Re: How to imoprt a p7c files into firefox?

2009-02-05 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 02/05/2009 06:36 PM, Vidal Pascal: thank you for your reply. In fact, i have a certificate containing a AIA extension. In this extension, there is the URL of my .p7c files which includes 3 certificates. These certificates are required to build the trusted chain. As indicated, Firefox will no

Re: newbie problems with certutil and signtool

2009-02-05 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
Thanks to David and Kyle for supplying information about InstallShield and its use of NSS for making Netscape Communicator compatible installers. David Tiertant wrote, On 2009-02-05 07:35: > Hi and thanks very much for the reply. Just to back things up a little > bit, I'll try to illustrate what

Re: newbie problems with certutil and signtool

2009-02-05 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
David Tiertant wrote, On 2009-02-05 07:52: > Interestingly enough, when I tried to include -d, signtool refused to do > anything other than spit out its syntax help. The process runs when > removing -d. It ends in an error (as you stated, probably related to > trust flags), but it runs. Could th

Re: Building certificate trusted chain problem

2009-02-05 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
Vidal Pascal wrote, On 2009-02-04 08:35 PST: > i look for some information about firefox and the building trusted chain > mecanism. I have a certificate containing two URL in the AIA extension: > > 1) p7c files containing cross-certificates > 2) OCSP URL PKCS#7 defines 6 content types: data, sig

Re: "pretty print" a cert from JSS

2009-02-05 Thread Glen Beasley
David Stutzman wrote: Is there a way to pretty print a certificate using JSS? I know NSS has the functionality based on output from certutil -L -n "nickname". you can code the same pretty print functionality but there is no existing function that duplicates certutil -l -n. You can start wit

Re: Full Disclosure!

2009-02-05 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 02/05/2009 08:36 PM, Gervase Markham: Eddy: I don't think Frank is saying that you made the _same_ mistakes as CertStar (out-sourcing validation etc. etc.), but that you made _a_mistake_, just like they did. He then goes on to make the point that making a mistake is not the end of the world.

Re: Proposal to split this list

2009-02-05 Thread Ian G
On 5/2/09 18:34, Frank Hecker wrote: Ian G wrote: OK, I'll wait. I don't have an NNTP reader, or don't know what one is. We'll forgive you the confusion. It's like saying "HTTP reader" instead of "browser" :-) Oh, it's newsgroup reader, got it, thanks. Is it something in Firefox or Thunde

mod_nss self signed cert for ocsp responder

2009-02-05 Thread Ahnjoan Amous
I'm attempting configuration of mod_nss to use an OCSP responder. My OCSP responder uses a self signed certificate (call it OCSPcert) to sign responses, my web server uses a certificate (call it SERVERcert) signed by a trusted CA (call it CA1cert). I also have a second trusted CA (call it CA2cert

Re: Full Disclosure!

2009-02-05 Thread Gervase Markham
Eddy Nigg wrote: >> So IMO you get points for prompt disclosure and fixes, but in the end >> you messed up just like Comodo and CertStar did. > > Nonono :-) > > I see the main differences as followed and I believe the main > differences are policy wise (and allow me to comment on this since you >

Re: Policy: revoke on private key exposure

2009-02-05 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 02/05/2009 04:13 PM, Frank Hecker: I agree. I think this is a case where it definitely makes sense to have this be a requirement. I also think the case of revocation on key compromise is relatively clear, and I don't anticipate any major problems finding policy language to deal with it. Terr

Re: Policy: revoke on private key exposure

2009-02-05 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 02/05/2009 04:03 PM, Frank Hecker: I agree that it would be unusual for a CPS to state that certificate revocation could be done only at the request of the subscriber. However I *can* imagine a CPS where this would be ambiguous. For example, your StartCom CPS is very slightly ambiguous, since

Re: Howto sign CRMF requests?

2009-02-05 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
David Stutzman wrote, On 2009-02-05 04:57: > Nelson B Bolyard wrote: >> axi...@googlemail.com wrote, On 2009-02-03 04:09: >>> Is there a way to sign CRMF and create CMMF using JSS? > CRMF requests aren't signed. I interpreted the question to mean "Is there a way to issue a cert based on the cont

Re: Proposal to split this list

2009-02-05 Thread Frank Hecker
Ian G wrote: OK, I'll wait. I don't have an NNTP reader, or don't know what one is. We'll forgive you the confusion. It's like saying "HTTP reader" instead of "browser" :-) Is it something in Firefox or Thunderbird? You can read Mozilla newsgroups in Thunderbird by creating a "newsgroup

Re: newbie problems with certutil and signtool

2009-02-05 Thread David Tiertant
And now... http://david.tiertant.com/installshield/007.jpg This shows that I have to create the DBs using certutil -N -d . first or I get the security authorization error when attempting to create the certificate. So I delete the DBs, create new empty ones, then create a certificate using tru

Re: How to imoprt a p7c files into firefox?

