On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 03:45:31AM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 09:19:32AM +0200, Paul-Olivier Dehaye wrote:
> > The short summary of the weakness of Tor here:
> > - We would like the whole protocol to be mixing (to an observer, the
> > probability of exiting at any node
On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 09:19:32AM +0200, Paul-Olivier Dehaye wrote:
> The short summary of the weakness of Tor here:
> - We would like the whole protocol to be mixing (to an observer, the
> probability of exiting at any node C given entrance at node A is close to
> 1/N),
Right, you're using termi
I use the word mixing 4 times, with two meanings:
"...enough mixing can happen..." : mathematical sense, on pairs of edges
around a node
"...yet highly mixing network..." : mathematical sense, on pairs of
entry/exit Tor nodes
"...between mixing chains and Tor, and can be seen as a lot of mixing
cha
So I don't work for Tor, nor am I a graph theorist, but I'll add a few
preliminary thoughts.
On 22 August 2013 21:08, Paul-Olivier Dehaye
wrote:
> As far as I can tell, the main threat by a global passive adversary comes
> from traffic analysis (?).
A Global Passive Adversary is technically outs
Hello,
Thank you for working on Tor.
I have a suggestion and would appreciate input. Please bear with me as I
have a limited understanding of the design of Tor and all the different
threats that it is meant to mitigate. Below, a (?) indicates a place where
I need some confirmation that my underst
