On Mon, 17 Jun 2019 18:04:06 +0200, Davide Caratti wrote:
> On Wed, 2019-06-05 at 16:25 -0700, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> > On Wed, 5 Jun 2019 17:39:23 +0200, Davide Caratti wrote:
> > We need some indication of the directions in which kTLS is active
> > (none, rx, tx, rx/tx).
> >
> > Also perhaps could you add TLS_SW vs TLS_HW etc. ? :)
>
> I can add a couple of u16 (or larger?) bitmasks to dump txconf and rxconf.
> do you think this is sufficient?
SGTM!
> > > + int err = 0;
> >
> > There should be no need to init this.
> >
> > > + if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
> >
> > Hmm.. why this check? We never clean up the state once installed until
> > the socket dies completely (currently, pending John's unhash work).
>
> the goal was to ensure that we don't read ctx anymore after
> tls_sk_proto_close() has freed ctx, and I thought that a test on the value
> of sk_state was sufficient.
>
> If it's not, then we might invent something else. For example, we might
> defer freeing kTLS ctx, so that it's called as the very last thing with
> tcp_cleanup_ulp().
Mm.. I was hoping the user space can no longer access a socket once
it reaches sk_prot->close :S Perhaps I got this wrong. If it can
we need to make sure we don't free context before calling tcp_close()
otherwise the state may still be established, no?
In particular:
#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
if (ctx->rx_conf == TLS_HW)
tls_device_offload_cleanup_rx(sk);
if (ctx->tx_conf != TLS_HW && ctx->rx_conf != TLS_HW) {
#else
{
#endif
tls_ctx_free(ctx); <<< <<< <<< <<< kfree()
ctx = NULL;
}
skip_tx_cleanup:
release_sock(sk);
sk_proto_close(sk, timeout); <<< <<< <<< <<< tcp_close()
/* free ctx for TLS_HW_RECORD, used by tcp_set_state
* for sk->sk_prot->unhash [tls_hw_unhash]
*/
if (free_ctx)
tls_ctx_free(ctx);
