Text of possible interest to anons...
Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4941
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On Wed, 30 Jan 2013 19:41:50 +0100
"Sebastian G. " wrote:
> > How far along is the Directory Server decentralization in general?
>
> If you talk about DHT (distributed hash tables) to bootstrap rather
> than fetching the consensus from a central place or a mirror... I
> remember that it wasn't sa
Thus spake unknown (unkn...@pgpru.com):
> On Wed, 30 Jan 2013 15:49:54 -0400
> Mike Perry wrote:
>
> > Longer term, I'm interested in having some form (or better: many forms)
> > of multipath consensus validation:
>
> May be that algo is relevant to independed control of consensus data:
> https
On Wed, 30 Jan 2013 15:49:54 -0400
Mike Perry wrote:
> Longer term, I'm interested in having some form (or better: many forms)
> of multipath consensus validation:
May be that algo is relevant to independed control of consensus data:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linked_timestamping
Any Tor nod
On 01/30/2013 10:20 AM, unknown wrote:
> Just my personal example.
>
> I use up to 6 anonymous installations of TBB in one Debian system.
> They runs in parallel, with parallel runned X-session from different users
> and pointed with iptables to different ports of one system Tor-daemon to
> comp
On 01/30/2013 12:26 AM, Jérémy Bobbio wrote:
When a user runs the launcher script, it checks if
~/.torbrowser/$VERSION exists. If it doesn't, it extracts the TBB
tarball to there. Then it runs ~/.torbrowser/$VERSION/start-tor-browser.
>
> How do you handle home directories that are
Thus spake Raynardine (raynard...@tormail.org):
> On 1/30/2013 11:58 AM, unknown wrote:
> > On Tue, 29 Jan 2013 19:49:23 -0600
> > Raynardine wrote:
> >
> >> I just wanted to ask here in Tor-Talk where the efforts to decentralize
> >> the Tor directory servers have gone so far?
> > One of the goa
On Wed, 30 Jan 2013 12:17:04 -0600
Raynardine wrote:
> What happens if a government (such as the United States)
> demands the private keys for the Directory Authorities? Would you even
> know if it has already happened years ago?
And what? Everyone can run your own tor node and see in the consen
Hi,
(trimmed)
me replying as non-tor-people, non-dev, non-crypto-expert, non-researcher.
Raynardine:
> How far along is the Directory Server decentralization in general?
If you talk about DHT (distributed hash tables) to bootstrap rather than
fetching the consensus from a central place or a mir
On Wed, 30 Jan 2013 09:26:22 +0100
Jérémy Bobbio wrote:
> > >> Releasing updated versions is simple. The update would include a new TBB
> > >> tarball and the launcher script would include a new version, so the next
> > >> time a user runs Tor Browser it will extract the new version in their
> >
On 1/30/2013 11:58 AM, unknown wrote:
> On Tue, 29 Jan 2013 19:49:23 -0600
> Raynardine wrote:
>
>> I just wanted to ask here in Tor-Talk where the efforts to decentralize
>> the Tor directory servers have gone so far?
> One of the goals of centralizing is protect Tor against attacks
> based on th
On Tue, 29 Jan 2013 19:49:23 -0600
Raynardine wrote:
> I just wanted to ask here in Tor-Talk where the efforts to decentralize
> the Tor directory servers have gone so far?
One of the goals of centralizing is protect Tor against attacks
based on the desynchronisation and dividing stats for users
Actually, I might be a good fit. Feel free to ping me off-list to discuss.
On Wed, Jan 30, 2013 at 11:22 AM, Damian Johnson wrote:
>> Can anyone tell me what mechanisms we (or the Tor Project members)
>> have in scanning for malicious exit nodes. Such as nodes that are
>> manipulating DNS request
> Can anyone tell me what mechanisms we (or the Tor Project members)
> have in scanning for malicious exit nodes. Such as nodes that are
> manipulating DNS requests, stripping SSL, etc. I know of the SOAT
> project from Mike Perry but the last I heard there was a GSOC dev
> working on the project.
Can anyone tell me what mechanisms we (or the Tor Project members)
have in scanning for malicious exit nodes. Such as nodes that are
manipulating DNS requests, stripping SSL, etc. I know of the SOAT
project from Mike Perry but the last I heard there was a GSOC dev
working on the project. Is that st
Micah Lee:
> Right now no one owns the bug in trac, so I don't think anyone is
> thinking about it: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5236
>
> I have limited time and I'm not sure I want the responsibility of being
> the TBB deb package maintainer, although it shouldn't be much work s
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