Great messaging. Until about 1/2 of the email I was wondering where
this was going to go and finding it plausible.
Thanks for the morning laugh!
Guido
On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 6:45 AM, Jonathan McDowell wrote:
> A potential issue in the DFSG freeness of the Debian keyrings has been
> brought to
also sprach Jonathan McDowell [2017-04-01 06:45 +0200]:
> gpg --armor --export-secret-key | \
>sh -c '$(echo ZWNobyAiWW91J3ZlIGJlZW4gQXByaWwgRm9vbGVkISIK | base64 -d)' |
> \
>mail -s 'Key material' keyring-ma...@debian.org
Jonathan,
I think it's great that you guys are taking this to
On Wed, 05 Mar 2014, peter green wrote:
> Also ECDSA shares with DSA the serious disadvantage over RSA that
> making signatures on a system with a broken RNG can reveal the key.
I believe that we should avoid ECDSA gnupg keys and subkeys like the plague
for the time being.
You'd most likely get E
Xavier Roche dijo [Wed, Mar 05, 2014 at 06:47:13PM +0100]:
> > I would tend to side more with Odyx here in that the keys are still
> > considered trustworthy enough to be in the keyring but we're encouraging
> > moving to stronger keys and no longer accepting these keys to be
> > included.
>
> Yes
Helmut Grohne writes ("Re: RSA vs ECDSA (Was: Bits from keyring-maint: Pushing
keyring updates. Let us bury your old 1024D key!)"):
> ECDSA is a DSA algorithm and therefore relies on the creation of secure
> random numbers. It has this problem, that if you happen to choose the
&
On Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 02:33:23PM -0600, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> Umh, I feel I have to answer this message, but I clearly don't have
> enough information to do so in an authoritative way¹. AIUI, ECDSA has
> not been shown to be *stronger* than RSA ??? RSA works based on modulus
> operations, ECDSA on
On Wed, Mar 05, 2014 at 08:29:37AM +0100, Ondrej Surý wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 4, 2014, at 21:33, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > Ondrej Surý dijo [Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 08:10:47PM +0100]:
> > > On Mon, Mar 3, 2014, at 19:13, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > > > As keyring maintainers, we no longer consider 1024D keys to
Le 05/03/2014 15:05, Jeremy T. Bouse a écrit :
> I would tend to side more with Odyx here in that the keys are still
> considered trustworthy enough to be in the keyring but we're encouraging
> moving to stronger keys and no longer accepting these keys to be
> included.
Yes, this was my thoughts,
On 05.03.2014 04:01, Didier 'OdyX' Raboud wrote:
Le mercredi, 5 mars 2014, 10.47:07 Paul Wise a écrit :
On Wed, Mar 5, 2014 at 1:55 AM, Xavier Roche wrote:
> I have a rather silly question: would a mail (signed with this
key)
> request to the DDs who already signed the initial key (and checked
Le 05/03/2014 10:01, Didier 'OdyX' Raboud a écrit :
> Le mercredi, 5 mars 2014, 10.47:07 Paul Wise a écrit :
>> On Wed, Mar 5, 2014 at 1:55 AM, Xavier Roche wrote:
>>> I have a rather silly question: would a mail (signed with this key)
>>> request to the DDs who already signed the initial key (and
Le mercredi, 5 mars 2014, 10.47:07 Paul Wise a écrit :
> On Wed, Mar 5, 2014 at 1:55 AM, Xavier Roche wrote:
> > I have a rather silly question: would a mail (signed with this key)
> > request to the DDs who already signed the initial key (and checked
> > the identity) to sign the replacement key c
On Tue, Mar 4, 2014, at 21:33, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> Ondřej Surý dijo [Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 08:10:47PM +0100]:
> > On Mon, Mar 3, 2014, at 19:13, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > > As keyring maintainers, we no longer consider 1024D keys to be
> > > trustable. We are not yet mass-removing them, because we don
On Wed, Mar 5, 2014, at 7:58, Bastian Blank wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 05, 2014 at 06:54:53AM +, Ondřej Surý wrote:
> > > Also ECDSA shares with DSA the serious disadvantage over RSA that making
> > > signatures on a system with a broken RNG can reveal the key.
