So I don't work for Tor, nor am I a graph theorist, but I'll add a few preliminary thoughts.
On 22 August 2013 21:08, Paul-Olivier Dehaye <paul-olivier.deh...@math.uzh.ch> wrote: > As far as I can tell, the main threat by a global passive adversary comes > from traffic analysis (?). A Global Passive Adversary is technically outside of Tor's threat model (see https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorFAQ#Whatattacksremainagainstonionrouting) - but if there are easy ways to make it more difficult for such an adversary, at a low engineering cost - then Tor tends to be up for them. > This attack should become easier as the number of > Tor nodes increases (?) I'm not sure I agree with that. If the adversary is not global, but only partly global, then network diversity is crucial. If the adversary is truely global, I don't think more nodes would help as much as more _traffic_. > A dual way to see this is that > not enough mixing can happen around a node for incoming/outgoing edge pairs, > bar injecting a huge amount of fake traffic. In what sense do you use the word 'mixing'? In the traffic analysis literature, I think it tends to refer to mix networks, and collecting several messages into a pool before releasing some or all of them (http://crypto.is/blog/mix_and_onion_networks). -tom _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
