On Fri, Oct 16, 2026 at 11:30:17AM -0400, Willem de Bruijn wrote:
> Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 15, 2026 at 01:50:54PM -0400, Willem de Bruijn wrote:
> > > Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > > The ingress validation as implemented by the previous
> > > > patch is stricter than what it replaced: GSO
> > > > packets whose checksum metadata matches no transport header are
> > > > dropped, and non-GSO ones get their checksum completed in place.
> > > > Such packets used to pass with the metadata unvalidated,
> > > > and with no overhead.
> > > > 
> > > > I judge that this should not affect any deployments, but there is still
> > > > some risk that it does.  In case a deployment depends on them anyway,
> > > > provide a per-netns switch to get the old behavior back:
> > > > 
> > > > echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/virtio_net_hdr_csum_check
> > > > 
> > > > The default is validating.
> > > > 
> > > > Assisted-by: LLM
> > > > Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
> > > > ---
> > > >  Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst | 15 +++++++
> > > >  include/linux/virtio_net.h               | 23 ++++++++++
> > > >  include/net/netns/core.h                 |  1 +
> > > >  net/core/dev.c                           |  6 +++
> > > >  net/core/net_namespace.c                 |  1 +
> > > >  net/core/sysctl_net_core.c               | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > >  6 files changed, 100 insertions(+)
> > > > 
> > > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst 
> > > > b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst
> > > > index e586e17fc7a5..7f230929c37e 100644
> > > > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst
> > > > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst
> > > > @@ -246,6 +246,21 @@ processes are dropped unless socket option 
> > > > SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_TSONLY is set.
> > > >  Default: 1 (on)
> > > >  
> > > >  
> > > > +virtio_net_hdr_csum_check
> > > > +-------------------------
> > > 
> > > Make more generic, virtio_net_hdr_validate?
> > > 
> > > In case we add more validation in the future (as we have in the past),
> > > without having to introduce multiple such knobs.
> > 
> > But it's uapi, are you sure we'll be able to change the meaning
> > of an existing knob, even if we keep the name vague?
> > 
> > > > +
> > > > +When processing packets with a virtio net header (through tun, tap, a
> > > > +packet socket or a virtio network device) that request checksum offload
> > > > +(VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM), validate the packet: complete the 
> > > > checksum
> > > > +in software, or drop the packet where the header does not match it.
> > > > +
> > > > +When disabled, the header is trusted not to corrupt the packet, and the
> > > > +checksum is offloaded to hardware (or not verified if it never reaches
> > > > +hardware). This is only safe if no protocol is processing the packets.
> > > > +
> > > > +Default: 1 (on)
> > > > +
> > > > +
> > > >  wmem_default
> > > >  ------------
> > > >  
> > > > diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/linux/virtio_net.h
> > > > index 357115ff0ec2..aa2f8ac4657c 100644
> > > > --- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h
> > > > +++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h
> > > > @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
> > > >  #include <linux/if_vlan.h>
> > > >  #include <linux/ip.h>
> > > >  #include <linux/ipv6.h>
> > > > +#include <linux/jump_label.h>
> > > >  #include <linux/netdevice.h>
> > > >  #include <linux/udp.h>
> > > >  #include <net/gso.h>
> > > > @@ -78,6 +79,19 @@ static inline struct iphdr 
> > > > *virtio_net_ip4_parse(struct sk_buff *skb,
> > > >         *thoff = nhoff + iph->ihl * sizeof(u32);
> > > >         return iph;
> > > >  }
> > > > +/* Defined in net/core/dev.c, enabled while any network namespace
> > > > + * has net.core.virtio_net_hdr_csum_check set to 0.
> > > > + */
> > > 
> > > Should this be a global sysctl, rather than per netns?
> > 
> > 
> > For customers I work with, it would be much less useful.
> 
> Third option: make it an integer rather than a boolean.
> 
> 0: no validation
> 1: current level of validation
> 2 and beyond: if we have to extend it later


Oh that's an interesting idea. Issue: userspace learns about 1, then
someone sets it to 1 thinking this is the highest level and in fact
disables some security.


> Not pretty, I'll admit. So fine to keep as is too if you prefer.
> But I do foresee more changes in this area, if history is a guide.
>  
> > 
> > > Even if per-netns, most likely do not want it writable by netns root
> > > with user namespaces.
> > >
> > > That is the equivalent of ns_capable(CAP_NET_RAW), which is the cause
> > > of many crashes due to bad packets ingested by, e.g., a packet socket.
> > 
> > Hmm, yes i get that. Two knobs? a. verify b. the per netns value ro? Both
> > on by default?
> 
> A single system wide field is simplest.
> 
> Is there a benefit to making this configurable on a per netns basis?
> 
> If so, that's fine too. As long as root-in-namespace cannot modify it,
> so readonly indeed.


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