Re: [tor-dev] Onion DoS: Killing rendezvous circuits over the application layer

2019-12-10 Thread meejah
George Kadianakis writes: > However, IMO the right way to do this feature, would be to improve the control > port code and design so that it doesn't get so overwhelmed by multiple > events. That said, I'm not sure exactly what kind of changes we would have to > do to the control port to actually

Re: [tor-dev] Onion DoS: Killing rendezvous circuits over the application layer

2019-12-08 Thread teor
Hi, There's also another negative we haven't considered: > On 3 Dec 2019, at 00:16, George Kadianakis wrote: > > Negatives: > > a) It's a dirty hotfix that blends the networking layers and might be annoying > to maintain in the long-term. > > b) It only works for HTTP (and without SSL?). c

Re: [tor-dev] Onion DoS: Killing rendezvous circuits over the application layer

2019-12-02 Thread Nick Mathewson
On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 9:16 AM George Kadianakis wrote: > However, IMO the right way to do this feature, would be to improve the control > port code and design so that it doesn't get so overwhelmed by multiple > events. That said, I'm not sure exactly what kind of changes we would have to > do to

[tor-dev] Onion DoS: Killing rendezvous circuits over the application layer

2019-12-02 Thread George Kadianakis
Greetings! This is another thread [0] about onion service denial-of-service attacks. It has long been suggested that onion service operators should be given the option to kill spammy rendezvous circuits at will if they feel they are causing too much damage. Right now this is possible using the H