Hi, (trimmed)
me replying as non-tor-people, non-dev, non-crypto-expert, non-researcher. Raynardine: > How far along is the Directory Server decentralization in general? If you talk about DHT (distributed hash tables) to bootstrap rather than fetching the consensus from a central place or a mirror... I remember that it wasn't safe enough back at that time. I don't know if anyone is working on it. > How is the idea of breaking up the Tor relay list into smaller groups to > frustrate efforts to block Tor in certain countries? If that's for the relay list, probably not so useful. Censors could still put them back together. Every client has to know about the network. All an attacker would have to do is run a client and block every IP:PORT it finds in the consensus. And the list of relays is available. Projects of the Tor Project show currently running relays. If that's for unlisted relays aka bridges, it exists to some degree. The pool of bridges is split and different addresses are given out via email, website and manually. > Has anyone broached the idea of more isolated Bridge communities with > their own independent directories, yet? If I'm not mistaking Torservers.net operates bridges that don't publish themselves to the BridgeDB. > What about the idea of being able to easily create custom "spins" of the > Tor Browser Bundle for use over private VPN networks or special private > bridge relay networks? The are bundles containing obfsproxy and flash proxy to work around blockades. It separates the user base. It is also a malware problem. I haven't seen such bundle, but they seem to exist. People seem to find it a good idea to repack the bundle with some nasty stuff. Therefore users have to trust those creating these "spins". > What about the ability to run Tor "Gateways" which act as a gateway > between private bridge communities and the relays they use there, and > the public global relay network? Please have a look at flash proxy [1], it goes in that direction with ticket 7944 [2] > Thank you for your time, and I appreciate any feedback on any of these > ideas. Thank you for your time as well. Thank you for thinking about how to improve/change things. Regards, Sebastian (bastik_tor) [1] http://crypto.stanford.edu/flashproxy/ [2] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7944 _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk