On Mon, Jan 5, 2015 at 2:17 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
> To be clear, are you suggesting that each relay and each client should
> pick some relays from the consensus and exchange chaff with them, and
> clients should also exchange chaff with their guards?
I'm saying you definitely have to have you
On Thu, Jan 15, 2015 at 10:25 AM, Philipp Winter wrote:
> The median amount of new fingerprints in a consensus is six. The
> Here are some preliminary notes about the most significant spikes. I'll
> 2008-10-25: Missing consensuses.
FYI, between here there was thread tor-talk 'many new relays'
On Mon, Jan 19, 2015 at 6:08 PM, Michael Rogers
wrote:
> Thanks for the explanation.
I think I have more comment address this subsection...
>> If anyone knows of networks (whether active, defunct or
>> discredited) that have used link filling, I'd like a reference.
>> Someone out there has to ha
On Mon, Jan 19, 2015 at 11:47 AM, Philipp Winter wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 15, 2015 at 06:11:25PM -0500, grarpamp wrote:
>> FYI, between here there was thread tor-talk 'many new relays' of possible
>> event around end 2009-06 to begining 2009-07. Along with usual posts
>
cal networks created by
their applications riding over and within the physical.)
> To every possible recipient? Clearly you have to make a tradeoff.
Full meshing of chaff addressed to all participants seems unnecessary.
> grarpamp wrote:
> Is there so much (possibly far less than corr
On Sun, Feb 8, 2015 at 1:57 AM, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> any time soon? Other suggestions would be welcome.
Everything should have a set of applicable status so parties
know, possibly a pinger, in particular if the goal is to keep
certain things moving along. Even if you have to use RT/trac
to tr
On Mon, Feb 9, 2015 at 1:01 PM, Paul Syverson
wrote:
>> > https://petsymposium.org/2011/papers/hotpets11-final10Syverson.pdf
>>
>> Nice paper. Wonder why it isn't in anonbib too. I am used to keep a
>> bookmark on anonbib as a central repository of anonymity research
>>
>> I will add a bibtext ent
On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 1:56 AM, Erik de Castro Lopo
wrote:
>> Several of us [0] working on hidden services have been talking about
>> adopting better terminology.
>
> In general, I am in agreement with this, but I wonder if now might be
> a good time to unify Tor terminology with other similar te
In situations where it is inconvenient / impossible to
manage / rely a bunch of library files, dropping a static
compiled tor in place is handy. Similarly, it should be possible
to completely configure and run tor in that one static
binary and in ram... no other files at all (torrc, geoip, .tor
sta
On Tue, Feb 17, 2015 at 11:30 AM, Libertas wrote:
> Has anyone looked into this? I talked to the maintainer of the OpenBSD
> Firefox port, but he wasn't very interested and pointed out the
> difficulty caused by the deterministic build system.
>
> I can verify that it doesn't work out of the box,
FYI tor-talk, there is some gathering happening around this
subject. Relavent starting threads, tickets and such linked
below for those interested. Someone else can suggest what
list to move the work to.
http://lists.nycbug.org/pipermail/tor-bsd/2015-February/000225.html
https://lists.torproject.o
On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 3:07 PM, Rishab Nithyanand
wrote:
> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/call-arms-helping-internet-services-accept-anonymous-users
>
>Step one is to enumerate the set of ... services that handle Tor connections
>differently
>
> I think it's an important step to help make more
Would like to see some of these implemented. Presume
maybe this thread means some funds appeared for HS love
and/or the control port. Not sure if it is control port only.
Combine setevents circ and stream
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11179
signal NEWNYM exit bucketing
https://t
On Thu, Apr 9, 2015 at 2:40 AM, karan grover wrote:
> The project I am interested in working on is Incorporating ruleset testing
> into https-everywhere release process. I have been understanding the
> codebase of https-everywhere-checker, and am now quite familiar with it. I
Some time ago I has
On Tue, May 5, 2015 at 9:22 PM, Mike Perry wrote:
> Yikes!
>
> Given your costs, it also seems worthwhile for us to fund development to
> improve this situation, so that meek remains a transport of last resort
> rather than people's first choice.
>
> Here's a couple options:
>
> 1. We can add a br
In the sense that the IPv6 addresses provided by Onioncat
are namelike, these may be of reference interest
(I do not know if Bernhard has produced paper/slides/video for
the new HS crypto model in english yet. I hope to look it over.)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zj4hSx6cW80
https://www.yo
On Thu, May 28, 2015 at 9:11 AM, Yawning Angel wrote:
> While not as great as 256 bit random numbers, PID reuse within the same
There's often a case for combining human meaning with random.
On the random...
Width of pid+epoch is 48 bits.
CPU 4GHz per epoch = 32 bits. 48+32=80.
ssh-agent deems (a-
There are about 350 places in tor and torspec that are afflicted
by this ism, other locations surely exist...
find . -type f -exec egrep -i ' ' {} \+
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On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 1:22 PM, Tom van der Woerdt wrote:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/If_and_only_if
Aha, documentation, use presumed consistent, carry on, thanks.
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On Sat, Aug 8, 2015 at 7:36 AM, Alec Muffett wrote:
> 9) appending a credit-card-like “you typed this properly” extra few
> characters checksum over the length might be helpful (10..15 bits?) -
> ideally this might help round-up the count of characters to a full field,
> a1uik-0w1gm-fq3i5-ievxd-m
people wrote:
> And just where exactly and in what protocols and apps are
> going to build in that feedback popup... browsers? ssh? MUA? ping? skype?
> Vanity addresses encourage people to only verify the human-readable part
> That said, if an address is completely incapable, even hostile to vali
My sense of tor-relays is that "end users" as relay operators
(which presumably operate most relays, with places like
torservers doing the rest) just go looking for VPS accounts.
ie: compute platforms aren't their thing.
Which leaves the only real users of compute to be attackers
and researchers.
fabio, sky, et al...
Please stop top quoting massive amounts of
useless text that everyone's already seen before.
It's seriously annoying to peoples workflow
trying to figure out what youre replying to and
if youve inlined other stuff below. And it needlessly
bloats peoples mailboxes and thus sear
> various wrote:
> Yesterday Lief compellingly argued that if a TBB user accidentally clicks on
> a link to my tor2web proxy (onion.link), that they should be redirected to
> the .onion address. It hadn't occurred before that a Tor user might
> accidentally click a onion.link URL
TBB plugin: T2W-O
On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 6:59 PM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> You are correct my good sir! This is indeed the better way. Thank you!
That'll be half a BTC please, lol: 161JvwnowBsojF4rRcdjMRcztoLb7R1qkN
> It's unclear to me how to make these rules only apply to the TBB version,
> but judging by the
On Sun, Oct 4, 2015 at 12:06 AM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
>> That'll be half a BTC please, lol: 161JvwnowBsojF4rRcdjMRcztoLb7R1qkN
>
> My pleasure. You saved me half a BTC!
Holy shit, somebody tipped me, on a LOL no less, this Bitcoin thing works!
You, kind benevolent and most gracious Sir, are ge
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ResearchEthics
Any number of problems and obstacles to legitimate
research areas exist with this...
"
Examples of unacceptable research activity
It is not acceptable to run an HSDir, harvest onion addresses, and do
a Web crawl of those onion serv
On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 6:46 AM, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> the upcoming Onionoo version 3.0 will support searches by
> space-separated fingerprint.
>
> "9695DFC35FFEB861329B9F1AB04C46397020CE31"
>
> "9695 DFC3 5FFE B861 329B 9F1A B04C 4639 7020 CE31"
Instead of continuing to backport and further e
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 4:08 PM, Razvan Dragomirescu
wrote:
> essentially, I want to be able to host hidden service keys on the card. I'm
> trying to bind the hidden service to a hardware component (the smartcard) so
> that it can be securely hosted in a hostile environment as well as
> impossible
On Fri, Oct 16, 2015 at 1:58 AM, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> It seems that the introduction of ed25519 identities will allow us to
> find a format that doesn't suffer from shortcomings like this one. Be
> sure to watch that process and raise your concerns while they can
> still be considered.
Where
On Sat, Oct 17, 2015 at 5:46 PM, Razvan Dragomirescu
wrote:
> Exactly, you ask the smartcard to decrypt your traffic (and sign data if
> needed), it never tells you the key, it's a blackbox - it gets plaintext
> input and gives you encrypted (or signed) output, without ever revealing the
> key it'
You mentione...
> I have Tor running on the USBArmory by InversePath (
> http://inversepath.com/usbarmory.html ) and have a microSD form factor card
> made by Swissbit (
> www.swissbit.com/products/security-products/overwiev/security-products-overview/
> ) up and running on it.
Good that USBarmor
On Tue, Oct 20, 2015 at 3:05 PM, Ivan Markin wrote:
> No, I will be secure. An adversary could sniff your PIN and sign
> whatever they want to, true. But revealing the PIN != revealing the key.
> In this case your identity key is still safe even if your PIN is
> "compromised".
Yes the private key
On Fri, Oct 16, 2015 at 3:22 PM, s7r wrote:
> I am describing something like a Sybil attack where the adversary runs
> relays, gets lucky and is selected in a certain position of a certain
> Does this change with padding? If yes, how?
> [1]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-us
On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 8:44 AM, tor-dev had:
> I agree with Roger that ideally all relays can be exits (and since
> we're being ideal, we'll assume that 'exit' means to every port). And
> the network location distribution of relays by bandwidth is
> proportional to both the client destination sele
> Galois Inc has just released an implementation of the Tor protocol
> implemented in the Haskell programming langauge:
> https://github.com/GaloisInc/haskell-tor
What other implementations of Tor (with links) are out there
besides mainline? I could wiki them.
_
On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 2:25 PM, grarpamp wrote:
> What other implementations of Tor (with links) are out there
> besides mainline? I could wiki them.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ListOfTorImplementations
It's currently an orphan, someone with privs can add it t
I'd mentioned before idea of posing question how much HS-to-HS
bandwidth (unused relay mod hopcount) is freely available within tor.
For what this work goes to ansering that, thanks.
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Can a one be generated covering each year and maybe a five year one.
And three other check sets but sorted left to right by
first online date
FP
AS
As to the actual FP's, all I can think of is including a second text file
with pixel number to FP mappings. Or some "maps" style online zooming.
_
"Makefile", line : Need an operator
make: fatal errors encountered -- cannot continue
6772:export TESTING_TOR_BINARY=$(top_builddir)/src/or/tor
6794:export PYTHON=
6795:export SHELL=/bin/sh
6796:export abs_top_srcdir=/tmp/tor-0.2.7.5
6797:export builddir=.
This is on a FreeBSD 8.x from early 2014
On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 1:10 AM, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor
wrote:
> What's the version of autoconf / automake?
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17732
added
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On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 11:59 AM, David Stainton wrote:
> Obviously operating such an exit node might be risky due to the potential for
> abuse...
Whatever.
> however don't you just love the idea of being about to use low-level network
> scanners over tor?
Yes. Such network tools and features
On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 7:11 PM, Jesse V wrote:
> Here's a webpage, a paper, and software from djb:
> http://sphincs.cr.yp.to/ This is of course one example, there are other
> works on [typeof] cryptography, and I'm sure most of the authors
> like to provide a reference implementation of their idea
On Sat, Jan 2, 2016 at 10:22 PM, Yawning Angel wrote:
> In terms of prioritization, ensuring all existing traffic isn't
> subject to later decryption is far more important
I'd think so as you could adapt around other things, but
a traffic decrypt seems quite bad, especially given how
much is stor
On Wed, Jan 6, 2016 at 4:56 AM, Moritz Bartl wrote:
> Just as a data point, I don't see much scanning/abuse regarding SMTPS
> (465)
SUBMISSION (567) is what is used these days as relay to send mail.
465 is a legacy bug.
25 fronts your @address.
See wikipedia for more info.
> or IMAPS (993).
POP
Parsing and escaping things on one line is often a pain.
Atomic batching might be useful, though I've no use case.
< BATCH BEG label
< cmd1
< cmdN
< BATCH END label
< BATCH PRINT / DELETE label
< BATCH EXEC label [instance]
> BATCH RESULT label [instance]
< BATCH RESULT AUTODEL params [label]
[if
On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 12:44 AM, Jesse V wrote:
> This is quite interesting, thanks for the report. I'm not sure why it
> would be advantageous to set up a server or network this way, but I
> guess they have their reasons.
1) They may or may not be aware of their routing, or the routing
applied
On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 9:58 AM, coderman wrote:
> this is the proper situation. only question is who would have a
> compelling use for separating outbound OR connections and outbound
> Exit traffic, as per #17975?
Bandwidth peering contracts preferential to push or eyeball traffic.
_
On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 4:27 AM, coderman wrote:
>>> ... only question is who would have a
>>> compelling use for separating outbound OR connections and outbound
>>> Exit traffic, as per #17975?
>>
>> Bandwidth peering contracts preferential to push or eyeball traffic.
> outbound bind address. Ex
On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 3:03 AM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> I.e., if I want the extra resistance to traffic analysis that higher latency
> connections provide, is there a way to specify that in my Tor config?
Higher latency, in and of itself, does not provide any resistance to
traffic analysis.
ht
On 2/25/16, blacklight . wrote:
> hello there! i don't know if this mailing list works but i thought of
> giving it a try.
>
> i was lately reading an article (
> http://www.pcworld.com/article/3037180/security/tor-users-increasingly-treated-like-second-class-web-citizens.html
> )
> and it was ab
On 3/14/16, Deepankar Tyagi wrote:
> Make Exitmap fully autonomous (
> https://github.com/NullHypothesis/exitmap/issues/7)
> Create module(s) which emulate a user and explore the web dynamically.
As these operating architectures are posted here I'll at least read
over them. I've did a chunk of th
On 3/18/16, Mridul Malpotra wrote:
> b. For testing active attacks, can there be modules developed
> keeping other cleartext protocols like SNMP and Telnet in mind?
Tor only supports TCP of course, however any cleartext application
protocol using it is subject to snooping / modification.
The list of server/client -versions seems long and unuseful...
0.2.4.23
0.2.4.24
0.2.4.25
0.2.4.26
0.2.4.27
0.2.5.8-rc
0.2.5.9-rc
0.2.5.10
0.2.5.11
0.2.5.12
0.2.6.5-rc
0.2.6.6
0.2.6.7
0.2.6.8
0.2.6.9
0.2.6.10
0.2.7.1-alpha
0.2.7.2-alpha
0.2.7.3-rc
0.2.7.4-rc
0.2.7.5
0.2.7.6
0.2.8.1-alpha
I'd cut
On 4/3/16, Griffin Boyce wrote:
> How do you transmit an elephant? One byte at a time...
>
> But on a serious note, it's possible to transfer 2.6TB over Tor in small
> pieces (such as file by file or via torrent). Given the size, however, I'd
> suspect they mailed hard drives after establishing co
On 3/29/16, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
> /** Private networks. This list is used in two places, once to expand the
> So I think we should keep [::]/8 in the list of private addresses.
> That said, the list of IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in tor is incomplete,
> https://www.iana.org/assi
On 4/25/16, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
>
>> On 22 Apr 2016, at 17:03, grarpamp wrote:
>>
>> FYI: The onioncat folks are interested in collaborating
>> with tor folks regarding prop224.
>>
>> https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/224
On 4/30/16, str4d wrote:
> On 27/04/16 22:31, grarpamp wrote:
>> Yep :) And I know Bernhard was hoping to get in touch with Roger
>> on this before long.
>>
>> Basically, prop224 HS being wider than 80 bits will break onioncat's
>> current HS onion <---&
Thanks for your work david.
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On 6/22/16, konst...@mail2tor.com wrote:
> I posted steps on how to connect Freenet nodes over Onioncat and Garlicat
> for Tor/I2P. I am looking to scale it into an Opennet inside Tor with a
> lot of peers:
>
> https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/2016-June/039056.html
> https://emu.freen
On 6/22/16, konst...@mail2tor.com wrote:
> I want to be clear about a couple of things. I am not looking to defy the
> wishes of Tor developers and relay contributors. I hope to get their views
> on the matter. Should they explicitly refuse, I will look at I2P.
When I ran, donated, managed relays
Freenet has talk on their lists of adding 100 new onioncat nodes
to tor and i2p as linked to in this thread...
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-June/011108.html
Is anyone working on resurrecting the onioncat
mailing list and archives?
___
On 6/24/16, konst...@mail2tor.com wrote:
> Chinese users can reach Freenet again with Tor. China blocks Freenet with
> DPI for a long time.
This use case is nice to hear. Compared to other networks and
attack vectors it's not the best at, Tor has put good effort into
and is rather strong at gett
On 6/23/16, grarpamp wrote:
> Don't forget to add around 1000+ ms latency.
Should say that on average tor's not that high, but
as to prudently setting somewhat higher timeouts,
especially for initial setup where the '+' may indeed
apply.
I remember a survey list of torsocks workalikes
somewhere (where?). This one's for windows and
I don't remember it. Whoever maintains that list can
add it for reference.
https://github.com/cpatulea/TorCap2
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> Nathan Freitas writes:
>> Any thoughts on a format? torhs://clientname:authcookie@foo.onion looks
>> decent.
