On Sun, Oct 11, 2015 at 01:12:53PM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > No, I'd consider it a technique to avoid having > your exit put on braindead tor-hating consensus > scraping blacklists... a feature not a bug... with
Tor users aren't entitled to special treatment, and another false conclusion one could draw from that is one is being MITMed. If you get the impression a service like Tor isn't honest to you, you may consider it open the usual FUD from parties who don't like Tor. Honestly, you don't want that. Since Tor is available to everyone, it shoud be easy to not to unwillingly participate too. The rationale behind this, is for example a Site offers services that stores user data and ip-addresses, that information could be made or become available to 3rd parties. It could be a site-ops choice, not to allow users to use his services, since it may compromise them. Ever thought of that? > the great side effect that such exits are usable to > circumvent similar braindead / hating censorship > directed at tor users. Have you ever considered, that people who operate hidden services for websites, like to redirect people to said hidden services instead of relying on exits? How can we do that without relying on tors internal information or query other services? > Exonerator is for operators, that's their choice there. Exonerator is available to everyone, and some assumptions Karsten has, like storing IPs forever aren't even in the best interests of all operators. And I feel the tor-project should be much more open and aware of possible impacts and sideeffects from all the information it stores longterm. Sorry, if that sounds scary, but some relay operators I met the this year hat quite a negative relay experience. > I'd rather add a blurb on check.tpo to hit newnym > and check again if user has reason to believe they're > using tor than start booting relays because of this. > (Or "fixing" exit DB / check.tpo by scanning). The consensus enables us to build circuits, and the Exit _*FLAG*_ that this node could be an endpoint for a circuit. Basically, were a packet leaves isn't relevant to operate, since it uses circuits and nodes participating doesn't need to know. ;) I am currently wrapping my head around this, trying to figure out if it makes correlation attacks easier or MITMing and inserting convert channels between arbitrary nodes harder. Any other conclusion we draw from that, shows a lack of understanding in either the consensus or Tor. While we are at it, I consider having the exit ip for multihomed nodes in the consensus beneficary. If you like to start including additional information into the consensus consider the AS too. The data is available form the RIRs, I am using it with a Tor monitor, that isn't libre and I am not sure how the RIRs would like to have their services put under load. Anyway, I am moving this to tor-talk with the intention to discuss, at least, a multihomed flag. Could be provided like the Family-Information. TYVM. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
