Jonathan Looney brought to our attention multiple problems in TCP stack at the sender side.
SACK processing can be abused by malicious peers to either cause overflows, or increase of memory usage. First two patches fix the immediate problems. Since the malicious peers abuse senders by advertizing a very small MSS in their SYN or SYNACK packet, the last two patches add a new sysctl so that admins can chose a higher limit for MSS clamping. Eric Dumazet (4): tcp: limit payload size of sacked skbs tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits tcp: add tcp_min_snd_mss sysctl tcp: enforce tcp_min_snd_mss in tcp_mtu_probing() Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt | 8 ++++++++ include/linux/tcp.h | 4 ++++ include/net/netns/ipv4.h | 1 + include/net/tcp.h | 2 ++ include/uapi/linux/snmp.h | 1 + net/ipv4/proc.c | 1 + net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 11 +++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp.c | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 10 +++++++--- net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 1 + 12 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) -- 2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog
