Retain connection information within the network, or ourside? Either way, aren't they already logging tbat you'rw using tor?
On Mon, Jan 18, 2016, 6:24 PM Tim Wilson-Brown - teor <teor2...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On 19 Jan 2016, at 04:53, Evan d'Entremont <e...@evandentremont.com> > wrote: > > What threat is Tor trying to defeat? Region locking or nation states? If > the former, then great, select an exit country, or just use a VPN. If the > latter, perhaps that actual threat profile should be taken into account. > > Is there any reason why Tor doesn't select exit nodes which are as close > as possible to the intended host? > > If I connect to Tor and request a resource from a server on ISP A, would > in not make sense to enforce an exit node also on ISP A, or if not, as > close as possible? > > As well, entry guards should be as close as possible to the user, limiting > the ability of others to log the connection. > > In short, it's safer that only my ISP see a connection rather than my ISP, > a backbone provider, the entry guard's ISP, etc. Systems like XKeyscore > wouldn't even see the traffic in this case. It seems that selecting an exit > country may actually be detrimental to anonymity by forcing traffic over > the (monitored) internet backbone. > > > It depends on your threat model. > > My country requires ISPs to retain connection information, so choosing a > nearby entry to me, and a nearby exit to a website in this country, would > be very detrimental to my anonymity. > > Tim > > Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) > > teor2345 at gmail dot com > PGP 968F094B > > teor at blah dot im > OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F > > _______________________________________________ > tor-dev mailing list > tor-dev@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev >
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