On Tue, Sep 11, 2012 at 1:36 AM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
> Nick Mathewson:
>> On Mon, Sep 10, 2012 at 10:28 PM, grarpamp wrote:
>>> The typical use case is wanting to use multiple accounts on the
>>> same site at once, with a guarantee that you're not appearing to
>>> be from the same exit and thu
Nick Mathewson:
> On Mon, Sep 10, 2012 at 10:28 PM, grarpamp wrote:
>> The typical use case is wanting to use multiple accounts on the
>> same site at once, with a guarantee that you're not appearing to
>> be from the same exit and thus are not as easily linked.
>>
>
> This doesn't make sense to
> Tor's hidden service protocol
I get most of the protocol.
> Patient: `Doctor, it hurts when I do this.'
> Doctor: `Don't do that then.'
Though I might agree, more perhaps from the humor aspect :) We all
know telling users not to do something, that is at least marginally
possible, doesn't work.
On Tue, Sep 11, 2012 at 12:21 AM, grarpamp wrote:
>>> The typical use case is wanting to use multiple accounts on the
>>> same site at once, with a guarantee that you're not appearing to
>>> be from the same exit and thus are not as easily linked.
>
>> This doesn't make sense to me. If you've got
>> The typical use case is wanting to use multiple accounts on the
>> same site at once, with a guarantee that you're not appearing to
>> be from the same exit and thus are not as easily linked.
> This doesn't make sense to me. If you've got two requests open from
> the same exit to the same site
On Mon, Sep 10, 2012 at 10:28 PM, grarpamp wrote:
> The typical use case is wanting to use multiple accounts on the
> same site at once, with a guarantee that you're not appearing to
> be from the same exit and thus are not as easily linked.
>
This doesn't make sense to me. If you've got two req
On Mon, Sep 10, 2012 at 10:10 PM, grarpamp wrote:
>> - Log fewer lines at level "notice" about our OpenSSL and Libevent
>> versions and capabilities when everything is going right.
>
> The version confirmation was handy when you're compiling
> static and want to know what actually made i
I noticed this when trying multiple SocksPort's. I ended up with
the following circuits, listed in order of command invocation:
port 8051 circ 35 nodes R1 R2 E1
port 8052 circ 34 nodes R3 R4 R5 E1
Note the same exit was selected.
Also, the second circuit was longer.
I don't think either of these
> - Log fewer lines at level "notice" about our OpenSSL and Libevent
> versions and capabilities when everything is going right.
The version confirmation was handy when you're compiling
static and want to know what actually made it into the binary
without using strings. Doesn't matter to
OnionLand now has well over 500 known onions online :)
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On Mon, Sep 10, 2012 at 06:49:31PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> https://www.torproject.org/download/download
Ok, I lied. While 0.2.2 and 0.2.3 are both still alive, it is unwise
to clutter our download page with alpha releases. You can find the
tarballs at
https://www.torproject.org/dist/
--R
Tor 0.2.4.2-alpha enables port forwarding for pluggable transports,
raises the default rate limiting even more, and makes the bootstrapping
log messages less noisy.
https://www.torproject.org/download/download
(Packages coming eventually.)
Changes in version 0.2.4.2-alpha - 2012-09-10
o Major
On 2012-09-10, at 8:56 AM, adrelanos wrote:
> antispa...@sent.at:
>> On Mon, Sep 10, 2012, at 00:21, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
>>> It would facilitate the inclusion of Tor in third party applications
>>> that include/bundle/redistribute Tor, regardless of the Linux
>>> Distribution.
>>
>> S
antispa...@sent.at:
> On Mon, Sep 10, 2012, at 00:21, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
>> It would facilitate the inclusion of Tor in third party applications
>> that include/bundle/redistribute Tor, regardless of the Linux
>> Distribution.
>
> Sounds like a potential risk, the third party interven
On Mon, 2012-09-10 at 12:16 +0200, antispa...@sent.at wrote:
> Pidgin is one. But I have read about it having leaks, thus the removal
> from the TBB.
What leaks does Pidgin have? I've configured it to connect to hidden
services before, so it can't have DNS leaks, can it?
Tor used to support a To
antispa...@sent.at:
> Do you know any clients built with anonymity in mind? I wish to
> run something that doesn't need a reboot into a safe distro like Tails
> just to shield the leaks.
Torchat, jtorchat, pidgin-torchat and maybe cryptocat?
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warms0x:
> There's a couple of problems with this approach:
> [...]
> * The amount of time required to negotiate an HTTP request being proxied
> from A.onion -> B.onion and then sending a request from B.onion ->
> A.onion -> Client would very likely brush up against HTTP timeouts (120s)
I don't u
On Mon, Sep 10, 2012 at 12:03:48PM +0200, antispa...@sent.at wrote 0.5K bytes
in 12 lines about:
: This is a silly idea. But how about it? Can I tweak the pack somehow so
: I get two TorBrowser windows working independent of one another? Do I
: need two Vidalias too? The idea would be to have my r
On 9/10/2012 5:16 AM, antispa...@sent.at wrote:
Pidgin is one. But I have read about it having leaks, thus the removal
from the TBB. Jake Applebaum talked about Jitsi. Truly a Skype
replacement on steroids. Only it needs Java. And I have no idea if it
leaks. Do you know any clients built with ano
On 9/10/12 11:43 AM, antispa...@sent.at wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 10, 2012, at 00:21, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
>> It would facilitate the inclusion of Tor in third party applications
>> that include/bundle/redistribute Tor, regardless of the Linux
>> Distribution.
> Sounds like a potential risk,
Chat would always mean less than anonymous. It puts you online in a
particular time frame. And you do have to have a user.
Yet, can it be done? So far, I gather the best option would be XMPP,
TLS and OTR. That would include people having Gmail accounts too. And
in some future, who knows, maybe Fac
This is a silly idea. But how about it? Can I tweak the pack somehow so
I get two TorBrowser windows working independent of one another? Do I
need two Vidalias too? The idea would be to have my regular web
connection and one obvious ID, than running TBB as Johnny Nobody
himself, and a third instanc
On Mon, Sep 10, 2012, at 00:21, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
> It would facilitate the inclusion of Tor in third party applications
> that include/bundle/redistribute Tor, regardless of the Linux
> Distribution.
Sounds like a potential risk, the third party intervention. See the
discussion abou
On Thu, Sep 6, 2012, at 01:56, Mansour Moufid wrote:
> Anyway, I think cryptography will depend more and more on steganography
> -- and in the case of Tor, covert/subliminal channels. Imagine a protocol
> where Alice sends Bob a steady stream of garbage, and the message is
> encoded in the inter-pa
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