3.5.7.4 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Kees Cook <[email protected]> commit 7b9205bd775afc4439ed86d617f9042ee9e76a71 upstream. The seccomp path was using AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND from when seccomp mode 1 could only kill a process. While we still want to make sure an audit record is forced on a kill, this should use a separate record type since seccomp mode 2 introduces other behaviors. In the case of "handled" behaviors (process wasn't killed), only emit a record if the process is under inspection. This change also fixes userspace examination of seccomp audit events, since it was considered malformed due to missing fields of the AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND event type. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]> Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]> Cc: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> Cc: Julien Tinnes <[email protected]> Acked-by: Will Drewry <[email protected]> Acked-by: Steve Grubb <[email protected]> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> [ herton: adjust context, include/uapi/linux/audit.h -> include/linux/audit.h ] Signed-off-by: Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski <[email protected]> --- include/linux/audit.h | 4 +++- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 22f292a..eaa7c9f 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ #define AUDIT_MMAP 1323 /* Record showing descriptor and flags in mmap */ #define AUDIT_NETFILTER_PKT 1324 /* Packets traversing netfilter chains */ #define AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG 1325 /* Netfilter chain modifications */ +#define AUDIT_SECCOMP 1326 /* Secure Computing event */ #define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */ #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */ @@ -510,7 +511,8 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr); static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) { - if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context())) + /* Force a record to be reported if a signal was delivered. */ + if (signr || unlikely(!audit_dummy_context())) __audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, code); } diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 4b96415..a0ecca4 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2670,7 +2670,7 @@ void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) context->type = AUDIT_MMAP; } -static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr) +static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab) { uid_t auid, uid; gid_t gid; @@ -2685,6 +2685,11 @@ static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr) audit_log_task_context(ab); audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); +} + +static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr) +{ + audit_log_task(ab); audit_log_format(ab, " reason="); audit_log_string(ab, reason); audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); @@ -2715,8 +2720,11 @@ void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) { struct audit_buffer *ab; - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); - audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", signr); + ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP); + if (unlikely(!ab)) + return; + audit_log_task(ab); + audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall); audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task()); audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current)); -- 1.7.9.5 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
