On Mon, Aug 31, 2026 at 9:47 PM Sanghyun Park
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Cgroup link updates compare only the program type. Programs verified
> for different hooks can share a type, so a UDP6 sock_addr program can
> replace a UDP4 program and write beyond the four-byte ipc.addr field in
> the stack-local struct ipcm_cookie. The same gap permits incompatible
> LSM_MAC and LSM_CGROUP replacements.
>
> Validate every replacement program against the link attach type before
> dispatching to the link-specific update operation. Keep the CGROUP_SKB
> CAP_NET_ADMIN check at initial attach so pinned or delegated link FDs can
> still be updated after a capability drop.
>
> Fixes: 0c991ebc8c69 ("bpf: Implement bpf_prog replacement for an active 
> bpf_cgroup_link")
> Acked-by: Leon Hwang <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Sanghyun Park <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <[email protected]>

> ---
> v5:
>   - Fold the link-create permission check call onto one line.
> v4: 
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
>   - Validate every program link update through the shared attach-type helper.
>   - Fold the LSM attach-flavor check into that helper.
>   - Keep the CGROUP_SKB permission check in the attach-only wrapper and rename
>     the wrapper to describe that role.
>   - Follow the preferred BPF multi-line comment style.
>   - Add focused regression selftests as patch 2/2.
> v3: 
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
>   - Factor the CGROUP_SKB CAP_NET_ADMIN check into an attach-only helper.
> v2: 
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
>   - Extend validation from cgroup sock_addr programs to all cgroup program
>     types, including exact LSM attach flavors.
>   - Preserve legacy CGROUP_SKB ingress/egress replacement compatibility.
>   - Keep the CGROUP_SKB CAP_NET_ADMIN check on attach, not link update.
> v1: 
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
> ---
>  kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
>  1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> index 6874ba1424af..2bcd3f3a2a55 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> @@ -4481,14 +4481,9 @@ static int bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(const 
> struct bpf_prog *prog,
>         case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR:
>         case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT:
>         case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP:
> +       case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
>                 return attach_type == prog->expected_attach_type ? 0 : 
> -EINVAL;
>         case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
> -               if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> -                       /* cg-skb progs can be loaded by unpriv user.
> -                        * check permissions at attach time.
> -                        */
> -                       return -EPERM;
> -
>                 ptype = attach_type_to_prog_type(attach_type);
>                 if (prog->type != ptype)
>                         return -EINVAL;
> @@ -4542,6 +4537,20 @@ static int bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(const 
> struct bpf_prog *prog,
>         }
>  }
>
> +static int bpf_prog_attach_check_perm(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
> +                                     enum bpf_attach_type attach_type)
> +{
> +       /*
> +        * CGROUP_SKB programs can be loaded by unprivileged users, so check
> +        * permissions at attach time.
> +        */
> +       if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB &&
> +           !bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> +               return -EPERM;
> +
> +       return bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(prog, attach_type);
> +}
> +
>  static bool is_cgroup_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type ptype, enum 
> bpf_attach_type atype,
>                                 bool check_atype)
>  {
> @@ -4606,7 +4615,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr)
>         if (IS_ERR(prog))
>                 return PTR_ERR(prog);
>
> -       if (bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(prog, attr->attach_type)) {
> +       if (bpf_prog_attach_check_perm(prog, attr->attach_type)) {
>                 bpf_prog_put(prog);
>                 return -EINVAL;
>         }
> @@ -5805,8 +5814,7 @@ static int link_create(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t 
> uattr)
>         if (IS_ERR(prog))
>                 return PTR_ERR(prog);
>
> -       ret = bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(prog,
> -                                               
> attr->link_create.attach_type);
> +       ret = bpf_prog_attach_check_perm(prog, attr->link_create.attach_type);
>         if (ret)
>                 goto out;
>
> @@ -5968,6 +5976,10 @@ static int link_update(union bpf_attr *attr)
>                 goto out_put_progs;
>         }
>
> +       ret = bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(new_prog, link->attach_type);
> +       if (ret)
> +               goto out_put_progs;
> +
>         if (link->ops->update_prog)
>                 ret = link->ops->update_prog(link, new_prog, old_prog);
>         else
> --
> 2.48.1

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