> > Care to share a source? I thought
On Wed, Mar 05, 2014 at 06:54:53AM +, Ondřej Surý wrote:
> > Also ECDSA shares with DSA the serious disadvantage over RSA that making
> > signatures on a system with a broken RNG can reveal the key.
> Care to share a source? I thought that RSA would be vulnerable to poor RNG as
> well.
The a
On 5. 3. 2014, at 5:54, peter green wrote:
>>
>> I am not sure what's the timeframe for GnuPG 2.1.0[1] release, but would
>> it be possible to skip the RSA and go directly for ECDSA, before we
>> start deprecating DSA? Or at least have an option to do so? (Well,
>> unless GnuPG 2.1 release is to
I am not sure what's the timeframe for GnuPG 2.1.0[1] release, but would
it be possible to skip the RSA and go directly for ECDSA, before we
start deprecating DSA? Or at least have an option to do so? (Well,
unless GnuPG 2.1 release is too much far in the future.)
IMO we need to phase out 1024
On Wed, 2014-03-05 at 10:47 +0800, Paul Wise wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 5, 2014 at 1:55 AM, Xavier Roche wrote:
>
> > I have a rather silly question: would a mail (signed with this key)
> > request to the DDs who already signed the initial key (and checked the
> > identity) to sign the replacement key
On Wed, Mar 5, 2014 at 1:55 AM, Xavier Roche wrote:
> I have a rather silly question: would a mail (signed with this key)
> request to the DDs who already signed the initial key (and checked the
> identity) to sign the replacement key considered unreasonable ?
Considering that the initial keys ar
On Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 08:10:47PM +0100, Ondrej Surý wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 3, 2014, at 19:13, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > As keyring maintainers, we no longer consider 1024D keys to be
> > trustable. We are not yet mass-removing them, because we don't want to
> > hamper the project's work, but we defini
Ondřej Surý dijo [Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 08:10:47PM +0100]:
> On Mon, Mar 3, 2014, at 19:13, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > As keyring maintainers, we no longer consider 1024D keys to be
> > trustable. We are not yet mass-removing them, because we don't want to
> > hamper the project's work, but we definitiv
Xavier Roche dijo [Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 06:55:08PM +0100]:
> I have a rather silly question: would a mail (signed with this key)
> request to the DDs who already signed the initial key (and checked the
> identity) to sign the replacement key considered unreasonable ?
>
> And would it be considered
On Mon, Mar 3, 2014, at 19:13, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> As keyring maintainers, we no longer consider 1024D keys to be
> trustable. We are not yet mass-removing them, because we don't want to
> hamper the project's work, but we definitively will start being more
> aggressively deprecating their use. 10
Le 03/03/2014 19:13, Gunnar Wolf a écrit :
> If you have a key with not-so-many active DD signatures (with
> not-so-many ≥ 2) waiting to get it more signed, stop waiting and
> request the key replacement².
I have a rather silly question: would a mail (signed with this key)
request to the DDs who a
Vincent Danjean dijo [Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 05:16:43PM +0100]:
> On 03/03/2014 19:13, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > If you have a key with not-so-many active DD signatures (with
> > not-so-many ≥ 2) waiting to get it more signed, stop waiting and
> > request the key replacement².
>
> Is there a way to
Jonathan McDowell dijo [Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 05:38:11AM +]:
> > Surely this is well within keyring-maint purview and a GR is thus
> > unnessecary? Running the plan by debian-project seems a reasonable
> > level of consultation.
