We can validate PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ accesses in the same way that we do for PTR_TO_PACKET. The only difference is that we don't plug NET_IP_ALIGN into the equation.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <da...@davemloft.net> --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index e74fb1b..cdbf282 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -823,10 +823,27 @@ static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, } static int check_val_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, - int size, bool strict) + int off, int size, bool strict) { - if (strict && size != 1) { - verbose("Unknown alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed in value access.\n"); + int reg_off; + + /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ + if (!strict || size == 1) + return 0; + + reg_off = reg->off; + if (reg->id) { + if (reg->aux_off_align % size) { + verbose("Value access is only %u byte aligned, %d byte access not allowed\n", + reg->aux_off_align, size); + return -EACCES; + } + reg_off += reg->aux_off; + } + + if ((reg_off + off) % size != 0) { + verbose("misaligned value access off %d+%d size %d\n", + reg_off, off, size); return -EACCES; } @@ -846,7 +863,7 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, case PTR_TO_PACKET: return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(reg, off, size, strict); case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ: - return check_val_ptr_alignment(reg, size, strict); + return check_val_ptr_alignment(reg, off, size, strict); default: if (off % size != 0) { verbose("misaligned access off %d size %d\n", -- 2.1.2.532.g19b5d50