot be used as an illustration. It is, in short, sādhya-sama,
still to be proved.
A thing is not produced either from itself or from another. A pot is not
produced from the self-same pot, nor from another pot. It may be urged that
pot is produced from clay. But how is pot related to day? Is it
non-different, different, or both different and non-different from it? If
pot is non-different from clay, it cannot be produced, since day is already
existent. If it is different, there is no reason why it should not be
produced from another pot or a piece of doth which are also different. And
it cannot be both different and non-different, because of contradiction.
Similarly, neither the existent nor the non-existent nor what is existent
and non-existent can be produced. It is meaningless to say that what exists
is produced. The non-existent cannot be produced even because of its
non-existence. The third alternative involves us in contradiction.
It is true that empirical distinctions are observed between knower and
known, pain and the source of pain, etc. From the standpoint of reasoning
based on relative experience (yukti-darśanāt), there are differences as
also causal relation governing the differences. But from the standpoint of
the Absolute (bhūta-darśanāt) there is no difference and the concept of
cause is unintelligible.
Gauḍapāda admits creation in the sphere of the empirical. But creation,
according to him, is neither de novo nor transformation of an original
stuff. It is of the nature of Māyā, illusory manifestation or
transfiguration. The world is not related to the self either as a piece of
doth to the threads or as curds to milk. In fact, no relation is
intelligible. The one reality somehow appears as the pluralistic universe
through its own Māyā (ātma-māyā). The complexes that constitute the world
are projections, like the dream-contents, affected by the illusion of the
Ātman. Things are said to be born only from the standpoint of empirical
truth (saṃvṛti-satya) they have therefore no permanence. Just as an
illusive sprout shoots from an illusive seed, all things arise from Māyā.
There are several theories of creation. Some philosophers favour
materialistic origins for the world. For example, there are thinkers who
attribute the origination of the universe to Time. Theists, however, regard
God as the first cause of things. Some of them ascribe to Him efficient
causality alone, others both efficient and material causality. The former
say that creation is the mere volition of the Lord, while the latter hold
that it is His expansion. Some maintain that God creates for the sake of
His enjoyment. Others urge that creation is His sport. But how can desire
be in God who is āpta-kāma and has no end to achieve? In our ignorance we
must content ourselves with saying that creation is His nature or māyā.
Like dream and magic it is illusory. The non-dual world is imagined to be
the manifold world. The latter is neither different from the self nor
identical therewith. Hence it is declared to be indeterminable.
The philosophers of the different schools characterise the real in
different ways and give their own schemes of categories. Each emphasises
one particular aspect of reality and holds on to it as if it were the
whole. The self has been variously conceived as life, elements,
constituents of Primal Nature, things, worlds, Vedas, sacrifice, what is
subtle, what is gross, what has form, what has no form, and so on.
According to the Sāṅkhyas, there are twenty-five tattvas or principles. To
these, the followers of the Yoga system add one more, viz., God. In the
view of the Pāśupatas there are twenty-one categories. There are others who
make the categories endless in number. All these theories are but the
imaginations of their respective advocates There is only one self which
appears as many through self-delusion as it were. First the jīvas are
imagined and then the various things, external and internal. The world of
souls and things is an appearance superposed on the self, as the snake-form
is imposed on the rope-substance in the dark
The teaching of creation has no final purport. As has been shown already,
what is real cannot be really born. If it is said to be born, it must be in
the sense of an illusory appearance. Ordinarily it is stated that, saṃsāra
which has no beginning comes to an end when release is attained. But this
is figurative language. If saṃsāra had no beginning, it could not have an
end. If release is attained, it is liable to be lost again.] If the
universe really existed, it would be destroyed. As we have observed,
duality is māyā-mātra, mere illusion. Removal of saṃsāra and attainment of
mokṣa are figurative. These have to be taught in a language which needs to
relate to duality. When the real is known, there is no duality whatsoever.
9 True to its character as an upadeśa-śāstra, the Gauḍapāda-kārikā
contains practical teaching at the end of each chapter. The purpose of a
śāstra is to enable the aspirant to cross the sea of saṃsāra and reach the
shore of blessedness which is the highest human goal (parama-puruṣārtha).
The vicious circle of empirical life dependent on the law of cause and
effect is evil (anartha). This, however, as has been shown above, is a
product of avidyā or Māyā. As long as there is an obstinate faith in
causality which is illusory (āvidyaka), the chain of birth and death will
not cease. When that false belief is destroyed through knowledge, saṃsāra
is removed. The cause of birth and death is ignorance as regards the
ultimate truth which is causeless. When this is realised, there is no
further cause for metempsychosis, and we attain release which is freedom
from sorrow, desire, and fear. Attachment to the non-real is responsible
for the illusory wanderings in the wilderness of saṃsāra. When one becomes
non-attached through knowledge, one turns back from the false pursuit of
the non-real, and reaches the non-dual reality which is homogeneous and
unborn.
