On 08.06.2011 14:15, Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
This seems to be solved with my implementation, because my keyserver can
forward the original signed message.
But it's not really a great solution.
Why not?
I'm thinking the following could solve the problem
Please help me: which problem
On 08.06.2011 13:51, Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
Is the script smart enough to identify and extract the encryption
certificate in the mail when the sender uses separate signature and
encryption certificates ? (and of course the S/MIME properties are
correctly set to identify this, and propagate
Kai Engert wrote:
> Another short note: The problem with solely distributing the S/MIME
> certs is that a MUA does not have the S/MIME capabilities of the cert
> owner's MUA. So the sender MUA might choose a weak symmetric cipher.
> ...
> So the safest way is still to send a signed e-mail fo
Kai Engert wrote:
- the keyserver will extract the cert from the email, and will
store both email and cert locally
Is the script smart enough to identify and extract the encryption
certificate in the mail when the sender uses separate signature and
encryption certificates ? (and of course
On 03.06.2011 00:12, Kai Engert wrote:
In short, go to
http://kuix.de/smime-keyserver/
and give it a try.
...
(as of today, the keyserver accepts the same signing roots
as Mozilla software. It also allows certs from cacert.org)
In addition it will also accept the certs from
http://ec.europa.
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