Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote:
> A few problems here:
>
> 1.) Please go to
> http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/pending/#id0x118b3bd8 and
> click on the first "Download/Install" link (for example
> https://www.a-trust.at/certs/A-Trust-Qual-01a.crt ). This is not a CA
> certificate
A few problems here:
1.) Please go to
http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/pending/#id0x118b3bd8 and
click on the first "Download/Install" link (for example
https://www.a-trust.at/certs/A-Trust-Qual-01a.crt ). This is not a CA
certificate! This is true for all the others as well...
OK so I went with making the SignerInfo outside of JSS which wasn't as
bad as I first thought. This works with private keys from PKCS12 or
Sun-PKCS11 hardware tokens. I used BouncyCastle methods to do this. In
the spirit of openness and thanks for all the help I get here, here's
some code to
Hi,
I have an issue with NSS and mozilla's password manager.
The password manager is using the SDR to encrypt its passwords. The
problem is that the application I'm working on has to replace the user's
keystore with every update because there are special keys in that
database. So the user gets a n
Gervase Markham wrote:
>>> The CA can choose what friendly names they like for their website and
>>> for the store; any confusion is their problem. You can check which
>>> cert is which by comparing fingerprints.
>>>
>>>
>> Can you give me an example? I can't find a way to compare anyth
Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote:
> If I remember right, there was a discussion on that issue? Don't
> remember its outcome however...Perhaps the Mozilla CA policy should be
> clearer in that respect and explain if a CA should be public or not
> (Assuming that a CA for Austria citizens only is no
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