On Sun, Oct 11, 2015 at 01:12:53PM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
> No, I'd consider it a technique to avoid having
> your exit put on braindead tor-hating consensus
> scraping blacklists... a feature not a bug... with
Tor users aren't entitled to special treatment,
and another false conclusion one could
On Sun, Oct 11, 2015 at 05:36:22PM -0700, coderman wrote:
> it would be fun to compare different Tor configurations:
> - Tor Browser
Mozilla browser (and plugins) more or less hardwired to Tor.
> - TAILS
Distribution (app-armored) failing to boot, when no NIC is
present or detected (last time I
On Fri, Oct 09, 2015 at 07:05:08PM +0200, Aymeric Vitte wrote:
> Anyway I don't think that's really of the interest of this list except
> that some exit nodes operators might envision to use something like the
> dynamic blocklist, if some are often bothered by notices/letters we can
> propose a tri
On Thu, Oct 08, 2015 at 07:53:02PM -0700, coderman wrote:
> "security vs. usability", as ever...
Thats not what the discussion is about any longer, the
discussion is about security and convenience.
Thats what you fail to grasp, imho.
> consider the Tor Browser PDF exploit that accessed $HOME for
On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 10:40:06PM +, behnaz Shirazi wrote:
> why you think we are limited to less than ~999 possible proxy?
Sorry, I simply stop here, since we are not talking discussing TBB
or Tor anymore.
> 1-as I said UnidentifiableMode is not made for everyday life, we only
> use it for
On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 11:47:40PM +0200, Aymeric Vitte wrote:
> Most of the study is now here:
> https://gist.github.com/Ayms/f2da9f860775ead2066e but some parts remain
> undisclosed.
> For those that don't like the 'paid' aspect of the blocklist, see the TF
> comments:
Historically, there is not
On Mon, Oct 05, 2015 at 04:00:36PM -0700, coderman wrote:
> the primary problem with Pidgin is libpurple [
> https://pidgin.im/news/security/ ] and a more appropriate mitigation
> would be Qubes isolation, perhaps Whonix-Qubes on new 3.0. :)
One of the major problems is the design of Pidign, which
On Wed, Oct 07, 2015 at 09:28:24AM -0300, Ben Mezger wrote:
> - The Tor Network encryption
> - A analysis of the Tor Network (Packets, internal security and etc)
> - Real world use
http://freehaven.net/ carries most academic research and
https://gitweb.torproject.org/ is were you find technical sp
On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 12:48:22PM -0700, Kit Carson McGuire wrote:
> I do like Tor Browser, but I'd like to know why the Tor Browser places
> me (according to Google) everywhere except where I am actually located?
> I am in central Arizona, but every time I open Tor Browser my start page
> (http
On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 03:22:03PM +0200, aka wrote:
> If millions of people would use the same Firefox on the same version
> with mostly the same browser/javascript behaviour, it would make TBB
> obsolete. Wouldn't it make more sense to include those anonymity patches
> into the mainline Firefox a
On Mon, Oct 05, 2015 at 03:47:35PM -0700, Spencer wrote:
> Yes, but discrimination is unsupported and avoidable.
Discrimination happens between you and your endpoint,
not between you and Tor. It may be that a exit discriminates,
if you request a destination port that isn't available
on some exits
On Mon, Oct 05, 2015 at 02:14:11AM -0700, Spencer wrote:
> The various bits that define your fingerprint.
That makes only sense if you sync your clients requests
to TrackHostExitsExpire, the effect on CDNs that stick
lots of cookies to you, is that what happens to the folks
in the cloudflare threa
While using the exits
EF8AFB7F6A040CBE0ABA2C5A76BE04D84524C56B~Heaven
184E9215A97F21323BF8661329FCB6F89305CDAC~QPgufmQMLX9T
to i.e. http://www.freedesktop.org (and some academic sites)
we observe occasionally strange behavior, like HTTP
requests redirected from port 80 to 8123.
I can't tell much
On Sat, Oct 03, 2015 at 09:16:50AM +, behnaz Shirazi wrote:
> If we use a socks proxy server to talk with destination instead of a
> private Tor exit node then such an attack becomes as dangerous as when
> you are using a detectable TBB over a public Tor exit node because the
> number of socks
On Fri, Oct 02, 2015 at 09:08:38PM -0700, Spencer wrote:
> They suck (time and energy). They seem to only come in robot
> discrimination form.
This will never be solved, since tors main property is to hide
the origin of requests, it provides more benefits to an possible
adversary from the view/
On Fri, Oct 02, 2015 at 04:58:12PM +, behnaz Shirazi wrote:
> As I said it won't happen. It doesn't make sense to use
> undetectableizer when using a public Tor exit node because that will
> compromise you are using Tor thereby minority of undetectable users
> won't hurt anonymity of major dete
On Mon, Sep 28, 2015 at 09:51:30PM +, mtsio wrote:
> Is it safe to use pidgin over tor?
It depends on which protocols you use, since pidgin
is a mulitprotocol instant messaging client and behaves
quite different depending on protocols used/involved.
With Tor, TLS[1], XMPP[2] and OTR[3] it get
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