You probably want to coordinate with ricochet if it
doesn't already have such QR sharing feature.
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Hi Jeremy.
In regard your post 'Tor and Namecoin' here...
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-July/011245.html
In this thread prefixed 'Onioncat and Prop224' started and
spanning from here through now...
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-April/010847.html
Onionc
And 10 years down when 20 bits is easy, you're going
want shrinking it again, or along any interim update cycle.
This is going to upset downstream parsers such as
web indexers that expect matching fixed length / pattern.
or that have to write zero [de]fillers.
ex: [a-z2-7]{16}\.onion, we now see s
Add your projects here...
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ListOfTorImplementations
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> On Fri, Aug 26, 2016 at 01:42:38AM +, Liu, Zhuotao wrote:
>> We hope to have an estimate about computation capacity of Tor relays. For
>> instance, how many circuits a relay can maintain when its CPU is driven to
>> about 100%? On average, how many circuits are maintained by a busy guard
>> a
On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 5:13 AM, Alex Elsayed wrote:
> Hi, I'm using Tor in transparent mode, and I'm running into a rather
> inconvenient behavior.
>
> VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6 refuses to parse unless the network address given
> is a /40 or broader. However, IPv6 ULA, which makes it very easy to gi
On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 6:10 PM, Alex Elsayed wrote:
>> (Yes, there is a typo in the last IPv6 address as well.
>> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20153 )
Yes Tor is making some quite bad text representation issues
so I added summary of them to this ticket.
> - [FC00]/8 is _reser
On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 9:14 AM, René Mayrhofer wrote:
> Sep 19 11:37:41.000 [warn] I have no descriptor for the router named
> "ins1" in my declared family; I'll use the nickname as is, but this may
> confuse clients.
> Sep 19 11:37:41.000 [warn] I have no descriptor for the router named
> "ins2"
On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 9:14 AM, René Mayrhofer wrote:
> Setup: Please note that our setup is a bit particular for reasons that
> we will explain in more detail in a later message (including a proposed
> patch to the current source which has been pending also because of the
> holiday situation...)
On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 5:36 PM, René Mayrhofer wrote:
> That is exactly what we have patched our local Tor node to do, although
> with a different (slightly hacky, so the patch will be an RFC type)
> approach by marking real exit traffic with a ToS flag to leave the
> decision of what to do with
On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 10:32 AM, teor wrote:
> But I also think we should warn when Tor guesses between multiple addresses,
> because some operators are going to find that Tor guesses one they don't want:
Might help to emit a simple table on startup with
- explicitly configured addrs / ports
-
On Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 5:33 AM, Yawning Angel wrote:
> Where: https://git.schwanenlied.me/yawning/sandboxed-tor-browser
> X11 is a huge mess of utter fail. Since the sandboxed processes get direct
> access to the host X server, this is an exploitation vector.
Is anyone actually actively throwi
There is VM's, and
Multiple X server can isolate on up to all available vty's.
There is also program shipped by X11 called Xnest.
But the more concern than apps and keyboards above,
is probably the driver / kernel portion of security surface.
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https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/54rpil/dht_syncthing_bitsync_over_tor/
Hi we would like to integrate DHT Bittorrent Syncing over Tor for our
open source encrypted obfuscated media rich notepad app.
This app will have for main objective to provide a secure information
gathering and sharing t
On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 11:30 AM, dawuud wrote:
> Are you aware of Tahoe-LAFS?
Don't know if they are, or if they are here, all we have is their short post.
If they just need an insert and retrieve filestore for small user
bases, there are lots of choices. If they need the more global
and random
Many wrote, in subthread started by dawuud 5 days ago:
> talk: internet of things, security / exploit / nsa, crypto via tor,
> everything over tor, exits
This subthread does not concern the subject made for curating /
supporting / tracking / developing "Onioncat and Prop224" [1].
Please a) end it,
On Wed, Oct 5, 2016 at 4:09 PM, Philipp Winter wrote:
> Also, Tor Browser MUST abort the ERP procedure if the HTTPS
> certificate is not signed by a trusted authority.
This is a problem for independant sites that choose not to pay
the CA cabal, deal with what free CA will be around tomorrow,
or
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 3:51 PM, grarpamp wrote:
> Freenet has talk on their lists of adding 100 new onioncat nodes
> to tor and i2p as linked to in this thread...
