On 3/25/21 10:51 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 3/25/21 8:31 AM, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> On 3/25/21 9:58 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:
>>>> +static int __init mem_encrypt_snp_init(void)
>>>> +{
>>>> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
>>>> + return 1;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (rmptable_init()) {
>>>> + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
>>>> + return 1;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + static_branch_enable(&snp_enable_key);
>>>> +
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +}
>>> Could you explain a bit why 'snp_enable_key' is needed in addition to
>>> X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP?
>>
>> The X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP indicates that hardware supports the feature --
>> this does not necessary means that SEV-SNP is enabled in the host.
> I think you're confusing the CPUID bit that initially populates
> X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP with the X86_FEATURE bit. We clear X86_FEATURE bits
> all the time for features that the kernel turns off, even while the
> hardware supports it.
Ah, yes I was getting mixed up. I will see if we can remove the
snp_key_enabled and use the feature check.
> Look at what we do in init_ia32_feat_ctl() for SGX, for instance. We
> then go on to use X86_FEATURE_SGX at runtime to see if SGX was disabled,
> even though the hardware supports it.
>
>>> For a lot of features, we just use cpu_feature_enabled(), which does
>>> both compile-time and static_cpu_has(). This whole series seems to lack
>>> compile-time disables for the code that it adds, like the code it adds
>>> to arch/x86/mm/fault.c or even mm/memory.c.
>> Noted, I will add the #ifdef to make sure that its compiled out when
>> the config does not have the AMD_MEM_ENCRYPTION enabled.
> IS_ENABLED() tends to be nicer for these things.
>
> Even better is if you coordinate these with your X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP
> checks. Then, put X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP in disabled-features.h, and you
> can use cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP) as both a
> (statically-patched) runtime *AND* compile-time check without an
> explicit #ifdefs.
I will try improve this in v2 and will try IS_ENABLED().