The real bliss is veiled and the non-real sorrow is projected on
account of the perfection of illusory plurality. Enshrouded by the darkness
of ignorance, those of immature knowledge (bāliśaḥ) dispute about what they
consider to be the nature of reality. Some say, it is; some, it is not;
others, it is and is not; yet others, it neither is nor is not. All these
are kṛpaṇas, narrow-minded, who see fear in the fearless, and follow the
way of difference, getting themselves engrossed therein. Opposed to these
are the great knowers (mahājñānāḥ) who are settled in their wisdom about
the unborn, unchanging reality.
The knowledge which saves is not that which remains a mere theoretical
comprehension, but that which has become a direct experience. Study of
scripture, ethical discipline, detachment from objects of sense and intense
longing for release—these are essential for realising the self. The
aspirant should learn the purport of the Veda and acquire freedom from
passions like attachment, fear, and anger (vita-rāga-bhaya-krodhaḥ); and he
should fix his thoughts on the non-dual reality. Gauḍapāda teaches two
methods of concentrating the mind on the non-dual, Pranava-yoga in the
first chapter and Asparsa-yoga in the third. These are to serve as
auxiliaries to the knowledge of the Absolute, methods to loosen the cords
of ignorance.
Asparśa-yoga is the yoga of transcendence, whereby one realises the
supra-relational reality. Saṅkalpa is the root of activity and bondage. The
mind contemplates objects and gets distracted and shattered with the result
that there is no peace or happiness. Acceptance and desistance are
motivated by the centrifugal tendency of thought-process. Hie out-going
mind should be called back and controlled. Controlling the mind is
difficult, indeed, as difficult as emptying the ocean drop by drop by the
tip of kuśa grass. But it is not an impossible task; only it requires
relentless effort. If the mind is restrained through discrimination, the
end will certainly be reached. One must remember first that all is misery
and turn back from desires and enjoyments. The mind that moves out must be
brought to unity. But in this process care must be taken that it does not
fall into sleep. When the mind goes to sleep, it must be awakened; when it
tries to go out, it must be calmed. When the stormy mind is stifled, there
is the thrill of quietude. But one should not reveal even in this yogic
trance. Anything that is enjoyed must belong to duality; it cannot be
unlimited or lasting happiness. The mind must become non-mind (amanībhāva);
the relations of subject and object, enjoyer and enjoyment must be
transcended. This will come only through the knowledge of the non-dual
self. Knowledge and the self are not different. Knowledge is the self or
Brahman. Hence it is said that through the unborn (knowledge) the unborn
(Brahman) is known. Self-established, the unborn knowledge attains its
natural equanimity or sameness. This is called asparśa-yoga, the yoga which
is pleasing and good to all beings, and which is beyond dispute and
contradiction.
The same end may be reached through meditation on OM (praṇavayoga). ‘Om’ is
the term indicative of the Brahman-self. It consists of three mātras, a, u,
m, and a soundless fourth which is amātra, A stands for Viśva, u for
Taijasa, and m for Prājña. Meditation on the significance of the three
sounds respectively will lead to the realisation of the three aspects of
the self. The sound ‘om’ proceeds from and is resolved in the soundless
amātra. Similarly, the Turīya is the absolute which is unchanging and
non-dual, but which appears as many and changing. When the meaning of the
soundless culmination of Om is realised, there is leading to or attainment
of anything; for the Turīya is no other than real and only self. Thus the
Praṇava is to be meditated upon and known. It is the beginning, middle and
end of all things. It is the lord established in the heart of all beings.
There is nothing before it nor anything after it, nothing outside it nor
anything other than it. Understanding the Pranava in this manner, one
attains the supreme.
Mokṣa or release is not a post-mortem state; it can be realised even here
(iha), while in embodiment. To speak of it as an attainment or realisation
is but figurative. It is the eternal and inalienable nature of the self. He
who knows this is released, he is a jīvan-mukta. Because he has attained
full omniscience and is free from the delusion of duality, there is nothing
for him which he can desire. He is not elated by praise nor depressed by
blame. He does not offer obeisance to any, nor does he perform any rite. He
has no fixed home, and subsists on what omes his way. He lies like a
non-conscious being, and lives as he likes. Though he has no obligations,
his conduct can never be immoral. Virtues like humility, equanimity,
calmness, and self-control are natural to him. His is the immortal state
which is difficult to be seen, very deep, unborn, ever the same, and
fearless. He sees the truth everywhere. He delights in the truth and does
not swerve from it. He is the truth.
10 From the account of Gauḍapāda’s philosophy given above it will be clear
that this great teacher was an Advaitin, the earliest known to us—who in
his Kārikā laid the foundations of a philosophy which was to become a
glorious edifice through the immortal work of Śaṅkara. While making use of
logical reasoning and the dialectical method, he does not deviate from the
teaching of the Upaniṣads. Even where he employs Bauddha terminology, he
takes care to point out that his system should not be confused with
Buddhism. While denying absolute reality to the world, he is firm in
proclaiming that the non-dual Brahman-self is the supreme truth. He has no
quarrel with any system of philosophy because, in his view, all systems if
properly understood are pointers to non-duality. While the dualists oppose
one another, the doctrine of non-duality does not conflict with them] Ajāti
or the unborn reality is the final goal of all metaphysial quest.
K RAJARAM IRS 19924 PART 4
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