>
> We didn't need one for removing PGPv3 keys so I don't see why
* Vincent Danjean [2014-03-04 17:16:43 +0100]:
> On 03/03/2014 19:13, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > If you have a key with not-so-many active DD signatures (with not-so-many ≥
> > 2) waiting to get it more signed, stop waiting and request the key
> > replacement².
>
> Is there a way to check this r
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 03/03/2014 19:13, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> If you have a key with not-so-many active DD signatures (with not-so-many ≥
> 2) waiting to get it more signed, stop waiting and request the key
> replacement².
Is there a way to check this requirement?
On 03/04/2014 09:24 PM, Jeremy T. Bouse wrote:
> If any DDs are in, or will be, the Atlanta area and would like to get
> together for a key signing I would be more than welcome to get together
Most likely, I will attend the OpenStack summit in Atlanta [1] next May
(from 12th to 16th). Even if I'm
I've actually been in the process of working to transition from my
existing to 1024D key I created back in 2002 with my new 4096R key I
created in 2011 that I use 3072R subkeys on a OpenPGP v2 smartcard.
Unfortunately I haven't been able to get together with any other DDs to
perform a key signi
On Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 06:27:38PM +1000, Alexander Zangerl wrote:
> On Tue, 04 Mar 2014 04:46:17 +, Luca Filipozzi writes:
> >I propose 2014-SEP-01. Gives people six months to get this done. Even *I*
> >can
> >get it done in that amount of time. I've already emailed my fellow Vancouver
> >
On Tue, 04 Mar 2014 04:46:17 +, Luca Filipozzi writes:
>I propose 2014-SEP-01. Gives people six months to get this done. Even *I* can
>get it done in that amount of time. I've already emailed my fellow Vancouver
>Debian Developers in the hopes of coordinating a revolution^Wkeysigning [1].
l
On Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 12:45:05PM +0800, Paul Wise wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 12:28 PM, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
>
> > About a schedule: No, we do not currently have it. We should work on
> > getting a plan for this. Now, it is not an easy task to get done, and
> > as we might effectively end up l
On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 10:28:41PM -0600, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> Thomas Goirand dijo [Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 11:49:48AM +0800]:
> > On 03/04/2014 02:13 AM, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > > As keyring maintainers, we no longer consider 1024D keys to be trustable.
> > > We are not yet mass-removing them, because
On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 12:28 PM, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> About a schedule: No, we do not currently have it. We should work on
> getting a plan for this. Now, it is not an easy task to get done, and
> as we might effectively end up locking out many DDs, I'm thinking (and
> I have not yet talked this o
Thomas Goirand dijo [Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 11:49:48AM +0800]:
> I salute this effort! :)
Yay! :)
> On 03/04/2014 02:13 AM, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > As keyring maintainers, we no longer consider 1024D keys to be
> > trustable. We are not yet mass-removing them, because we don't want to
> > hamper the
I salute this effort! :)
On 03/04/2014 02:13 AM, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> As keyring maintainers, we no longer consider 1024D keys to be
> trustable. We are not yet mass-removing them, because we don't want to
> hamper the project's work, but we definitively will start being more
> aggressively deprec
On 3 March 2014 20:01, Steve Langasek wrote:
>
> Done. The page is user editable, provided that you're logged in to the
> wiki.
>
Thanks. I'm sorry, I was confused: I think the real reason I didn't edit
the page was because at the time I didn't know whether it or the other
material I had read w
On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 07:37:53PM +, Reuben Thomas wrote:
> On 3 March 2014 18:13, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > As keyring maintainers, we no longer consider 1024D keys to be
> > trustable. We are not yet mass-removing them, because we don't want to
> > hamper the project's work, but we definitivel
On 3 March 2014 18:13, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
>
> As keyring maintainers, we no longer consider 1024D keys to be
> trustable. We are not yet mass-removing them, because we don't want to
> hamper the project's work, but we definitively will start being more
> aggressively deprecating their use. 1024D
Hi,
I do not think that it is a good idea to push for 4k RSA keys! You gain
nothing from it except for slowness on small devices. Debian is used on
a lot of small devices. Further DDs are strongly represented in the WoT
and thus many keyrings will increase in size and checking all the
signatures
Hi,
On Thu, Sep 16, 2010 at 02:02:33PM +0200, Alexander Reichle-Schmehl wrote:
> > FWIW, the OpenPGP smartcard v2 supports keys up to 3072 bits.
> At the recent FrOSCon I have been told, that 4096 bit keys should work,
> but aren't officially supported. (Haven't tested it myself, yet.)
Well, I'
Hi!
Am 15.09.2010 17:07, schrieb Marco d'Itri:
>> I suspect that those figures are because 2048 bits is the default size
>> for RSA keys and 4096 bits is the largest size that GnuPG supports.
> FWIW, the OpenPGP smartcard v2 supports keys up to 3072 bits.
At the recent FrOSCon I have been told,
Hi there!
On Thu, 16 Sep 2010 00:38:25 +0200, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 15 2010, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
>> As for the large keysize, it is seen as too large. It was recommended
>> that Debian should try to do something that would help reduce the
>> overall threat to the De
Hi there!
On Wed, 15 Sep 2010 22:15:25 +0200, Tollef Fog Heen wrote:
> ]] Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
>
> | I just wondering where I am supposed to find a good smartcard that can
> | take 2048R (or larger) keys, works well with gnupg, and for how much :)
>
> http://shop.kernelconcepts.de/product_
* Marco d'Itri (m...@linux.it) wrote:
> On Sep 14, "brian m. carlson" wrote:
>
> > I suspect that those figures are because 2048 bits is the default size
> > for RSA keys and 4096 bits is the largest size that GnuPG supports.
> FWIW, the OpenPGP smartcard v2 supports keys up to 3072 bits.
>
Man
On Wed, Sep 15, 2010 at 11:57:25AM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> On Wed, 15 Sep 2010 12:41:49 -0300 Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
> wrote:
> > On Wed, 15 Sep 2010, Felipe Sateler wrote:
> > > On 14/09/10 01:18, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > > > - Your new key should be signed by two or more other Debian
On Wed, Sep 15 2010, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
> As for the large keysize, it is seen as too large. It was recommended
> that Debian should try to do something that would help reduce the
> overall threat to the Debian PKI instead of promoting very large key
> sizes *in order to acommodat
]] Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
| I just wondering where I am supposed to find a good smartcard that can
| take 2048R (or larger) keys, works well with gnupg, and for how much :)
http://shop.kernelconcepts.de/product_info.php?cPath=1_26&products_id=42
does 3072 bit keys and are quite reasonably p
On Wed, Sep 15, 2010 at 03:14:48PM +0200, Marco d'Itri wrote:
> On Sep 15, Christian PERRIER wrote:
> > > I would like to know the process which lead to selecting these
> > > figures.
> > Apparently, just like many other things in the project: the folks
> > doing the work (and appointed for this b
On 2010-09-15 12:34:46 -0300, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
> On Wed, 15 Sep 2010, Marco d'Itri wrote:
> > On Sep 14, "brian m. carlson" wrote:
> > > I suspect that those figures are because 2048 bits is the default size
> > > for RSA keys and 4096 bits is the largest size that GnuPG supports
On Wed, 15 Sep 2010 12:41:49 -0300 Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
wrote:
> On Wed, 15 Sep 2010, Felipe Sateler wrote:
> > On 14/09/10 01:18, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > > - Your new key should be signed by two or more other Debian
> > > Developers
> >
> > The NM and DM processes require only one signatur
On Wed, 15 Sep 2010, Felipe Sateler wrote:
> On 14/09/10 01:18, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> > - Your new key should be signed by two or more other Debian Developers
>
> The NM and DM processes require only one signature. Why is it harder to
> replace a key than to become a DD?