>
> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-June/011108.html
More folks blogging related to the ab
> On 2016-09-26 00:54, teor wrote:
>> The one concern I have about this is that Tor-over-Tor would stick out more,
>> as it would look like Tor coming out the OutboundBindAddressExit IP.
>> But we don't encourage Tor-over-Tor anyway.
ToT is technically not some special tor aware / tunneled relay f
You may encounter special justification to
extend support for last branch that still supports
pre-prop224 onions. There is a *lot* of code / community
built on those. Darknet fora have mentioned possible
maintenance forks as such if need be.
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Always wondered how naming is relevant,
for example, IPv6 with OnionCat as a deterministic
form of naming. So now we propose a 'naming' layer.
Which should not also support IPv6 addressing?
Is not IPv6, subsequent to the 80bit scheme,
merely a name on top of onions? ie: If we develop
a 'naming' lay
On Wed, Jan 18, 2017 at 3:31 AM, George Kadianakis wrote:
> What do you mean by "develop an IPv6 layer"?
prop224 destroys the one to one bidirectional binary mapping that
makes onioncat possible, and fails to provide a replacement for it :-(
Any "human naming" layer (whether under prop224 or curr
Ancient gcc says
src/or/connection.c:1843: warning: passing argument 1 of 'TO_OR_CONN'
discards qualifiers from pointer target type
src/or/connection.c:1843: warning: passing argument 1 of 'TO_OR_CONN'
discards qualifiers from pointer target type
src/test/test_dir.c:3700: warning: assuming signed
Skimming thread...
Version or not is fine, provided if you want versions you
know you must store the bits somewhere, or ensure regex
parser rules to recognize and match an intrinsic version
represented by entire address format specification itself.
Note onion search spiders rely on such address r
It was a test compile on a very old 8.x i386 box, warnings
would be no surprise there, hardly worth addressing unless
exposed a bug, since 11.x runs on most all hw 8.x does.
gcc version 4.2.1 20070831 patched [FreeBSD]
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> test x"$url" = x
Some users may be a bit unfamiliar with this longform
'test' construct having trended from that in say
their distro's example rc scripts over recent posix
and bugfixed decades, easier visual delimited parsing,
4 chars of line width saved, to form of...
[ ! "$var" ]
http://pubs
Tor could ship with a tool to offline generate all the
various keys, encrypt and sign with them, for debug, test, and
use with other apps that tie to tor.
And a tool to translate strings between different encodings in use.
Or at least provide howto and links in the docs to third party tools
that us
Are these the current / recommended paper refs for
eyeballing things on this to date?
torspec/proposals/251-netflow-padding.txt
torspec/proposals/254-padding-negotiation.txt
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On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 12:35 PM, Boter42 wrote:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/doc/ListOfServicesBlockingTor
> It would be great to have an updated records of this kind of websites so that
> we can push website owners to make the Tor user-experience as smooth as
> possible
> [1] Maybe from tor-talk or linked to your idea from the wiki page.
You also see some discussions here
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-access/
and here
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/
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>>> https://gitweb.torproject.org/torsocks.git/shortlog/refs/heads/dlerror
>>> It seems to fix the issues on my Ubuntu system. I could use some testing
> https://code.google.com/p/torsocks/issues/detail?id=3#c47
These compile on freebsd 8.x:
eea4dab master [production]
655e673 dlerror [untested
> Thus, I am declaring the following tar.gz to be the final RC for 1.3:
Though I don't actually use it on FreeBSD RELENG_4 anymore,
it doesn't compile there. If someone has old routers or something
based on that they should speak up.
On RELENG_8 it's fine but for a few small things...
# make
tes
> Do you have the compiler output from RELENG_4?
make all-recursive
Making all in src
source='torsocks.c' object='torsocks.lo' libtool=yes DEPDIR=.deps
depmode=gcc /bin/sh ../depcomp /bin/sh ../libtool --tag=CC
--mode=compile gcc -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -I. -I.. -g -O2 -Wall -c -o
torsocks.lo tor
Swiped from the 'BitTorrent complaint' thread over on relays...
> If an exit relay then drops that
> connection silently, Tor (and the user) cannot know it needs to select a
> different exit. The connections simply fail.
> ...
> What you do with that iptables rule (or similar rules) is block a bun
>> RPW's, et al's paper was made public today, and demonstrates several
>> practical attacks on Hidden Services.
>> http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a080.pdf
"pg 80: Until now there have been no statistics about the number of
hidden services..."
There are some... at least one cur
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