In preparation for removing the deprecated strlcat() API[1], replace the strscpy()/strlcat() chain in selinux_ima_collect_state() with a struct seq_buf, which tracks the write position and remaining space internally.
The seven open-coded WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len) truncation checks become a single seq_buf_has_overflowed() check after the string is built. The kzalloc() and its exact-size computation are unchanged, so the measurement string passed to IMA is unchanged. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/370 [1] Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges <[email protected]> --- security/selinux/ima.c | 35 ++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/ima.c b/security/selinux/ima.c index aa34da9b0aeb..3d81093d16aa 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ima.c +++ b/security/selinux/ima.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ */ #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <linux/ima.h> +#include <linux/seq_buf.h> #include "security.h" #include "ima.h" @@ -21,8 +22,9 @@ static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void) { const char *on = "=1;", *off = "=0;"; + struct seq_buf s; char *buf; - int buf_len, len, i, rc; + int buf_len, len, i; buf_len = strlen("initialized=0;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=0;") + 1; @@ -34,33 +36,24 @@ static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void) if (!buf) return NULL; - rc = strscpy(buf, "initialized", buf_len); - WARN_ON(rc < 0); + seq_buf_init(&s, buf, buf_len); - rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_initialized() ? on : off, buf_len); - WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len); + seq_buf_puts(&s, "initialized"); + seq_buf_puts(&s, selinux_initialized() ? on : off); - rc = strlcat(buf, "enforcing", buf_len); - WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len); + seq_buf_puts(&s, "enforcing"); + seq_buf_puts(&s, enforcing_enabled() ? on : off); - rc = strlcat(buf, enforcing_enabled() ? on : off, buf_len); - WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len); - - rc = strlcat(buf, "checkreqprot", buf_len); - WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len); - - rc = strlcat(buf, checkreqprot_get() ? on : off, buf_len); - WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len); + seq_buf_puts(&s, "checkreqprot"); + seq_buf_puts(&s, checkreqprot_get() ? on : off); for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; i++) { - rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_policycap_names[i], buf_len); - WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len); - - rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_state.policycap[i] ? on : off, - buf_len); - WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len); + seq_buf_puts(&s, selinux_policycap_names[i]); + seq_buf_puts(&s, selinux_state.policycap[i] ? on : off); } + WARN_ON(seq_buf_has_overflowed(&s)); + return buf; } -- 2.47.3

