Re: [tor-dev] OnionGatherer: evaluating status of hidden services

2017-03-10 Thread Evan d'Entremont
This is an interesting project, that being said I have a few concerns I'm hoping you can address. From a security standpoint; - The instructions for the webservice don't seem to indicate that it is being served as a hidden service, or even with ssl. See . This would mean that, even if chrome i

Re: [tor-dev] Onioncat and Prop224

2016-10-05 Thread Evan d'Entremont
to be more clear, those devices can currently be surveilled passively. If they were encrypted they couldn't be. On Wed, Oct 5, 2016 at 2:31 PM Evan d'Entremont wrote: > > Changing the subject a bit, isn't The Internet of Things > going to lead to a situation where there

Re: [tor-dev] Onioncat and Prop224

2016-10-05 Thread Evan d'Entremont
n my desk and none of them use any kind of encryption, from the device to backend, or from the backend to user. On Tue, Oct 4, 2016 at 12:07 PM Tim Kuijsten wrote: > Op 04-10-16 om 16:59 schreef Tim Kuijsten: > > Op 03-10-16 om 19:43 schreef Evan d'Entremont: > >> Not

Re: [tor-dev] Onioncat and Prop224

2016-10-03 Thread Evan d'Entremont
> > Changing the subject a bit, isn't The Internet of Things > going to lead to a situation where there are even more NSA, GCHQ, BND > remotely controlled computers with microphones and other sensors all > around us > Not if IoT dev's start encrypting things. On a side note, hidden services are a

Re: [tor-dev] Entry/Exit node selection

2016-01-21 Thread Evan d'Entremont
Retain connection information within the network, or ourside? Either way, aren't they already logging tbat you'rw using tor? On Mon, Jan 18, 2016, 6:24 PM Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote: > > On 19 Jan 2016, at 04:53, Evan d'Entremont > wrote: > > What threat i

[tor-dev] Entry/Exit node selection

2016-01-18 Thread Evan d'Entremont
anonymity by forcing traffic over the (monitored) internet backbone. Evan d'Entremont ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev

[tor-dev] Rate limiting of a hidden service

2015-09-30 Thread Evan d'Entremont
I developed a scheme to rate limit hidden services using proof-of-work; https://gist.github.com/evandentremont/a3ad12a5cc3a924dae34 The server sends a semi-prime to the client, which then factors it. The client submits the factored primes back with the next request. The 'rate' can be throttled by

Re: [tor-dev] Desired exit node diversity

2015-09-23 Thread Evan d'Entremont
> In application this would be a distribution that although unlikely to be optimal against any specific adversary, it's has robust hardness across a wide variety of adversaries. So, the F-35? Perhaps what needs considered is wether that is even possible; and against which adversaries is TOR desig