Re: Update on DigiNotar and Entrust

2008-06-21 Thread David E. Ross
On 6/20/2008 5:44 PM, Eddy Nigg wrote [in part]: > > This boils down to either of the two other options. If NSS isn't able to > choose the DigiNotar root or treat the cross-signed certificate as > revoked, than the email bit of Entrust should be set to off until the > issue is solved in a diffe

Re: New SSL warning

2008-06-21 Thread Eddy Nigg
Eddy Nigg: > You can try to edit the trust flags of that see (remove all trust) and > when encountering a site with a certificate from that CA to add an > exception. I don't know what I was thinking when I wrote this, but it should have been "edit the trust flags of that CA", not "see" ;-) --

Re: FF3 SSL does still allow insecure keys - example for critical server

2008-06-21 Thread Eddy Nigg
Jan Schejbal: > Akamai, a very big content distribution provider used by MANY > organisations including the german Finanzamt (equivalent to the IRS), > had a weak key. If I put > 127.0.0.1 a248.e.akamai.net > into my hosts file and run an apache with the broken cert (key got > published in some for

Re: New SSL warning

2008-06-21 Thread Eddy Nigg
Jan Schejbal: > > I have started a new thread about this with an example why a blacklist > is the only way to go. Please read the thread about Debian keys first: http://groups.google.com/group/mozilla.dev.tech.crypto/browse_thread/thread/b2cda44a0e6c4d5c# > >> This is induced via the name constr

FF3 SSL does still allow insecure keys - example for critical server

2008-06-21 Thread Jan Schejbal
Hi, I am posting this to a new thread because the other one is too old. I thought this would be fixed in ff3 by the new revocation system, but it seems some CAs do not use it. Akamai, a very big content distribution provider used by MANY organisations including the german Finanzamt (equivalent

Re: New SSL warning

2008-06-21 Thread Jan Schejbal
Hi, [great debian openssl f**kup] >some CAs have started to take action actively. I have started a new thread about this with an example why a blacklist is the only way to go. >> - allow limiting CA certificates to certifying certain domains (for >> example, I want my universities CA to be able