At 4:39 PM +0100 10/22/08, Gervase Markham wrote: >Julien R Pierre - Sun Microsystems wrote: >> If the root could "revoke itself", in the case of root cert key >> compromise, ie. the root cert's private key becoming public, anybody >> could then sign revocation information for that root CA - whether to >> mark it revoked or unrevoked. > >Leaving aside the question of what the standards say for just a moment, >what's wrong with that in principle? If you know a private key has been >compromised, most of the time you still have the key - so why shouldn't >or couldn't it be used to sign its own suicide note?
Quite right. The flip side of this is that if *anyone* other than the person who generated the key pair has they public key, they *should* sign the suicide note and distribute it because if they have it, a bad actor could have it as well. _______________________________________________ dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
