Hi,

[great debian openssl f**kup]
>some CAs have started to take action actively.

I have started a new thread about this with an example why a blacklist 
is the only way to go.

>> - allow limiting CA certificates to certifying certain domains (for
>> example, I want my universities CA to be able to issue valid certs 
>> for
>> subdomains of the university domain and a single other domain ONLY, 
>> so
>> if the CA gets hacked, noone can use its key to create a valid cert 
>> for
>> my bank).

>This is induced via the name constraint extension in CA certificates. 
>This is up to the issuing CA.

I would like to have a way to basically add a name constraint if the CA 
didn't. As I specifically add the certificate, I should be able to 
select "but trust this only for *.somedomain.de".

As I need this for only this one CA, if it is possible to create a new 
certificate with the same modulus it would be enough to give me some 
pointers how to do that.

>Of course Google has no problem getting valid
>certificate(s) for all its domain name extensions.

They shouldn't, but they do. (at least with www.google.com vs. 
google.com)

>> - allow saving and "locking in" onto a certain cert

just noticed there already is a bug similar to this, 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=286107

>>Imagine the following scenario:
>>
>> A dissident in china wants to get a new Firefox version. He uses a
>> secure system and is very afraid that the government will replace a
>> download of a program he wants by a trojan. For this reason, he does 
>> his
>> firefox download via https. The chinese government forced a CA to
>> cooperate, gets a valid cert for the mozilla web site and puts the
>> trojan into his download.

>If you can point to one CA even considering
>something like this, please forward the name
>of the CA.

I assume that any chinese CA would do this, I do not know if there are 
any. But you can apply that to other countries. There is a CA located 
in Israel that is trusted in FF. I think that if the Mossad wanted a 
fake cert, they would get it fairly quickly, one way or the other. And 
I don't know what would happen if the DHS or NSA asked Verisign for 
something like this in the name of national security.

Regards,
Jan

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