HI!
Someone sent me an encrypted S/MIME message which I could not decrypt in
Mozilla's Seamonkey. It was generated by Outlook 2010 beta.
It seems it's a CMS structure and recipientInfos contains subject key ids
instead of issuerAndSerialNumber. It seems Seamonkey 2.0.x does not support
that. Is i
On 03/30/2010 03:38 PM, rbellamy wrote:
> I apologize if this has already been covered, or if it falls under the
> umbrella of "stoopid questions."
>
> I'm trying to work through the FIPS sample, and am having a difficult
> time.
>
> First of all, the includes call out to "cryptoki.h", which doesn'
I apologize if this has already been covered, or if it falls under the
umbrella of "stoopid questions."
I'm trying to work through the FIPS sample, and am having a difficult
time.
First of all, the includes call out to "cryptoki.h", which doesn't
seem to exist anymore.
Any help would be apprecia
Thomas Zangerl wrote:
On Mar 30, 12:53 pm, Anders Rundgren
wrote:
It might be interesting to note how this works in MSIE since few
CAs can completely ignore MSIE even if they wanted to:
"" a la Microsoft:
It starts by the poor user trying to get the enroll ActiveX object
to run *by reducing s
On Mar 30, 4:39 pm, Thomas Zangerl wrote:
> to do it (can be painful) and it create standard PKCS#7 CSRs. Keygen
I meant "creates PKCS#10 CSRs". Need more coffee :)
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On Mar 30, 12:53 pm, Anders Rundgren
wrote:
> It might be interesting to note how this works in MSIE since few
> CAs can completely ignore MSIE even if they wanted to:
>
> "" a la Microsoft:
>
> It starts by the poor user trying to get the enroll ActiveX object
> to run *by reducing security until
On 03/30/2010 01:53 PM, Anders Rundgren:
It might be interesting to note how this works in MSIE since few
CAs can completely ignore MSIE even if they wanted to:
The solution is really to define one standard, if that's keygen, so
long...preferable it should be fairly simply with few flags poss
On Mar 30, 12:23 pm, Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
> The most adequate group for this discussion would be mozilla.dev.tech.crypto
>
> I agree than enhancing generateCRMFRequest to let it generate a more
> usual format instead of only CRMF would be a big step forward.
>
> And making more obvious that
It might be interesting to note how this works in MSIE since few
CAs can completely ignore MSIE even if they wanted to:
"" a la Microsoft:
It starts by the poor user trying to get the enroll ActiveX object
to run *by reducing security until it starts*.
Most people fail already at this stage.
Th
Eddy Nigg wrote:
On 03/30/2010 01:23 PM, Jean-Marc Desperrier:
And making more obvious that keygen is not a good long term solution
is a very good thing.
Only in case the alternative will be supported by all or most browsers.
The original message shows that the fact keygen imposes a text of
On 03/30/2010 01:23 PM, Jean-Marc Desperrier:
And making more obvious that keygen is not a good long term solution
is a very good thing.
Only in case the alternative will be supported by all or most browsers.
Regards
Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd.
XMPP:start...@startcom.org
Blog:
The most adequate group for this discussion would be mozilla.dev.tech.crypto
I agree than enhancing generateCRMFRequest to let it generate a more
usual format instead of only CRMF would be a big step forward.
And making more obvious that keygen is not a good long term solution is
a very good
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