So would it be fair say this is sort of like using a smartcard in that you need both possession of the token and knowledge of a PIN? And that the KDC guards the PIN against brute force guessing, because each guess requires a transaction against the KDC? So stealing the token gets the attacker nothing? ________________________________________________ Kerberos mailing list [email protected] https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos
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