2009-02-05 Thread Vidal Pascal
Hi, thank you for your reply. In fact, i have a certificate containing a AIA extension. In this extension, there is the URL of my .p7c files which includes 3 certificates. These certificates are required to build the trusted chain. I explain: I have two PKI domains : A and B. A server in the d

Re: newbie problems with certutil and signtool

2009-02-05 Thread David Tiertant
Interestingly enough, when I tried to include -d, signtool refused to do anything other than spit out its syntax help. The process runs when removing -d. It ends in an error (as you stated, probably related to trust flags), but it runs. Could this be a bug in signtool? This is shown below. ht

Re: newbie problems with certutil and signtool

2009-02-05 Thread David Tiertant
Yes, this is a basic overview of the process for anyone interested in the problem. Thanks! Kyle Hamilton wrote: InstallShield is its own separate thing. Newer versions use the Microsoft Installer (MSI) capability, but it is still made by Acresso (spun off from Macrovision). http://kb.acres

Re: Proposal to split this list

2009-02-05 Thread Ian G
On 5/2/09 14:22, Eddy Nigg wrote: On 02/05/2009 03:14 PM, Ian G: Excellent, OK, so I went here: https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security and subscribed. I guess it is up to each person to do that. Ian, this is the wrong list. The new list is called dev.security.policy, not dev.securi

Re: newbie problems with certutil and signtool

2009-02-05 Thread David Tiertant
Hi and thanks very much for the reply. Just to back things up a little bit, I'll try to illustrate what I would like to accomplish. I work for a software company and we typically distribute our software on CD media. The software is fairly specialized and only works when connected to a server, e

"pretty print" a cert from JSS

2009-02-05 Thread David Stutzman
Is there a way to pretty print a certificate using JSS? I know NSS has the functionality based on output from certutil -L -n "nickname". Dave -- dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto

Re: Policy: revoke on private key exposure

2009-02-05 Thread Frank Hecker
Eddy Nigg wrote: On 02/05/2009 04:05 AM, Frank Hecker: * In the near term I think we should make it a recommended practice that CAs should revoke certificates whose private keys are known to be compromised, as well as certificates for which subscriber verification is known to be invalid. Well,

Re: Policy: revoke on private key exposure

2009-02-05 Thread Frank Hecker
Eddy Nigg wrote: On 02/05/2009 04:23 AM, Kyle Hamilton: Once a key is in compromised state, it can never become uncompromised again. Enforcing this is part of the trust that I have in the certification authorities -- and why I don't currently trust any of them to tell me who anyone happens to b

Re: Proposal to split this list

2009-02-05 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 02/05/2009 03:14 PM, Ian G: Excellent, OK, so I went here: https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security and subscribed. I guess it is up to each person to do that. Ian, this is the wrong list. The new list is called dev.security.policy, not dev.security. It seems that the new list d

Re: Proposal to split this list

2009-02-05 Thread Ian G
Excellent, OK, so I went here: https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security and subscribed. I guess it is up to each person to do that. Now, the list charter! As a starting point: == a. Discussion on security policy, governance, directions and architecture in common for

Re: Howto sign CRMF requests?

2009-02-05 Thread David Stutzman
Nelson B Bolyard wrote: axi...@googlemail.com wrote, On 2009-02-03 04:09: Is there a way to sign CRMF and create CMMF using JSS? > If there is, you'll find it somewhere in http://mxr.mozilla.org/security/source/security/jss/org/mozilla/jss/pkix/crmf/ CRMF requests aren't signed. I think thi

Re: How to imoprt a p7c files into firefox?

2009-02-05 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 02/05/2009 02:38 PM, Vidal Pascal: Hi, does anybody have a solution to import automatically (via AIA extension) some certificates which are in a p7c files ? What do you mean by "AIA" extension? If some CA certificates are chained to the EE certificate and included in the PKCS7 file than th

How to imoprt a p7c files into firefox?

2009-02-05 Thread Vidal Pascal
Hi, does anybody have a solution to import automatically (via AIA extension) some certificates which are in a p7c files ? It works with IE 6 & 7. Best regards, Pascal -- View this message in context: http://www.nabble.com/How-to-imoprt-a-p7c-files-into-firefox--tp21850565p21850565.html Sent

Re: Policy: revoke on private key exposure

2009-02-05 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 02/04/2009 07:39 PM, Frank Hecker: Re resellers, I think it is a fruitless task for us to try to move the entire CA industry to change the way it operates as a business. Our main interest is in having CAs maintain effective controls over their authorized agents, whether these be actual reselle

Re: Full Disclosure!

2009-02-05 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 02/04/2009 08:27 PM, Frank Hecker: 2. I understand that what happened in the case of StartCom was not exactly the same as what happened in the case of Comodo/CertStar. However it's part of web security basics to assume that whatever a client sends to a server is untrusted and must be (re)verif