David E. Ross wrote:
> Recently, I visited the Web site of a bank where I have an account. The
> site certificate caused the "Website Certified by an Unknown Authority"
> popup to appear. The site certificate was signed by a Network Solutions
> certificate, which in turn was signed by an AddTrust
Kyle Hamilton wrote:
> Why would Network Solutions be signed by AddTrust? Network Solutions
> owns Verisign.
Actually, VeriSign acquired Netsol in 2000, retained the domain registry
business and sold off Network Solutions the registrar again so they are
no longer related.
Morgan
David E. Ross wrote:
> There is NO Network Solutions root certificate in SeaMonkey. There
> are four AddTrust root certificates in SeaMonkey.
To clear up some uncertainty here - these are:
AddTrust Class 1 CA Root
AddTrust External CA Root
AddTrust Public CA Root
AddTrust Qualified C
gt;> Enabling that root certificate allowed me to complete my visit to the
>> bank's Web site.
>>
>> AddTrust is still not on the WebTrust list. At the AddTrust Web site, I
>> can find no mention of any kind of outside audit, WebTrust or otherwise.
>>
>> Are
Kyle Hamilton wrote:
> Why would Network Solutions be signed by AddTrust? Network Solutions
> owns Verisign.
Not really true... and actually, it was the other way round: Verisign
owned Network Solutions - from June 2000 to November 2003, when they
sold it to Pivotal Equity. And recently (in Febru
st is still not on the WebTrust list. At the AddTrust Web site, I
> can find no mention of any kind of outside audit, WebTrust or otherwise.
>
> Are there any plans to examine legacy root certificates that are
> currently installed with Mozilla products? Will they be subjected to
> t
David E. Ross wrote:
> Are there any plans to examine legacy root certificates that are
> currently installed with Mozilla products? Will they be subjected to
> the same rigorous criteria that are required for proposed new
> certificates?
That's a good question. We are curre
At the AddTrust Web site, I
can find no mention of any kind of outside audit, WebTrust or otherwise.
Are there any plans to examine legacy root certificates that are
currently installed with Mozilla products? Will they be subjected to
the same rigorous criteria that are required for prop
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