This probably isn't a good approach. It would probably be better to write
a program for the OpenWRT implementation that regularly checks for newer
versions and downloads+installs as necessary automatically. You would need
to have it check the asc file too of course. There isn't a need to include
an
Similar ideas came up in the past. Last year I've implemented something
along those lines as part of my Bachelor's thesis, but I wasn't fully
satisfied with the results. Still, maybe my work is useful to you or
someone else: http://www.sinic.name/docs/bachelor.pdf
The most interesting part for you
Not correct; Namecoin supports mapping names to Tor hidden services, as
well as I2P and Freenet sites. Obviously you need to use a Namecoin
implementation that's a proxy instead of a DNS server, but that's not a
big deal (nmcsocks already implements this).
On 2/24/2012 3:22 PM, Andreas Krey w
The tor version in the current stable OpenWRT, 10.3.1 "Backfire", is
0.2.1.30, which complains on startup that it is too old. I would like
to get a more recent version included in Backfire.
Could any of the tor developers comment which version of tor is suitable
for inclusion in a long-term st
On Thu, 23 Feb 2012 22:01:22 +0800 (CST)
刚毅之男 wrote:
> Hello,i'm anovice that i get the knowledge that china has reject the
> tor network,so does it mean that it's useless to be a tor bridge in
> china?
Yes. Your bridge will not be able to talk to the rest of the tor
network, so will remain iso
On Wed, 22 Feb 2012 12:53:24 -0800 (PST)
Christian Kujau wrote:
> I'm running a Tor bridge for some days now (after shutting down an
> exit node, due to too many DMCA complaints) but it's hardly getting
> any traffic:
>
> Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 1 day 11:59 hours, with 2 circuits open.
> I
On Thu, 23 Feb 2012 at 19:21, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> Sounds like you are thinking that the last hop in the circuit is called
> the exit node, and earlier hops in the circuit are called bridges? This
> is not so.
>
> The last hop in the circuit is the exit relay. Hops other than the last
> are c
On Fri, 24 Feb 2012 17:47:30 +, Eugen Leitl wrote:
...
> What's wrong with a P2P name resolution? E.g. namecoin?
Everything. :-) Primarily the fact that namecoin provides
name->ipaddr mapping, and the whole point of *.onion is
that the service addressed ist *not* identified by an
IP address.
On 02/24/2012 09:53 AM, Juliusz Chroboczek wrote:
> Hi,
>
> The tor version in the current stable OpenWRT, 10.3.1 "Backfire", is
> 0.2.1.30, which complains on startup that it is too old. I would like
> to get a more recent version included in Backfire.
>
> Could any of the tor developers commen
Well,..
The according to the onion wiki, the length of the onion address is 80
bits.
The largest number the onion address can get is:
1208925819614629174706175
That's because FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF is the largest number
(unsigned) in hex for 80 bits key length.
If we assume we have a di
Hi,
The tor version in the current stable OpenWRT, 10.3.1 "Backfire", is
0.2.1.30, which complains on startup that it is too old. I would like
to get a more recent version included in Backfire.
Could any of the tor developers comment which version of tor is suitable
for inclusion in a long-term
On 2012-02-24, Andreas Krey wrote:
> Which node interprets the .onion names to hashes, anyway?
Tor clients themselves interpret hidden service hostnames, so every
Tor client would need to include every dictionary. (Dictionaries
couldn't be kept in an optional extra package, because clients whic
On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 04:10:48PM +, Robert Ransom wrote:
> On 2012-02-24, Andreas Krey wrote:
>
> > Which node interprets the .onion names to hashes, anyway?
>
> Tor clients themselves interpret hidden service hostnames, so every
> Tor client would need to include every dictionary. (Dicti
On Fri, 24 Feb 2012 13:36:45 +, Robert Ransom wrote:
...
> Which languages do you want us to ship a dictionary for in every Tor
> client? (Please specify the exact dictionaries you want us to use as
> well.)
Left as an exercise for later.
> How large are these dictionaries (in bytes)?
The l
Perhaps RFC 1751 would be easily adaptable.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1751
-- steve
On 2/24/12 3:36 AM, "Ahmed Hassan" wrote:
>Hello Folks,
>
>I have a cool idea to make onion addresses memorable. That will have no
>effect on its authenticity and security.
>
>
>First, I need to define so
On Fri, 24 Feb 2012 05:36:14 +, Ahmed Hassan wrote:
...
>
> cat-rat-hat.onion.
More like granoblastic-Congoese-counterirritate-solifluctional-Adeona or
shameproof-paralogize-concutient-hypersophisticated-Actinomyxidiida. :-)
...
> Users will not have an option to explicitly choose onion doma
On 2012-02-24, Ahmed Hassan wrote:
> Hello Folks,
>
> I have a cool idea to make onion addresses memorable. That will have no
> effect on its authenticity and security.
>
>
> First, I need to define some terms I will use in this email.
>
> Σ*_{e}: is any English (or any other language) word.
>
> D
Sounds like an interesting idea. Another potential solution is
Namecoin, which supports mapping memorable .bit addresses to .onion
addresses. In theory, the only way to seize/censor a .bit address is a
51% attack. I believe there are already some .onion addresses using
.bit addresses.
On 2
Il 24 febbraio 2012 11:36, Ahmed Hassan ha scritto:
> Hello Folks,
>
> I have a cool idea to make onion addresses memorable. That will have no
> effect on its authenticity and security.
>
>
> First, I need to define some terms I will use in this email.
>
> Σ*_{e}: is any English (or any other lang
Hello Folks,
I have a cool idea to make onion addresses memorable. That will have no
effect on its authenticity and security.
First, I need to define some terms I will use in this email.
Σ*_{e}: is any English (or any other language) word.
D*: is a set of all English words (or any other langua
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