Or rather, why the require
On Wed, 15 Sep 2010, Marco d'Itri wrote:
> On Sep 14, "brian m. carlson" wrote:
> > I suspect that those figures are because 2048 bits is the default size
> > for RSA keys and 4096 bits is the largest size that GnuPG supports.
> FWIW, the OpenPGP smartcard v2 supports keys up to 3072 bits.
Hmm, t
On Wed, 15 Sep 2010, Marco d'Itri wrote:
> On Sep 15, Christian PERRIER wrote:
> > > I would like to know the process which lead to selecting these figures.
> > Apparently, just like many other things in the project: the folks
> > doing the work (and appointed for this by the project through the D
On 14/09/10 01:18, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> - Your new key should be signed by two or more other Debian Developers
The NM and DM processes require only one signature. Why is it harder to
replace a key than to become a DD?
--
Saludos,
Felipe Sateler
signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signa
On Sep 14, "brian m. carlson" wrote:
> I suspect that those figures are because 2048 bits is the default size
> for RSA keys and 4096 bits is the largest size that GnuPG supports.
FWIW, the OpenPGP smartcard v2 supports keys up to 3072 bits.
--
ciao,
Marco
signature.asc
Description: Digital s
On Tue, 14 Sep 2010 16:56:50 + "brian m. carlson"
wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 14, 2010 at 09:59:16AM +0200, Marco d'Itri wrote:
> > On Sep 14, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> >
> > > pushing Debian towards adopting stronger RSA keys - We have
> > > accepted some 2048R keys, but if you don't have a real reason
On Wed, 2010-09-15 at 15:14 +0200, Marco d'Itri wrote:
> I suppose that this was not the result of cargo cult engineering, so if
> these new recommended key values have been selected as the result of a
> process I am curious to know the rationale which lead to the choice.
> It really looks like a s
On Sep 15, Christian PERRIER wrote:
> > I would like to know the process which lead to selecting these figures.
> Apparently, just like many other things in the project: the folks
> doing the work (and appointed for this by the project through the DPL)
> examine the situation, make plans and deci
Christian PERRIER schrieb:
>> I would like to know the process which lead to selecting these figures.
>
> Apparently, just like many other things in the project: the folks
> doing the work (and appointed for this by the project through the DPL)
> examine the situation, make plans and decisions and
Quoting Marco d'Itri (m...@linux.it):
> I would like to know the process which lead to selecting these figures.
Apparently, just like many other things in the project: the folks
doing the work (and appointed for this by the project through the DPL)
examine the situation, make plans and decisions
On Tue, 2010-09-14 at 16:56 +, brian m. carlson wrote:
> I suspect that those figures are because 2048 bits is the default size
> for RSA keys and 4096 bits is the largest size that GnuPG supports.
> Some specially patched versions of PGP can support keys of up to 16384
> bits, but IIRC those a
On Tue, Sep 14, 2010 at 03:55:30PM -0300, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
> There is a thread about this now in the cryptography ML. If anything really
> insteresting shows up there, I will relay it here. I am certainly
> interested on our bias towards RSA and away from DSA2 and El-Gammal, for
On Tue, 14 Sep 2010, brian m. carlson wrote:
> Personally, I can't see a reason that using an RSA 4096 bit key should
> be that painful even on very slow machines. You're performing a *single
> RSA encrypt operation* per signature.
Well, the main key is mostly a key-signing key/KSK (although you
On Tue, Sep 14, 2010 at 09:59:16AM +0200, Marco d'Itri wrote:
> On Sep 14, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
>
> > pushing Debian towards adopting stronger RSA keys - We have accepted
> > some 2048R keys, but if you don't have a real reason to keep your key
> > at that size (i.e. you very often build on underpo
On Sep 14, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> pushing Debian towards adopting stronger RSA keys - We have accepted
> some 2048R keys, but if you don't have a real reason to keep your key
> at that size (i.e. you very often build on underpowered machines where
> a 4096R key takes forever, or something like that
66 matches
Mail list logo
