Kyle Hamilton wrote:
> 2008/10/22 Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
Quite right. The flip side of this is that if *anyone* other than the
person who generated the key pair has they public key, they *should*
sign the suicide note and distribute it because if they have it, a bad
actor co
Paul Kinzelman wrote, On 2008-10-22 18:39:
> I originally posted this issue on moz.sup.tbird and somebody
> suggested posting it here. The suggestion I got over there was
> to try https://nic-nac-project.de/~kaosmos/p7mHandler-en.html
That should be https://nic-nac-project.org/~kaosmos/p7mHandler-
If your friend is encrypting the message, whose digital certificate
is he using to encrypt it with? Yours? Do you have a digital
certificate with an associated Private Key in your Tbird keystore?
If so, are you trying to read the encrypted e-mail from the same
machine where you have your Private
I originally posted this issue on moz.sup.tbird and somebody
suggested posting it here. The suggestion I got over there was
to try https://nic-nac-project.de/~kaosmos/p7mHandler-en.html
but that didn't change anything.
I'm using Tbird 2.0.0.17 (20080914)
When a friend uses an Apple to digitally s
2008/10/22 Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>>> Quite right. The flip side of this is that if *anyone* other than the
>>> person who generated the key pair has they public key, they *should*
>>> sign the suicide note and distribute it because if they have it, a bad
>>> actor could have it as well.
>
>
>
Julien R Pierre - Sun Microsystems wrote:
> Paul Hoffman wrote:
>> At 4:39 PM +0100 10/22/08, Gervase Markham wrote:
>>> Julien R Pierre - Sun Microsystems wrote:
If the root could "revoke itself", in the case of root cert key
compromise, ie. the root cert's private key becoming public, a
On 10/23/2008 12:34 AM, Julien R Pierre - Sun Microsystems:
However, in this particular case, for all NSS-based software - a manual
solution exists for older applications : simply mark the root as untrusted.
If they happen to hear about it. Or if they happen to use an updated NSS
library. How
Nuno,
nponte wrote:
Hi Julien,
Thanks for your reply.
Is there any ticket filed in bugzilla where I can track
developments on this issue?
Regards,
Nuno
Yes. See bugzilla 133191 . Also 321755 is related.
___
dev-tech-cr
Eddy,
Eddy Nigg wrote:
Updating software with a new root module is a lot simpler. Of course
that process has its own set of security issues as well.
Besides that, one of the problems is, how to reach each and every
software (including older or non-updated or smaller ones).
I think general
Paul,
Paul Hoffman wrote:
Updating software with a new root module is a lot simpler. Of course that
process has its own set of security issues as well.
It also doesn't work for users who are using a different root module. "Barely traceable
management action" != "open message protocol".
Tru
Hi Julien,
Thanks for your reply.
Is there any ticket filed in bugzilla where I can track
developments on this issue?
Regards,
Nuno
On Oct 20, 8:22 pm, Julien R Pierre - Sun Microsystems
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Ni Nuno,
>
>
>
> nponte wrote:
> > Hi,
>
> >
On 10/22/2008 09:46 PM, Julien R Pierre - Sun Microsystems:
Yes, they should ... But the big question is how do they actually do
that and get software to take notice of that suicide note ?
I don't think that can really be done without standards.
I think that's the key to solve the problem of
On 10/22/2008 10:14 PM, Paul Hoffman:
Yes, they should ... But the big question is how do they actually do that and
get software to take notice of that suicide note ?
I don't think that can really be done without standards.
Of course. I'm not saying we don't need a standard, just that the lack
>Yes, they should ... But the big question is how do they actually do that and
>get software to take notice of that suicide note ?
>I don't think that can really be done without standards.
Of course. I'm not saying we don't need a standard, just that the lack of a
standard *today* should not pre
Paul Hoffman wrote:
At 4:39 PM +0100 10/22/08, Gervase Markham wrote:
Julien R Pierre - Sun Microsystems wrote:
If the root could "revoke itself", in the case of root cert key
compromise, ie. the root cert's private key becoming public, anybody
could then sign revocation information for that ro
Gervase,
Gervase Markham wrote:
Julien R Pierre - Sun Microsystems wrote:
If the root could "revoke itself", in the case of root cert key
compromise, ie. the root cert's private key becoming public, anybody
could then sign revocation information for that root CA - whether to
mark it revoked or
At 4:39 PM +0100 10/22/08, Gervase Markham wrote:
>Julien R Pierre - Sun Microsystems wrote:
>> If the root could "revoke itself", in the case of root cert key
>> compromise, ie. the root cert's private key becoming public, anybody
>> could then sign revocation information for that root CA - whethe
Julien R Pierre - Sun Microsystems wrote:
> If the root could "revoke itself", in the case of root cert key
> compromise, ie. the root cert's private key becoming public, anybody
> could then sign revocation information for that root CA - whether to
> mark it revoked or unrevoked.
Leaving aside th
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